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A Note from the Editors
Florian Kohstall, Carola Richter, Sarhan Dhouib and Fatima Kastner
On 17 June 2017, Egypt’s Ministry of Education announced its decision to
remove references to “the revolutions of 25 January 2011 and 30 June
2013” from schoolbooks. This decision came in response to the major
controversy that had emerged over a question in the general high school
exam of Egypt’s thanawiyya amma: “How would things be if (Abdel Fat-
tah) Al-Sisi had not given the June 30th speech?”. Whereas the 25 January
2011 marked the start of the uprisings against President Hosni Mubarak,
mass demonstrations on 30 June 2013 against the elected President Mo-
hammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood paved the way for his ousting
through the military and the later election of President Al-Sisi. While sev-
eral parliamentarians and education experts, pointing to the importance of
understanding both uprisings, opposed the education minister’s decision,
those responsible for teaching in the classroom — educators — might
have welcomed the decision that relieved them of having to teach two of
the most controversial events in recent Egyptian history. The controversy
that erupted suggests that it may be too early to open the debate in the
classroom and underscores the difference in perceptions within and be-
yond Egypt regarding the uprisings and their limitations.
As early as at the first conference of the newly established Arab Ger-
man Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities (AGYA) in October
2013, a “transformation” working group was established. It was widely
recognized by all AGYA members, regardless of their disciplinary back-
ground, that the consequences of the popular uprisings that had affected
various Arab countries since 2010 would be a key aspect of exchange and
activities within the recently created Academy consisting of 25 Middle
Eastern and North African scholars and 25 German scholars. Addressing
transformation issues was considered to be just as important as addressing
those associated with education, energy and the environment, cultural her-
itage, health and innovation — each of which were the focus of other
working groups. This notwithstanding, the term “transformation” became
subject to considerable debate within the working group. Discussions in-
volving what we expected to be a quick look at the core countries of the
1
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uprisings in the MENA region (i.e., Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and
Syria) evoked mixed feelings on how to approach the uprisings and their
consequences. Would transformation apply primarily to changes in the
Middle East and North Africa, thus eclipsing important developments in
Germany and Europe? Would we focus on political developments exclu-
sively or include the legal, social, cultural and economic aspects of the de-
velopments? And how would we address the issue of transformation as
both a historical development and normative aspiration? In other words,
how might an exploration of transformation enable a deeper understanding
of events from a historical perspective while, at the same time, foster the
pursuit of such change from one stage to the next?
This publication is not about transformation itself. It focuses rather on
how the uprisings have affected and to what extent they have transformed
the field of academia — which includes a variety of academic disciplines
such as political science, Arabic studies, communication studies, philoso-
phy, socio-legal studies, computer sciences and archaeology. The contribu-
tions featured here present a unique opportunity to foster open dialogue —
across disciplines and cultures — on the recent transformations underway
in Arab countries and how these transformations interact with changes in
other parts of the world. Each author brings his or her specific disciplinary
background and geographic origin but also unique personal experience to
this dialogue. As individuals, the authors represent different perspectives
in terms of observation and engagement, empathy and distance, sympathy
and skepticism. While the 2010/11 uprisings in Arab countries are our fo-
cus, we nevertheless aim to contextualize these events and their develop-
ments within the variety of academic disciplines featured. Rather than
viewing “Arab countries” as objects of study in themselves, we see them
as already changing cultures within the context of broader global trends.
Indeed, we claim that many of the developments underway in the region at
once reflect and accelerate extant global trends. From our transcultural
perspective, ideas, norms and concepts do not travel linearly and in one di-
rection, but are rather diffused in a context of mutual exchange. Thus, the
transformations of academic disciplines we emphasize here should also be
seen in the light of long-term changes that are not bound to one region.
Indeed, “Academia in Transformation” became the terrain upon which
scholars from various disciplines and geographical and cultural back-
grounds debated their positions and reflected upon their own work and
that of their colleagues.
Florian Kohstall, Carola Richter, Sarhan Dhouib and Fatima Kastner
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During several meetings, and amid the presence of the renowned
Tunisian scholar Amal Grami and the German legal philosopher Hans Jörg
Sandkühler, we developed a deeper understanding of each discipline’s
dominant and marginalized debates, the research carried out by each
working group member and, sometimes, the impact of personal biogra-
phies on research and knowledge production. During this exchange, we
explored each discipline’s explicit and implicit assumptions and the tools
they work with. The exchange also helped us reflect on the spectrum of
positionalities held by each contributor during the Arab uprisings and how
these positionalities affect our research foci. The perspective of those of us
who were directly subject to the violence and emotional rollercoaster of
the political turmoil was different from those who observed the events
from a distance. Each contributor has emphasized the importance of dis-
tance in being able to reflect on the events of 2010 and 2011 as well as the
significance of personal engagement and empathy in shaping individual
perceptions.
The present volume features nine contributions from scholars of differ-
ent disciplinary backgrounds who explore the ways in which the Arab up-
rising entered their discipline’s discourse and molded the relations of pow-
er within the discipline. Contributors addressed this common theme in
terms of an open-ended question, because the extent to which political and
social events taking place at a critical historical juncture will have a last-
ing effect on a given academic discipline is unclear. And for those events
that do leave a lasting mark, the nature of their impact differs from disci-
pline to discipline. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or the terrorist at-
tacks of September 2001 are widely seen as epochal marker events. In the
context of the Arab uprisings, Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouaz-
izi’s act of self-immolation in December 2010 and the Tahrir square
protests that began just one month later mark points of departure for de-
velopments that cannot be reduced to a single date.
The shared observations reflected in the various contributions presented
here are the product of our long, often intense, discussions and our writing
exercises. One theme found in all the contributions is that the Arab upris-
ings urged scholars in the Middle East and Europe alike to revisit their an-
alytical frameworks and theoretical approaches. This is apparent in Florian
Kohstall’s contribution, in which he argues that the uprisings prompted us
to concern ourselves less with regime change — the traditional focus of
democratization theories — and look instead for evidence of continuity
and change with respect to the uprisings. Such an approach also calls for
1 A Note from the Editors
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new forms of cooperation between the different sites of knowledge pro-
duction in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Similar shifts are
also observable in the discipline of communication studies. Most scholars
in the field, when focusing on the Middle East, emphasize the role played
by new media and its political impact, but when examining the media in
the West and other world regions, concentrate on daily events instead.
Carola Richter and Hanan Badr provide a thorough review of foreign and
local scholarly communications literature, thus shedding light on the often
obscured complexity of media reality in the Middle East.
Two further contributions also explore concepts, norms and ideas that
are being revisited but not fundamentally rethought as a result of the Arab
uprisings. In her contribution, Fatima Kastner examines the extent to
which political transitions initiated thus far in post-uprising Arab countries
have affected the socio-legal discourse on transitional justice. After pre-
senting the crucial steps of developments that have shaped today’s under-
standing of the normative concept of transitional justice, her article illus-
trates some alterations that do in fact result from the transitions experi-
enced in some Arab countries, which might have the potential to serve as
innovative sources for future attempts at transitional justice. In their con-
tribution, computer scientists Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi present how
the Arab uprisings accentuated the shift in and rebalancing of the use of
technology, particularly in terms of circumventing government control of
internet access and content. As they demonstrate, the uprisings may not
have affected the discourse on technological development and innovation,
but they have provided an opportunity to subject certain assumptions to a
real-world test.
Other contributions show that in the context of the Arab uprisings, we
see an increased focus on daily life and micro-level analyses — which
mark turning points in the respective disciplines. Barbara Winckler and
Christian Junge’s examination of Arabic literary studies and revolutionary
forms of expression makes the case that the emphasis on everyday lan-
guage celebrates a revival of Arabic. This requires not only new and inno-
vative teaching methods, but also new formats for research cooperation
that build on, emphasize and convey new materials, ranging from wall
paintings to revolutionary and anti-revolutionary songs. Similarly, Bilal
Orfali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami examine the content and methods
of teaching Arabic as a foreign language in Beirut. They point to the fact
that even countries like Lebanon, which have remained in the shadow of
the uprisings, are recasting their Arabic language curriculum. As a recent
Florian Kohstall, Carola Richter, Sarhan Dhouib and Fatima Kastner
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target country for students of Arabic, the country and its universities have
become learning hubs and sites of critical reflection for students and social
scientists. Academic life in other countries mired in war and conflict has
been subject to utter destruction. In his contribution, Ammar Abdulrahman
documents how archaeological research and the protection of cultural her-
itage sites in Syria have collapsed under the destruction of war. And while
protecting Syria’s cultural heritage has become an issue taken up by the
international community, local archaeologists and those otherwise tasked
with protecting such sites have either been forced to flee or risk losing
their lives.
While the uprisings have had an impact on the use of analytical frame-
works, materials used and teaching methods applied, they have also
prompted many to reflect on the changing relations within the scholarly
community. Two of our contributions provide personal accounts of how
transformations underway in academia have affected the personal experi-
ence of individual scholars. Jan Claudius Völkel charts the manifold
changes in student–professor relationships and classrooms that he wit-
nessed while teaching political science at Cairo University in Egypt be-
fore, during and after the uprisings. Drawing comparisons to his experi-
ence as an instructor in Germany, he underscores the tragedy of Egyptian
students and professors with great potential who suddenly suffer a new cy-
cle of censorship and restrictions. The importance of transformative learn-
ing and transcultural exchange are also emphasized in Sarhan Dhouib’s
contribution, which highlights the value of philosophy in navigating the
shift from an authoritarian to a post-authoritarian context. This involves
engaging in a dual critique that acknowledges and explores the cultural
features of authoritarian contexts in the Arab world while also questioning
perceptions of the “other” in the West as essential to facilitating transfor-
mation.
Most contributors to this volume emphasize in one way or another the
shifting positions of domestic and foreign scholars in the disciplines fea-
tured here as well as the hierarchy of knowledge production in Arab and
Western institutions. Of course, boundaries have blurred as a result of
scholars’ increasing mobility and the emergence of technologies enabling
interaction across vast geographical distances. We remain unsurprised by
the fact that knowledge production on the Middle East and North Africa
continues to be shaped by Western universities, research institutes and
think tanks. Yet it is astonishing that this continues to be the case in peri-
ods of rapid change when local scholarship is clearly in a better position to
1 A Note from the Editors
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provide critical insights into events as they unfold. Foreign scholars have
drawn criticism for what has been decried as “sightseeing the Middle
East” in times of revolution. The authors of this volume argue that local
scholars, who often work in an unsafe environment, must be afforded due
respect if the disciplines featured here are to be advanced.
The themes addressed in this publication — reflecting on dominant the-
oretical approaches, interests in micro-analysis and the relationship be-
tween foreign and local knowledge production — must be linked to the
changing conditions for conducting research in the countries focused on.
The uprisings did not precipitate a sustained improvement in research con-
ditions in loosened political and social environments. Instead, after a short
period of opened access to archives and reconsiderations of dominant the-
oretical approaches, the windows of opportunity have since been quickly
shut down again by the return of the security state. This is true even in
Tunisia, where social science research can once again be subject to politi-
cal constraints.
The contributions to this publication draw on a range of forms, from
traditional academic approaches to personal observations to essayistic
variations on the common themes. They thus reflect both the transforma-
tions we describe and those we are undergoing. Our conclusions are tenta-
tive as they are reached in a specific moment and shaped by the specifics
of our individual and communal experience(s) that are linked to our pro-
fessional positions, our proximity to the events in a given country and our
personal backgrounds vis-à-vis the societies we study. The scholars of this
volume share “des regards croisées”, different perspectives that interact
with each other. While the writing of some of our German authors is in-
formed by their long-term residency in an Arab country, authors with ori-
gins in an Arab-speaking country have pursued a long-running academic
career in German or European universities. The publication also includes
contributions by “academics in exile” who look back on debates within a
specific discipline in their home country. Interweaving scholarly observa-
tions with the aim of giving expression to voices otherwise unheard, these
contributions resemble the work of what Tahar Ben Jelloun referred to as
the “public writer”.
It is our sincere hope that this book offers at least two added values. For
one, we aim to foster a broad-based effort to integrate the events of 2010
and 2011 and the subsequent developments in different Arab countries in-
to our respective disciplines which, by definition, share a universal voca-
tion. The region has been stigmatized for its presumed exceptionalism for
Florian Kohstall, Carola Richter, Sarhan Dhouib and Fatima Kastner
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far too long. Some scholars of the Middle East and North Africa have
claimed that 2011 marked an end to this presumed exceptionalism, as po-
litical apathy gave way to powerful political leadership. Seven years later,
the cruel reality on the ground in many countries across the region has
dimmed this optimism, demanding that we consolidate our knowledge
about these events and develop further our understanding of the macro-de-
bates, micro-processes and scientific traditions that abound. Questioning
dominant approaches, accounting for the intimate dynamics of daily life
and questioning the hierarchy in knowledge production are at the core of
the transcultural and multidisciplinary perspective we aim to promote.
Adopting such a stance involves acknowledging the universal importance
of the events of 2010/11. Indeed, the impact of the uprisings on specific
academic disciplines may have a longer reach than the uprisings’ social
and political effects, given the return of authoritarianism in countries such
as Egypt or the ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq.
A second added value involves leveraging the opportunities for aca-
demic cooperation that have been generated by the various transforma-
tions unleashed and rendered visible since the events of 2010 and 2011.
We are strong advocates of the need to strengthen and advance coopera-
tion across disciplines and institutional and national boundaries. The con-
tributions presented here illustrate the extent to which we depend on de-
tailed observations of unfolding events as well as transcultural perspec-
tives which juxtapose observations from the field against scholarly debates
on the region. As Hans Jörg Sandkühler argues, this transcultural perspec-
tive is essential to recognizing the plurality of different cultures of knowl-
edge and framing questions within their temporal and regional contexts,
which represents a form of human freedom. Ultimately, this perspective
requires a willingness to debate and the space to carry out debate. But this
space is too often constrained by restrictions that are placed on academic
freedoms as well as de facto power relations that are present in different
funding schemes and instruments of cooperation. Whereas these instru-
ments should have the potential to foster a transcultural perspective, they
often reproduce current power relations, which limits opportunities for de-
bate. Different forms and instruments of cooperation must be part of the
debate and should ultimately be conceived by those who animate the de-
bate. AGYA is one of many initiatives and forms of cooperation that has
the potential to contribute directly to this debate. This volume represents a
first step in forging a way forward.
1 A Note from the Editors
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Introduction: Academia in Transformation —
Testing the Paradigms of New Knowledge
Amal Grami
The Arab uprisings created a window of change and transformation, thus
becoming an event with considerable intellectual as well as political im-
pact. Eventually, they succeeded in changing researchers’ perceptions of
the “Arab world”, leading to the development of alternative forms of
knowledge and challenges to the dominant Western systems of representa-
tion. People in Arab countries are today no longer considered to be vulner-
able “docile citizens” or “resilient bodies” unwilling and/or unable to chal-
lenge the status quo and their authoritarian rulers. Scholars from the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA) region are for the most part no longer
represented as silent, passive and incapable of resolving conflicts regard-
ing the relationship between power, knowledge, action and thought.
Hence, the Arab uprisings had a deep impact not only on societies in
the MENA region, but also on academic disciplines in European and Arab
countries, and scientific relations between them. Emerging post-Arab up-
rising paradigms have brought about changes in the perception and evalu-
ation of institutions, with universities being no exception to this trend.
Since the outbreak of the uprisings, scholars from a variety of disciplines
have demonstrated renewed interest in protest, contestation and cultural
forms of expression and discourse. There have been attempts to under-
stand how the “disciplined society” became aware of its rights and staked
a claim to political and economic change. For such scholars, the dominant
question was how to theorize political, social and cultural change in soci-
etal contexts that have often been viewed by the West as stagnant and hos-
tile to progressive politics.
In fact, academic literature on the Arab uprisings has proved that trans-
formations, regardless of their rapidity and whether they are ongoing, con-
tinuous or structural, superficial or complex, visible or invisible, are of
great importance to a large number of scholars and analysts who believe
that the process of transformation is a vital topic to study. The academic
community has thus begun to interpret actions in the region and analyze
the new realities. While some scholars have continued to work on tradi-
2
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tional issues, showing little or no interest in questions raised by non-aca-
demics, other Middle Eastern studies, Islamic studies and international-re-
lations scholars have imported analytical tools that have previously been
applied to other regions of the world, such as Latin America, Europe,
Eastern Europe and East Asia.
Indeed, we have witnessed a proliferation of academic articles, univer-
sity seminars and conferences devoted to exploring the nature and con-
tours of political and social transformation. However, transformation with-
in the academic setting itself has remained largely hidden and marginal-
ized as a subject of study. This prevailing state of blindness has motivated
some scholars to focus on various aspects of transformation in the aca-
demic milieu. Some believe it is important to develop new modes of in-
quiry and forms of knowledge able to help them understand this new his-
torical conjuncture and the nature of transformation. This group of
scholars’ preliminary focus has been on paradigms and concepts, analyti-
cal tools, methodologies, theories, narratives and perspectives. Some have
attempted to criticize Western misinterpretations of the rest of the world,
along with the respective academic discipline.
The members of the Transformation Working Group at the Arab-Ger-
man Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities (AGYA) have attempt-
ed to improve their understanding of issues related to transformation in
post-Arab uprising societies by taking a transcultural perspective. This
book is one of the results of the working group’s attempts to grasp the
complexities that arise from these issues. Over a period of months, mem-
bers of the working group reflected on how ideas, norms and concepts are
diffused in a context of mutual exchange, and how scientific relations be-
tween Europe and the Arab world can be improved. There is evidently a
shift underway to a focus on understanding the meaning of what others
“communicate concerning values, ideals, feelings, moral decisions, and
such concepts as freedom, justice, love, labor, autonomy, commitment and
democracy” (Mezirow 2003 a: 204).
Coming from a wide range of disciplines, from Arab countries as well
as from Germany, the contributors to this volume have sought to reflect
together on current challenges. On the one hand, this combination of dif-
ferent disciplines and their respective research objects, methods and over-
arching theories has provided an excellent foundation for transdisciplinary
work. However, we should note that this discussion forum has also led to
confrontation and compromises. The participating scholars have started to
learn how to think differently, while becoming more self-critical. Their
Amal Grami
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goal has been to address major issues confronting today’s societies, while
simultaneously thinking critically about how best to construct a form of
collaborative knowledge. Through both theoretical observations and per-
sonal experiences the key objective of the interdisciplinary group has been
to demonstrate that the organization of knowledge has changed, not only
in countries affected by the so-called Arab Spring, but also in Europe, the
United States and Asia.
Overview of articles
The book includes 9 articles that build on and communicate with one an-
other and present a general reflection at the end. In his article “Middle
East Studies and Academic Cooperation in the Wake of the Arab Upri-
sings”, Florian Kohstall sheds light on the field of Middle East studies, a
very interesting area. Since 2010, as coordinator for research and teaching
programs at the Freie Universität Berlin’s Cairo office, he has engaged
critically with a number of issues such as “inequalities, especially between
researchers working on the ground and those observing the events from
the outside”. Positioning himself simultaneously as a witness, observer
and scholar, Kohstall describes “the role of students and professors in
Egypt’s uprising”, along with that of other new actors. In addition, he criti-
cizes various concepts and theoretical tools, and highlights new paradigms
used to analyze transformation processes.
While seriousness is presented in academia as the normative standard of
all critical thinking and writing in the humanities, Kohstall in contrast ar-
gues that expressing one’s emotions (empathy, joy, fear, discomfort or dis-
orientation, for example) during the Arab uprisings was a “liberating expe-
rience”. After analyzing cases of transformation, Kohstall “suggests new
avenues for cooperation and proposes employing a more comparative ap-
proach in the further development of the field of Middle East studies”.
In his article “Political Science in Egypt: Talkin’ Bout a Revolution”,
Jan Claudius Völkel explores the conditions for researchers teaching polit-
ical science or social sciences under authoritarian regimes in the Arab
world, and particularly in Egypt. He points out that if “political science in
Germany is to a substantial extent understood as ‘democracy science’”,
this field of research is “dangerous” and represents a risk in other coun-
tries. In fact, many scholars in the Arab world remain under state control
and suffer under a lack of academic freedom. Although they participated
2 Introduction: Academia in Transformation
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in the transition process and engaged in critical teaching and research,
such scholars are no longer able to contribute to forming democratic soci-
eties. According to Völkel, “the current developments in Egypt represent a
missed chance to develop political science further into a meaningful disci-
pline that would not only prepare students for the job market, but also con-
tribute to improving the overall quality of Egypt’s academic landscape”.
Despite such challenges, the “exchange of faculty and students through
workshops and conferences [has] helped trigger fresh ideas about modern
teaching methodologies”. There is no doubt that scholars and students
alike will struggle to establish a new environment in which academic free-
dom is respected. We should bear in mind that one of the rights people
ought to seek is the right to knowledge, as this is essential to democratic
citizenship.
In their article “Opening Up the Text. Arabic Literary Studies on the
Move”, Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge highlight the relationship
between art and literature in times of political and social transformation.
They demonstrate how Arab writers revisited the societal roles of art and
literature in a time of political upheaval. Additionally, Winckler and Junge
discuss the involvement of Arab literature scholars in teaching “new text
forms (e.g., blogs, graffiti and slogans) and explor[ing] their sociopolitical
conditions and the socio-cultural practices of writing”. Winckler and
Junge further show how writers and scholars have been involved in “the
unleashed creativity of the uprisings”. While scholars in the West often ne-
glect “research conducted at universities in the Arab world, particularly if
published in Arabic or by an Arab publisher...and exclude Arab scholars in
the region from contributing to internationally acknowledged knowledge
production”, the authors note that new initiatives and programs promoting
the exchange of perspectives and experiences between scholars from uni-
versities in Germany and in the Arab world are being implemented today.
The Arabic language is, as a consequence, increasingly being practiced as
a living language of knowledge production and academic communication.
In consideration of the situation of Syrian refugees, Winckler and Junge
suggest that “to study Arabic literature at German universities, selected
seminars and lectures should be conducted in Arabic. As a positive side
effect, this would also improve the language skills of other students of
Arabic”. Moreover, Winckler and Junge think that it is urgent to encour-
age Syrian “authors to gain more visibility and improve their reputations
within the German cultural sphere”. In this regard, activism and academia
can be combined in a creative process of writing symbiosis, creating the
Amal Grami
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possibility of collaborations that facilitate the development of new skills,
and helping to introduce different understandings of literacy.
In their article “An Uprising in Teaching Arabic Language”, Bilal Or-
fali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami draw from the field of education to
explore another case of transformation involving language, thinking here
in terms of “transformative pedagogy”. They describe the motivations of
students traveling to the Middle East today, who show an interest “both in
the events surrounding them as well as in the ongoing transformations, not
only of political regimes but also of the surrounding culture and values”.
Aware that Arabic has become a language of change, protest and revolu-
tion, Orfali, Siblini and Houssami discuss recent developments in teaching
the Arabic language from different perspectives (exposing students to the
language by having them listen to native speakers, participate in commu-
nity social work, attend clubs focusing on Arab culture or listen to folk
music, for example). These scholars focus on new teaching techniques
created by a Lebanese institute that teaches the Arabic language, including
colloquial speech, to foreign students. According to Orfali, Siblini and
Houssami, the “Summer Arabic Program already provides some models
that can be emulated and developed further when dealing with the refugee
crisis in various Arab states and in Europe”.
In her article “Justice in Transformation: Rethinking Theory and Prac-
tice of the Global Transitional Justice Model”, Fatima Kastner analyzes
the socio-legal studies discourse on transitional justice, focusing on the
evolution of the global transitional justice model. After studying the emer-
gence of several related concepts and discussing different ways of under-
standing them, Kastner analyzes the complex factors involved when gov-
ernments attempt to develop and promote lasting periods of peace, or sus-
tain processes of democratization and reconciliation in post-uprising soci-
eties. It is clear that resolving crisis situations requires critical decisions
that balance the conflicting claims of established systems and possible fu-
ture outcomes. Kastner highlights the changes arising from the “Arab
Spring” transitions, such as “the demand to include economic and finan-
cial crimes within the liberal normative concept of transitional justice”.
She argues that “there is a strong demand to widen the present liberal un-
derstanding of transitional justice both in the direction of local notions of
justice and toward economic accountability”. Her article argues that in-
stead of maintaining its precarious critical role, the humanities should be-
come a creative laboratory for future forms of intellectual labor. There is
no doubt that the passage from authoritarianism to a new order of society
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will take time, and push scholars to rethink the processes of reconciliation,
democratization and the establishment of the rule of law.
In his article “Philosophy in Transition — Philosophy of Transition”,
Sarhan Dhouib compares the role of philosophy in an authoritarian state to
its transformative role in a post-revolutionary context. Dhouib takes the
reader through a transcultural philosophizing approach, in which he — as
an observer, witness and actor — narrates transformation from personal
experience in both Tunisia and Germany. Despite the lack of academic
freedom under the Ben Ali regime, some philosophers were involved in
combating “cultural and intellectual poverty” and in building “intercultur-
al and interdisciplinary dialog”. Convinced that the Arab uprisings radical-
ly defined new ways of existing in the world, Dhouib writes that discus-
sion, debates and seminars have since served as mini-democracies, and
that professors and students alike have been involved in the creation of a
learning society. After analyzing the relationship between philosophy, hu-
man rights and democracy, Dhouib moves toward rethinking the aims of
higher education as a community of rational and democratic discourse,
within which democracy is learned and practiced. Focusing on “a (self-)
critical look at academic life in Europe and Germany, particularly with re-
gard to the issues of equality of opportunity and support for young tal-
ents”, Dhouib acknowledges the advantage of “German–Arab networks”.
For him, “German–Arab exchange in times of political transformation not
only enables us to think through questions of human rights, experiences
with injustice and the culture of remembrance from a dual perspective,
and to advance the idea of a transcultural philosophy. It also serves to dis-
mantle prejudices and blinders”.
Drawing on Jack Mezirow’s descriptions of new forms of knowledge,
in which transformative learning is “the process by which we transform
our taken-for-granted frames of reference (meaning perspectives, habits of
mind, mind-sets) to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, emo-
tionally capable of change, and reflective so that they may generate beliefs
and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action”
(Mezirow 2003 b: 58 f.), we can say that Dhouib defends the idea that phi-
losophy is a “school of freedom”. For him, university is creating new op-
portunities and spaces for discourse among young scholars. In addition,
the role of professors is to attempt to create a community of critical rea-
soning, critical reflection, and free and critical conversations. Such “decol-
onized” universities would not only teach democracy and human rights as
subjects of study, but also teach democratically and, in the process, create
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and support a democratic society. In this sense, higher education would it-
self become a learning society.
The article by Carola Richter and Hanan Badr, “Communication Stu-
dies in Transformation — Self-Reflections on an Evolving Discipline in Ti-
mes of Change”, deals with the transformation of the scientific knowledge
produced in communication studies of post-Arab uprising media. By re-
flecting on the phenomenon of mediatization, Richter and Badr show how
scholars “shift their focus from the mass consumption of media to individ-
ualized forms of media production and use”. The authors criticize the
methodologies and concepts used by many communication studies
scholars as tools for understanding the Arab uprisings. In fact, “scholars
referred to the events in the Arab countries as long as they seemed to sup-
port particular favored academic approaches, but stopped doing so as soon
as their concepts proved no longer able to encompass the complexities of
the interactions between the region’s media, society and processes of
transformation”. Like Winckler and Junge, Richter and Badr hold that
“scientific knowledge generated in Arabic remains largely unknown and
disconnected from international research”. From their point of view, it is
urgent “to focus less on technology and more on people-centered analyses
of media practices”.
Drawing on the widespread observation that the Arab uprisings were
characterized by the strong use of social media tools and familiar internet
platforms, Tobias Amft’s and Kalman Graffi’s article, “Webs of Change?
The Transformation of Online Social Networks and Communication Infra-
structures from a Technological Point of View”, examines the impact of
the Arab uprisings on academic thinking in the field of computer science,
especially with regard to topics such as privacy, anonymity and security in
networking and communications. After discussing “the technological
weaknesses that allow these networks to be spied on, censored and
blocked, thus hindering the dissemination of information”, Amft and Graf-
fi present practical solutions for combating surveillance and censorship,
such as encryption and proxy-based routing. These “solutions originate
from the computer science subject areas of security and dependability” as
well as “operating, communication, database and distributed systems”.
Despite some regimes’ attempts to block information and punish activists,
Amft and Graffi affirm that “new forms of secure communication will be
developed. In the end, information will flow”.
In his article “The Damage Done: the ‘Arab Spring’, Cultural Heritage
and Archaeologists at Risk”, Ammar Abdulrahman takes an archaeolo-
2 Introduction: Academia in Transformation
25
gist’s point of view in highlighting the challenges his field faces with re-
gard to safeguarding valuable historical artifacts particularly in Syria, but
also in Iraq and Egypt. Artifact trafficking is also flourishing in Libya,
Yemen and Tunisia, he notes. In this war against cultural memory, orga-
nized networks take advantage of the lack of law enforcement and surveil-
lance in broad areas to buy and sell valuable antiquities, with “most of the
artifacts illicitly traded find[ing] their way into markets in European and
other Western countries”. Despite the dangers of the current environment,
archaeologists are still working to preserve and restore monuments that
have been damaged in the Syrian conflict. In addition to his account of the
situation in Syria, Abdulrahman describes the efforts of many local actors
and international organizations to raise awareness regarding the value of
this cultural heritage, as well as to combat the illegal trafficking of arti-
facts. Abdulrahman believes that responsibility implies knowledge as well
as action. In order to move forward, he calls for greater efforts both from
those within and outside the academy. Abdulrahman suggests that “Syrian
archaeologists currently living abroad can support students of archaeology
inside Syria through their scientific networks and thereby help establish
the next generation of experts. In addition, networks of local and foreign
experts must be maintained”. The reason to promote greater involvement,
according to Abdulrahman, is that “Syrian cultural heritage is much more
than a local issue; as a global matter, it concerns all of humanity”.
In sum, this book marks a new trajectory for studying the Middle East.
It offers a theoretical discourse that can be transformed into research and
action with regard to academic liberties and the preservation of cultural
heritage in conflict zones. By tackling the question of how cultural
paradigms influence changes within academia, and by demonstrating “col-
lective engagement”, the volume’s contributors are in fact developing
ways of confronting problems from multiple directions rather than com-
partmentalizing knowledge. From their point of view, transformation, or
this act of unveiling the reality behind culturally influenced academic dis-
courses, is an ongoing, never-ending and dynamic process. By presenting
various examples of researcher mobility and connectivity, as well as col-
laboration between scholars living in Europe and the Arab world, the
members of AGYA and their co-authors aim to explore the contemporary
configurations of knowledge, culture and connection that come about
through researchers’ cross-border movements. Indeed, AGYA’s re-
searchers have been interacting with such productive intensity that they
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themselves have had a transformative effect on the scholars around them,
and even on their broader academic disciplines.
Finally, it is clear that transformation as described in this book can be
regarded as a creative environment rather than a destructive one. Scholars
are sharing knowledge and ideas through a process of cultural exchange
and agency. Most importantly, for all those writing here, the goal is not
simply to interrogate knowledge, but rather to experience it first hand,
learning how to produce ruptures and negotiate and overcome barriers.
The experience of composing this book has enabled the creation of places
and spaces of knowledge production, while also creating new solidarity
and collaborative relationships among AGYA members. Alongside the
transformations of identity, memory, awareness and other modes of con-
sciousness, a new “transnational imagination” is emerging. Indeed, it is
evident that an emancipatory transformation is taking place within
academia. The strengths of this book, with its focus on “Academia in
Transformation”, are numerous. The contributors revise structures of
meaning; think through new kinds of research methodologies and methods
in a way which is attentive to their ontological and epistemological an-
chors, and explore options for new roles, relationships and actions. How-
ever, the overarching hope is that each of the articles provides promise of
a better future within academia. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos rightfully
argues, “[t]here is no guarantee that a better world may be possible, nor
that all those who have not given up struggling for it conceive it in the
same way” (Santos, 2006: 52). If we lose sight of the possibility of new
ways of learning and producing knowledge, or of the fact that spaces can
be produced from an assemblage of linkages, experiences and practices
that are different from what might be visible today, then we become com-
plicit in silencing voices and eliminating alternative forms of existence
and opportunities for more democratic politics.
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Middle East Studies and Academic Cooperation in the Wake
of the Arab Uprisings
Florian Kohstall
“You are asking the wrong questions!” With this sentence, Jonas Lüscher
(2013) starts his debut novel Frühling der Barbaren (Spring of the Barbar-
ians), which describes a Swiss businessman’s trip to Tunisia. Initially
planning only to visit one of his subcontractors, the young, fortunate en-
trepreneur named Preising instead winds up traveling into the desert to at-
tend a wedding predominantly attended by British bankers at a lush holi-
day resort. While the bankers are partying in this artificial oasis, the
British pound collapses and England goes bankrupt. Overnight, the
bankers lose their jobs, and with their credit cards now blocked, they are
unable to even pay for their breakfasts. When the resort goes up in flames,
everyone tries to escape the chaos on their own. Lüscher’s novel is osten-
sibly about the financial crisis, but he skillfully interweaves his story with
themes drawn from the so-called Arab Spring. From the orientalist images
of camels and palm-tree gardens to the children working in the Tunisian
subcontractor’s company, from the side effects of mass tourism to the bru-
tal violence on Tahrir Square, the political present is portrayed in this nov-
el without ever being named.
The introductory sentence of Lüscher’s book repeats an often-reiterated
criticism of the field of Middle East studies in the wake of the Arab upris-
ings. Political scientists studying Arab countries are said to have missed
forecasting this major transformation because they had asked the wrong
questions. For decades they seem to have overemphasized the stability of
authoritarian regimes on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, thereby
overlooking the massing forces of mobilization that drove the uprisings.
And indeed, the ouster of two presidents-for-life, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, did take many in the discipline by
surprise. Middle East scholars followed the events in a manner similar to
Lüscher’s character Preising: as astonished observers in the middle of a




Within the discipline of Middle East studies, the Arab uprisings were
quickly recognized as a milestone event, comparable to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 or the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington in
2001. Such events dominate scholarly debate for years after taking place,
in no small measure because they occur so unexpectedly (Howard and
Walters 2014). At the annual conferences of the American Middle East
Studies Association (MESA) and the German Middle East Studies Associ-
ation for Contemporary Research and Documentation (DAVO) in both
2011 and 2012, most panels and presentations revolved around the so-
called Arab Spring. The conferences’ programs provide a good overview
of the hot topics in Middle East studies at that time. Scholars were strug-
gling with the appropriate terminology (e.g., revolt, revolution or regime
change), as well as with the development of new theoretical approaches
suitable for analyzing the events that started in Tunisia in December 2010
and subsequently affected most of the region’s countries.
It is necessary to refute the often made criticism that scholars should
have anticipated the events (Heydemann 2002; Gause 2011). But it is also
essential to admit that scholars sometimes find themselves in the position
of perplexed observers, able to do no more than record what they see with-
out necessarily being able to explain it. Lüscher’s book reminds us not on-
ly of the complexity of such events, but also of the pitfalls of narrating
them.
In this article, I will address two of the several major challenges politi-
cal scientists working on the Middle East today face due to the rebellions.
First, I argue that the uprisings provided us with new opportunities for re-
search. Scholars were able to identify new actors, revisit analytical frame-
works, and benefit from increased public attention on the field and addi-
tional research funding. This helped us explore new fields of inquiry (see
also Bank 2015; Catusse et al. 2015; Schwedler 2015). As a result, our fo-
cus moved beyond the so-called inter-paradigm debate on democratization
and autocracy, which primarily concentrated on regime change (Pace and
Cavatorta 2012). In a second step, I will address the constraints and chal-
lenges that hamper further development within the field of Middle East
studies. The uprisings not only provided scholars with an increase in pub-
lic attention and funding; they also brought a number of inequalities to the
forefront, especially between researchers working on the ground and those
observing the events from the outside. In conclusion, I will suggest new
avenues for cooperation and propose employing a more comparative ap-
proach in the further development of the field of Middle East studies.
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The observations in this article are largely based on my own research
trajectory. They are far from comprehensive, and reflect a rather selective
way of reading through the enormous amount of academic literature pro-
duced in the past five years.1 In addition, the article is based on observa-
tions from my personal experiences as coordinator for research and teach-
ing programs and director of the Cairo Office of Freie Universität Berlin
since 2010.
New trends in Middle East studies following the uprisings
Six years after the uprisings, it is very hard to recall the festive atmosphere
that reigned in Tunisia and Egypt after the departure of Ben Ali and
Mubarak. In Egypt, configurations of power very similar to those that de-
fined the Mubarak era have been reinstated. Tunisia, the first and probably
most pioneering of all “Arab Spring” countries, is still struggling to
achieve internal security and political stability. On a regional level, the rise
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Daesh) and the ongoing wars in
Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen continue to dominate headlines. Europe has
been deeply affected by an unprecedented arrival of refugees that is a di-
rect consequence of developments in the region. This obscures the initial
euphoria that accompanied the events in 2011, when Egypt’s long-term
President Hosni Mubarak, who had governed the country for 30 years, was
ousted by mass demonstrations.
Times of euphoria and self-reflection
Current events also risk overshadowing the crucial period of self-reflec-
tion we Middle East scholars lived through at that time. Many of us had
worked for decades to explain various features of authoritarian rule, such
as the use of violence, the co-optation of oppositional forces and the pres-
ence of electoral fraud. While not a pleasant experience, investigating the
numerous facets of authoritarian rule represented a very agnostic way of
analyzing political change. After the 1990 s, the expected worldwide ex-
pansion of democratic rule failed to reach the Middle East (while suffering
1 For a more comprehensive review of that literature, see (for example) Grimm 2015.
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major setbacks in other regions). When in 2010–2011, demonstrators fi-
nally overcame police cordons and dictators were forced to flee, many
scholars shared the joy of the protesters on Tahrir Square and elsewhere.
For me and many of my colleagues alike, the events of 2011 were a liber-
ating experience. Liberating because, despite their austere and sober ana-
lysis, most scholars were very empathic with the region they studied. They
had long hoped that living conditions for the region’s people would ulti-
mately improve. Liberating too because the region’s politics received con-
siderable attention due to the uprisings; Middle East scholars were fre-
quently asked by the media and by decision-makers to explain the course
of events (Anderson 2012). Research-funding organizations made new
calls for the transformation processes to be studied. This interest in the re-
gion opened up opportunities to engage in public debate and explore new
avenues of research.
Observing the field of Middle East studies before 2011, one might have
gotten the impression that authoritarianism was the only debate in town.
Along with the focus on the role of political Islam, the issue of authoritari-
an resilience had become one of the most dominant subjects of inquiry for
specialists in the region. The inter-paradigm debate on democratization
and authoritarianism served as a point of reference for many prominent
fields of study, including examinations of public policy allocation, social
movements and local governance in the region. This often marginalized
other important developments and inhibited us from asking questions that
were also deserving of study, especially with regard to the unexpected up-
risings, but also with regard to ongoing transformations in the social and
economic spheres.
A look back at my own Ph.D. research, concluded in 2009, might illus-
trate the need to move beyond the debate on regime change: In this re-
search, I compared the university reform politics of two authoritarian
regimes. Taking Egypt and Morocco as examples, I concentrated on a spe-
cific policy sector and presented how both regimes negotiated with inter-
national donors and adopted different reform measures to internationalize
higher education. The thesis demonstrated that Morocco possessed greater
flexibility than Egypt with regard to the implementation of social reforms.
In Morocco, party pluralism and civil society were able to provide a filter
with which to channel social demands and implement reform policies
more effectively, while Mubarak’s dependence on single-party rule
through the National Democratic Party (NDP) limited the regime’s reform
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flexibility (Kohstall 2009). These were important findings for the upris-
ings that occurred later.
The question of why monarchies survived the “Arab Spring” reap-
peared prominently on the agenda after the uprising (Gause 2013). How-
ever, when I concluded my doctorate degree in 2009, I would not have
dared to predict that Egypt’s limited social reform flexibility would get
Mubarak into serious trouble one day, with Morocco sailing relatively
smoothly through the troubled waters of the uprisings. King Mohammed
VI was quickly able to silence the demands of the 20 February Movement,
Morocco’s umbrella protest organization, through the implementation of
another cycle of constitutional reforms. The dominant analytical current
on authoritarian resilience made it difficult to imagine any other outcome,
in particular a large-scale uprising. Consequently, my thesis concentrated
its main findings on variations of authoritarian governance and how differ-
ent regimes adjust to international and domestic pressure instead of outlin-
ing possible weaknesses in regime configuration. This illustrates how a set
frame of analysis can lead to the neglect of important developments.
While agnostic with regard to democratization, scholars also overempha-
sized the impossibility of change through a focus on authoritarian re-
silience.
A more diversified but unfinished research agenda
In the wake of the uprisings, many scholars turned their interests away
from Islamist movements and authoritarianism, previously the dominant
subjects of analysis. The uprisings presented a golden opportunity to ob-
serve history as it unfolded. This contributed to an important shift in the
discipline, from the study of authoritarianism to the study of new actors
and emerging institutional processes. On the streets, we were able to ob-
serve the pluralization of political protest movements, emerging social ac-
tors and political parties; in an analogous fashion, the field of Middle East
studies also experienced a moment of pluralization through its inquiry into
new and different research subjects. The role of new media, the negative
effects of economic policies on regime stability and the powerful mobili-
zation of various marginalized actors became particularly prominent re-
search subjects. None of these themes were completely new to the disci-
pline, but the way scholars now approached these questions differed great-
ly from the pre-uprisings era. I will illustrate this by focusing on just three
3 Middle East Studies and Academic Cooperation in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings
33
out of the many research trends that became very important after the
events in the region.
The first trend focused on explaining the dynamics of the uprisings,
with a particular focus on the idea of “politics from below”, an already es-
tablished research tradition that was now experiencing a comeback (Bayat
2013; see also Harders 2009). Scholars following this trend sought to
identify and categorize the different actors that played an important role in
the uprisings, such as workers, women, various religious groups and un-
employed graduates (Albrecht and Demmelhuber 2013). By tracing back
these different population groups’ activities, the scholars showed how
each had already acquired important protest experience, and how these
different protest cultures merged in the 2011 mass mobilization (El
Ghobashy 2011; Camau and Vairel 2015). My own contribution here fo-
cused on the role of students and professors in Egypt’s uprising. While in
my Ph.D. research I had considered members of this group to be marginal-
ized actors, I could now emphasize their fight for university autonomy un-
der Mubarak as a step toward mass mobilization. Once the protests started,
students and professors joined in large numbers, quickly launching
demonstrations on university campuses. Long confined by the regime to
being isolated pockets of protest, universities now became the avant-garde
in an uprising that included many sections of society (Kohstall 2013). This
highlights how the rebellions changed our perception and the way in
which we approached various actors. The uprisings made developments
visible that had remained hidden before.
A second trend, focused more on the issue of “politics from above”,
also benefited from developments after the uprisings. The Egyptian army,
which had long been off limits for researchers, suddenly became exposed
to critical public examination through the act of seizing power. This
opened new opportunities for intra- and interregional comparison of dif-
ferent “coup-proofing” strategies, and for the exploration of the confines
of civil and military regimes (Albrecht 2015). Another central actor whose
role had been long obscured by semi-legality now became exposed to a
new quality of investigation; Islamist movements and parties’ strategies
became clearer once they entered the electoral race without self-restraint
and gained power in Tunisia and Egypt. For a long time, scholars had de-
scribed the Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate movement (Rutherford
2006; Hamzawy 2005; Al Anani 2010). Now researchers could confront
the moderation hypothesis with Ennahda’s ruling practices in Tunisia and
Morsi’s presidency in Egypt (Roy 2012; Gerges 2013; Cavatorta 2013). In
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different political settings, they were able to observe how broadly un-
known political organizations operated within an existing political config-
uration. However, Morsi’s short presidency in Egypt probably illustrated
best that the moderation hypothesis was difficult to apply to a political set-
ting where all actors refused to set up a clear political framework.
To give a third example, researchers also rediscovered institutions such
as electoral processes and constitutional arrangements. In Egypt in 2011–
2012, elections were held in a relatively free and fair environment for the
first time. This in turn facilitated access to opinion polls and relatively vi-
able data on electoral turnout and results. Consequently, scholars could
now engage, at least cautiously, in electoral sociology, whereas before
they had mainly concentrated on “the menu of manipulation” of elections
under authoritarianism (Schedler 2002). Comparing constitutional change
and electoral processes in Tunisia and Egypt was not only instructive in
highlighting different paths of transformation, but was also a way to criti-
cally assess the literature on founding elections (Gervasio & Teti 2011;
Kohstall 2014). Founding elections had played an important role in transi-
tions from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Apply-
ing these findings to the Middle East now enabled scholars to add a new,
critical perspective to the study of this issue.
Summarizing these trends, I argue in accordance with André Bank
(2015) that the uprisings contributed to a more comparatively informed
study of Middle East politics. Scholars brought in fresh approaches from
the broader political science discipline that previously had been rather in-
frequently applied in Middle East studies. Studies on the mobilization of
diverse actors relied both on the literature on social movements (Allal &
Pierret 2013; Bennani Chraïbi & Fillieule 2012) and on comparisons with
other revolutionary experiences, such as those of 1848, 1968 and 1989
(Harders 2011; Stepan & Linz 2013; Wallerstein 2011; Weyland 2012).
What many characterized in the beginning as a “Facebook revolution”
subsequently attracted the attention of scholars not intimately familiar
with the region. But it also convinced specialists in the area to experiment
with new instruments. This contributed to the diversification of the re-
search agenda. Yet the debate over how to adjust the discipline to these
new research opportunities is still in full swing. Jilian Schwedler (2015)
criticizes the focus on regimes and social movements as dominant cat-
egories of analysis. Our obsession with comparison may lead to the ne-
glect of purely local dynamics of protest and repression, or of questions
such as how neo-liberal reforms shape politics on the local level. In a sim-
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ilar vein, Koen Bogaert (2013) argues that the Arab uprisings have to be
set in the context of the transformation of global capitalism during the past
30 years. Instead of asking whether a given regime is democratic or au-
thoritarian, it would be more relevant to investigate how authoritarian
practices have changed over the past decades he says.
Despite the promising new trends described above, it is evident that no
new research agenda has been forged so far. As the revolutionary experi-
ences in the various countries quickly developed along very different
paths, we do not share the privilege of our colleagues working on other ar-
eas, such as the transitologists who studied the transition from authoritari-
an rule in Latin America in the 1980 s using shared tools and a unified ap-
proach (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986). Similarly, Soviet-bloc
specialists were able to join in an analogous effort to study transformation
processes in Eastern Europe after 1989. By contrast, the Arab countries
experienced no domino effect. On the contrary, the uprisings resulted in
very different developments: from the negotiation of a new constitution in
Tunisia to the ouster of an elected president in Egypt; from the brutal re-
pression of demonstrations in Bahrain and Syria to foreign intervention in
Libya and Yemen. Rather than approaching these different developments
with a single set of theoretical tools, it appears crucial to emphasize their
very specific contexts.
Hence, many scholars tend to point out that the only common trends in
the region are the revival of the security state and increasing fragmentation
of the political order (POMEPS 2015; Perthes 2015). While these trends
are real, and while structuralist, non-culturalist explanations for the
longevity of authoritarian regimes in Arab countries remain valid (Kienle
2012), it is worthwhile remembering how much the region and the field of
Middle East studies have diversified. Even if more generalizable observa-
tions are necessary, micro-level developments should not be disregarded,
especially with regard to the interplay between change and continuity in
different sectors (Belakhdar et al. 2014; Rivetti 2015). This might, for ex-
ample, help us to understand better that the new wave of repression is not
simply a return to the old order, but that increasing mobilization has rather
been countered by a new and unprecedented spiral of violence. For Middle
East scholars, the uprisings were a wake-up call to study developments not
necessarily related to regime change. The major challenge ahead remains
one of better integrating our studies into the broader political science dis-
cipline, while still paying enough attention to local contexts. To do so,
scholars in the field will have to improve cooperation with both colleagues
Florian Kohstall
36
who are less familiar with the Middle East and with colleagues living and
researching in the countries we are observing.
Local versus foreign scholarship
Besides providing the opportunity to discover new actors and revisit ana-
lytical frames, the uprisings also cast a spotlight on another underexam-
ined issue — that of the hierarchy of scholars working on the region. This
question is not new; however, it gained attention as a consequence of the
uprisings. Scholars working in the region also benefited from the increase
in interest in the Middle East. At least in their early days, the events of
2011 opened up new opportunities to engage in debate and to provide the
discipline with fresh analysis. Local researchers were frequently asked by
the media, think tanks and international organizations to give their per-
spective on the events. They were partners in many newly established re-
search and cooperation projects, and they participated actively in the ad
hoc debate provided by newly created online publication platforms,
newsletters and expert talks. The question is whether this interest in the
viewpoints of local scholars have had a lasting effect on the discipline.
Have the questions raised by scholars working in the field been echoed in
the broader debate? Did increased cooperation with local scholars really
improve the conditions under which humanities and social sciences were
practiced in the countries affected by the uprisings?2
Academic knowledge production and activism
In September 2011, Mona Abaza, an internationally trained and renowned
sociologist, published an article on the newly established Jadaliyya plat-
form (which was founded in October 2010, but was catapulted to the fore-
front of critical debate on the Middle East thanks to the uprisings) entitled
“Academic Tourists Sightseeing the Arab Spring”. Concerned about the
“international academic division of labor”, she accused Western re-
searchers of exploiting the Arab uprisings as a sensational topic, and of us-
ing their Egyptian colleagues as mere service providers, or in Orientalist
2 For a similar concern about translocal cooperations, see also the contribution of
Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge in this volume.
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terms, as “les indigènes de service” (Abaza 2011). Abaza’s text provides
ample material for reflection on the role of local scholarship and its con-
straints. Her argument about an “international academic division of labor”
has to be carefully assessed, especially in the context of the Arab upris-
ings. Still, her distinction between “Western” and “local” scholars appears
to be a disturbing simplification in a time of internationalization marked
by the circulation of scholars and knowledge. Many Egyptian scholars
write from European and US universities and do not necessarily share the
conditions of colleagues working in academic institutions in the Middle
East. A distinction between those working on the ground and those ob-
serving developments from outside seems a much more appropriate way
to capture the balance of power regarding the production of knowledge on
the Arab uprisings.
Two tiny examples of international cooperation between local and for-
eign scholars, drawn from a much larger universe, may illustrate what has
been achieved and what still needs to be done in order to incorporate local
scholarship into international knowledge production better. In April 2011,
as a representative of the Freie Universität Berlin, I organized an interna-
tional conference entitled “From Revolution to Transformation” in con-
junction with the American University in Cairo. This symposium offered a
unique occasion for the comparison of the revolutionary events in Egypt in
2011 with those in East Germany in 1989. Many of the Egyptian scholars
we had invited presented first-hand accounts from Tahrir Square. Like
many other professors, they had participated in the protests against
Mubarak from the beginning. When they returned to their classrooms,
events were still fresh and ongoing. After Tahrir, universities quickly be-
came another site of the uprising. Many of those engaged in the protests
considered that after Mubarak’s removal, it was time to reform the univer-
sity system. This continuous engagement was strongly reflected in the aca-
demic presentations during the symposium. Scholars focused on the insti-
tutionalization of the Tahrir protest culture, the importance of different
groups (e.g., workers) in the uprising, and on concepts such as the “civil
state” as opposed to the military or religious state. Their analyses were ex-
tremely important in balancing some of the media commentary that had
framed the uprisings as a “Facebook revolution” and (over-) emphasized
the role of the young educated middle class in the protests.
Another series of events jointly organized by the Freie Universität
Berlin, Orient-Institut Beirut (OIB) and the German Academic Exchange
Service (DAAD) confirmed these observations. In the Cairo Talks on
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Transformation and Change (CTTC), a series of debates held between
April 2011 and February 2015, scholars discussed crucial aspects of
Egypt’s transformation process, from the constitutional amendments in
March 2014 to the state of the economy after the uprising.3 Each time, one
Egyptian and one German scholar opened the debate, each giving a 10 to
15-minute presentation. In most cases, the audience — composed of
Egyptian students and professors, as well as decision-makers and repre-
sentatives from European organizations present in Cairo — reacted most
directly to the Egyptian scholar’s talk. In their presentations the Egyptian
contributors focused on what had happened on the ground, while the Ger-
mans tended to take a somewhat distant observer’s perspective, centered
more on comparative and theoretical questions. The CTTC format was
very valuable in confronting these different perspectives. It illustrated the
high level of interest in a scholarly debate on the social, economic and po-
litical implications of the uprisings. Establishing CTTC as a forum for
academic debate only a short distance away from Cairo’s Tahrir Square
also meant providing scholars who had become activists (if they had not
already been so before) a “retreat” and time to reflect. Nevertheless, it also
reflected a broader challenge for the conduct of Middle East studies with
regard to the differing positions of those working on the ground and those
observing the events from a distance. In Cairo, first-hand accounts quickly
became the knowledge of the moment, while scholars observing the events
from outside often asked how they could insert these observations into es-
tablished analytical frames.
Local scholars and those based in the country provided the audience
with crucial knowledge on the rapidly unfolding events, thereby raising
new questions that remain of critical importance in the discipline’s further
development. Yet despite this important contribution to knowledge pro-
duction, the academic debate remains largely shaped by scholars observ-
ing events from the outside. Knowledge production on the Arab uprisings
in peer-reviewed journals is dominated by researchers working at US
think tanks and universities.4 They often observe the unfolding events
from the outside, where they enjoy a safe working environment. Instead of
3 For the program of the Cairo Talks on Transformation and Change, see: http://www
.fu-berlin.de/en/sites/cairo/veranstaltungen/Cairo_Talks_on_Transformation_and_C
hange__CTTC_/index.html.
4 A recently published study on peer-reviewed articles on the Arab uprisings shows
that 75 percent of this scholarly production comes from outside the Arab World,
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being confronted with the choice of joining the protests or sharing their
experience in a lecture hall, they might choose the luxury of writing in-
stead of acting. One passage described in the introduction to the Lüscher
novel captures the contrasts between local and foreign scholarship during
times of crisis. When Preising relates his experiences in Tunisia to a Swiss
colleague, the latter responds: “We are both captured in this inability to
act, but Preising managed to see this inability as a virtue, while I suffered
a lot from it. If we wanted to change something, we would have to act”
(Lüscher 2013 — author’s translation).
Especially on site, times of political crisis like the transformation period
following the Egyptian uprising seem to privilege the production of ad hoc
knowledge to the disadvantage of academic scholarship. Scholars have to
cope with rapidly unfolding events at a time when they are adjusting their
tools and re-examining their analytical frameworks. This seems especially
true for local scholars. As experts working in the countries involved, they
are frequently asked to give media interviews and expert talks. They are
considered to be the local voices. At the same time, they have to choose
between different intellectual positions. They present themselves at their
universities as neutral academic observers, while often simultaneously en-
gaging directly in activism or choosing to adopt the position of an adviser
or the critical role of the intellectual.
Political uncertainty and restrictions on academic freedom
Local knowledge production is not only bound by the choice between ac-
tivism and scholarship. It is also hampered by restrictions on academic
freedom and the uncertainty of a rapidly changing political environment.
Times of political crisis feel like emotional rollercoasters.5 In Egypt, as the
constitutional referendum in March 2011 gave way to the events of
Maspero in October of the same year, when a Coptic demonstration was
violently dissolved by the military, initially high hopes were quickly re-
placed by deep disappointment. Keeping the necessary distance to produce
predominantly from the United States (AlMaghlouth et al. 2015). See also Carola
Richter and Hanan Badr’s contribution in this volume on the problem of visibility
of local knowledge.
5 For a personal account of these “rollercoaster” emotions, see also the contribution
by Sarhan Dhouib in this volume.
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academic scholarship became extremely difficult under such circum-
stances.
Closely interlinked with this factor is the difficulty of conducting social
science research in Egypt and other countries of the Middle East. After a
short period of political pluralization in Egypt, social scientists were again
exposed to new waves of scrutiny. Even early in the uprisings, they were
directly exposed to the political struggles and violence that emerged with-
in universities in many countries. In the aftermath of the uprisings, Egyp-
tian universities benefited from political liberalization for a short time.
When the selection process for university presidents and deans was
changed to an electoral model in 2011, in a move to accommodate student
protests, professors started to develop new courses and teaching materials
in order to integrate theoretical perspectives on social movements and rev-
olutions into the curriculum (Sharobeem 2015). International cooperation
on various social science topics flourished. But this was a short honey-
moon for the social sciences in Egypt. With the overthrow of President
Morsi in 2013, political activity on campus was prohibited, several profes-
sors linked to the Muslim Brotherhood were banned from teaching, and
efforts to engage in international collaboration again drew suspicions of
foreign intervention.6
Today social scientists face even greater difficulties in doing quantita-
tive and qualitative research than was the case under Mubarak. Accurate
data is treated as a state secret, gaining access to archives requires lengthy
permission procedures, and potential interviewees have been imprisoned
or remain at risk of persecution (Fahmy 2016). The situation in war-torn
countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria or Yemen is even worse. In fact, in
very few countries of the region does social science research still make
any appreciable contribution to the cause of freedom and autonomy. When
the Arab Council for Social Sciences, created in March 2011, held its sec-
ond annual conference in March 2015 in Beirut, a lively influx of re-
searchers from all over the region was evident. Lebanon, along with Mo-
rocco and Tunisia, today appears as one of the few places in the region
6 See the excellent documentation of this issue by the Egyptian organization Associa-
tion for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), afteegypt.org. For an insid-
er’s perspective on Egyptian universities, see also Jan Claudius Völkel’s contribu-
tion in this volume.
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where social science research can be conducted and presented relatively
free of concern.7
Many of the aforementioned restrictions also apply to foreign re-
searchers, at least when they engage in long-term field research. Examples
ranging from Michel Seurat to Giulio Regeni8 illustrate the dangers faced
by foreign researchers. Local researchers feel these restrictions on a regu-
lar basis. In addition, they work in an academic environment where educa-
tion does not provide the same training in theoretical tools and approaches
received in Western universities, and where the incentives for academic
promotion differ. However, foreign and local researchers working on the
ground are similarly affected by the political environment and the restric-
tions authorities impose on research in the humanities and social sciences.
Toward a more comparative approach in Middle East studies
Seven years after the start of the Arab uprisings, it seems more important
than ever to engage in an active debate not only on how to develop Middle
East studies further, but also on how to establish consistent forms of aca-
demic cooperation with researchers in the countries being studied and pro-
vide them with a safe research environment. This article has highlighted
how the uprisings provided us with numerous opportunities to reassess an-
alytical tools and develop new research questions. At this stage, we have
examined different actors and institutional arrangements from new angles,
but due to the rapidly changing context and the continuing violence on the
ground, the field of Middle East studies remains fragmented and fragile,
fragmented because the diverse new findings have not yet coalesced into
new research agendas, fragile because locally based scholars in particular
continue to struggle with numerous constraints that reemerged as quickly
as the uprisings themselves appeared. The contribution of scholars work-
ing on site, however, seems more important than ever if our discipline is to
7 See the contribution by Bilal Orfali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami in this vol-
ume on the new ways of teaching the Arab language in Beirut after the uprisings.
8 French sociologist Michel Seurat died in 1986 while being held hostage by the Is-
lamic Jihad in Lebanon. Giulio Regeni, a doctoral student from Cambridge, disap-
peared on January 25, 2016, in Cairo and was found dead 10 days later with the




develop new questions and concepts and become better integrated into
broader political science debates. In order to face these challenges, Middle
East studies must be established as a truly comparative discipline. This
will require considerable engagement and commitment on the part of se-
nior scholars, funding organizations and governmental authorities.
Scholars such as Abaza and others often call for the development of an
indigenous sociology in order to rebalance the unequal relationship be-
tween “Western” and “Eastern” scholarship on the Middle East. I do not
think that more reading and deeper exegesis of the famous Arab sociolo-
gist Ibn Khaldun and other indigenous pioneers would necessarily save the
discipline in Egypt’s academic environment. Instead, I think that a more
intense dialogue is needed between those engaging in Middle East studies
from inside and outside the region. Those coming from the outside rely
heavily on the first-hand knowledge provided by their colleagues working
on the ground, benefiting from their local colleagues’ contacts and des-
criptions of events. But for scholars observing events from the outside, it
is probably time to throw overboard the old perception of the countries of
the Middle East as “our place for fieldwork”. We should take into account
the rich academic environment in the areas we engage in and with. Instead
of limiting ourselves to looking for primary sources and treating our col-
leagues working in Egyptian universities as interview partners, it would be
very helpful if we accorded these colleagues more respect by taking their
debates more seriously and citing their work.
In addition, it is time to rethink funding policies in order to improve co-
operation further. Local scholars benefit considerably from foreign fund-
ing when it enables them to pursue research stays abroad, where they can
spend time in libraries and establish the necessary distance from the tu-
multuous events in their home countries. This allows them to participate
more actively in the scholarly debate through the publication of peer-re-
viewed articles. Even apart from the aforementioned debate series, many
examples of successful cooperation do exist, but need further support to be
institutionalized. However, a truly comparative approach is needed to en-
gage scholars from Europe and the Middle East in a dialogue on relevant
theoretical tools and concepts.
Too often, doctoral candidates coming from the Middle East are encour-
aged to work on their own country when they study at European universi-
ties. Senior scholars from Egypt are often awarded scholarships because
they are considered experts on their own country. This has a number of
undeniable advantages, as they have a true mastery of the local language
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and privileged access to sources. But it is a disadvantage with regard to
enabling the necessary distance from the field, and with regard to the ana-
lytical tools they mobilize. Academic research is often most valuable
when theory is mastered without being swayed by the numerous existing
idée reçus, which one unavoidably holds not only about foreign countries,
but also about one’s own. Hence, as a second step, professors should en-
courage their doctoral students to focus on countries other than their coun-
try of origin, and scholarship organizations should support long-term re-
search cooperation projects and joint publications in which the local not
only represents the local, but also engages in the discipline’s broader de-
bates. This could help to bridge the gap between “local” and “foreign” re-
search, and encourage cooperation on a more even playing field. Of
course, much has to be done to overcome the current and past limitations
of the humanities and social sciences in the countries of the Middle East.
It will take a long time to convince paranoid governmental authorities that
independent research is not necessarily intended as whistle-blowing. A
more comparative approach in Middle East studies would have the advan-
tage of emphasizing theoretical findings over the acquisition of empirical
data, thus drawing attention away from the raw data of fieldwork to schol-
arly debates and innovative questions in the discipline.
The participation of scholars doing research on the ground seems cru-
cial if the discipline aims to develop further. The uprisings have illustrated
the limits of the inter-paradigm debate on democratization and authoritari-
anism. This approach was at least partly shaped by Western governments’
demand for policy advice. Since the Cold War, regime change has re-
mained one of the most intriguing questions for the discipline, thanks to
the idea that such change could create new allies (Camau 2006). A more
intense dialogue with local scholars might help us to move beyond this de-
bate and engage more intensely with questions of daily concern to the peo-
ple and societies we study. This is not to say that such debates would ig-
nore issues such as democracy and human rights, good governance and ac-
countability. On the contrary, these issues have been at the core of
protesters’ demands and animate the debate in Middle East academic cir-
cles. But the question of regime change is framed differently — not as an
end in itself, but as a means of achieving these goals. When we look at our
“Western” colleagues in political science studying US, French or German
politics or EU integration, it quickly becomes evident that the question of
regime change here is more softly embedded in questions of daily con-
cern. Thus, the debate on regime change should not be our only point of
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reference. We should be equally concerned with protest movements, ques-
tions of social inequality and public policy. This might not only help us to
join the broader political science debates, but also prepare us to ask the
right questions next time.
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Political Science in Egypt: Talkin’ Bout a Revolution
Jan Claudius Völkel
“Today Egypt’s educational system both reflects and augments the social un-
rest of its own people – and of those it has influenced. Historic conflicts be-
tween religious and secular leaders, between tradition and innovation, and
between foreign and national interest, influence contemporary Egyptian edu-
cation.”
(Cochran 1986: 1)
The job description was promising: the German Academic Exchange Ser-
vice (DAAD) was looking for a long-term lecturer in political science in
spring 2012 to teach on Cairo University’s “Euro-Mediterranean Studies
Programme” (EMSP) for the coming five years. “Given the revolutionary
changes in the country,” stated the call for applications, the successful can-
didate should offer courses on “societal transformation, development of
civil-society structures, democratization, crisis and conflict resolution”
(DAAD 2012, translation from German to English by the author).
This sounded like the perfect position to me, as I had been closely fol-
lowing contemporary political and economic developments across the
Arab world since my early academic years. I had also been dealing with
questions of democratization and transformation for a considerable time.
Thus, I submitted my application for this position in summer 2012, and
excitedly received an invitation for a job interview at the DAAD head-
quarters in Bonn, Germany, in September 2012.
The interview took a surprising turn when one of the selection commit-
tee members asked whether I might be able to teach more courses on the
European Union than originally outlined, and fewer on the issues of trans-
formation and democratization. I confirmed that I was also very familiar
with the EU, and that I would be happy to teach classes on that subject too
once in Cairo.
Some weeks later I received word that I had been accepted, and on
February 1, 2013, I started my new job at Cairo University’s well-known
Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS). I was excited about
working and living in Egypt, the epicenter of the uprisings that had shaken
almost the entire Arab world, and about becoming part of this unique pro-
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cess that had dominated regional analyses in academic publications and
discourses since its outbreak.1
Since taking up the position, I have been teaching courses on European
studies and the relations between Europe and the MENA region as part of
a team of excellent and likeable colleagues, and with students who have
been both interested and interesting. Yet I have not taught a single session
on transformation and democratization, the original focus of the position
advertised in 2012. Hardly a year later, the demand for these issues had all
but vanished at Cairo University.
In the following discussion, I will present some personal observations
as a political scientist living in Egypt during the last six months under for-
mer President Mohammed Morsi (who was ousted on July 3, 2013), and
then under the subsequent rule of interim President Adly Mansour and act-
ing President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. I will discuss the consequences of the
restoration of the suppression of critical political science at Egypt’s most
prestigious state university, and use this experience to help illuminate what
political science, and academia in general, could achieve in more favor-
able circumstances. The article will argue that the current developments in
Egypt represent a missed chance to develop political science further into a
meaningful discipline that would not only prepare students for the job
market, but also contribute to improving the overall quality of Egypt’s
academic landscape.
Political science here and there
Although there are many similarities between the political science content
taught in Egypt and Europe/North America, there is one important differ-
ence. The typical sub-disciplines studied, such as political theory, interna-
tional relations and comparative politics are similar. Classes in internation-
al law and political economy are offered south as well as north of the
Mediterranean. One difference, however, is that academic discourses in
the Arab world mostly reflect a positivist perspective, with very little
openness toward constructivist approaches. The strict belief in norms and




values leaves little room for divergent opinions or critical questioning of
“eternal truths”.
Another difference derives from working conditions. In liberal democ-
racies, despite some dependence on state resources, institutional autonomy
is broadly assured within academia (Hage 2013). By contrast, the social
sciences across the Arab world “face notable obstacles due to institutional
fragmentation, high levels of bureaucracy, and political restrictions”
(Amer 2016). In many regards, researchers in the Arab world are not free
in what they do. Lengthy administrative procedures are only one obstacle;
research restrictions are another. For each research initiative, scholars need
to obtain security clearance from the authorities, which usually takes
months if not years, and even some innocuous proposals are turned down
for security reasons. Conducting empirical research on the Muslim Broth-
erhood or the military is almost impossible inside Egypt, particularly since
Al-Sisi’s rise to the presidency and the reinstatement of the security state.
Even topics such as irregular migration, public health or civil society en-
gagement can only be studied, if at all, under close surveillance by the se-
curity forces. In addition, basic research is often perceived as unwanted
competition to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
(CAPMAS), the state’s statistical office that imposes additional hurdles on
the approval of research applications.2
An important difference also exists regarding the purpose of the social
sciences, including political science. Until 2011, political science educa-
tion in Egypt, like in many other Arab countries, primarily served the aim
of raising and training new experts for the political system. Graduates
were keen to obtain jobs primarily in public administration, the state party,
the diplomatic corps, the intelligence agencies or in one of the state-owned
media outlets. The popularity of political science in the Arab world before
2011 was mainly “based on a fake assumption held by many students that
it is the highway to get prestigious jobs in the government” (Hassan 2009:
8). Yet hundreds of thousands of students in fact failed to get such pos-
itions after university graduation (Abdel-Moneim 2016: 15ff.), particularly
if they lacked privileged family bonds with the elite circles. This led to
massive levels of personal despair and frustration, and eventually con-
tributed to the popular uprisings of 2011 (El-Said 2014: 65).
2 See the contribution by Sarhan Dhouib in this volume on other hurdles and prob-
lems of doing research in authoritarian systems.
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Across the Arab world, governing regimes maintained close links to po-
litical science faculties, and interfered both directly and indirectly in
teaching of the subject. In Egypt, this was particularly strong from the be-
ginning: Legend has it that it was President Gamal Abdel Nasser himself
who ordered the establishment of FEPS at Cairo University, as his daugh-
ter wanted to study political science. In truth, Hoda Gamal Abdel Nasser
did pursue this course of study, and ultimately became a respected profes-
sor at FEPS.
However, Nasser’s involvement in Cairo University’s new teaching
programs was motivated by more than just a desire to help his daughter
realize her dreams; 1960 was a year in which Nasser sought to bring Egypt
as a whole into line with his comprehensive ideology. The press was na-
tionalized (Völkel 2008: 158), and the social sciences were perceived as a
useful medium through which to propagate Nasser’s version of Arab so-
cialism, which later became known as “Nasserism”. In order to give
widespread legitimacy to this comprehensive populist ideology, Cairo
University had to “spell out, justify and spread the nationalist and socialist
goals of the regime” (Reid 2002: 200); higher education “functioned as a
tool to train future party leaders, state cadres, and bureaucrats” (Abd
Rabou 2016: 55).
This important charge notwithstanding, Cairo University, like the whole
educational sector in Egypt, suffered from chronic underfinancing, as state
allocations were clearly not enough to equip universities with sufficient
resources to conduct their tasks properly. Consequently, Egypt’s educa-
tional system even today remains among the world’s lowest-ranked,
placed 135th out of 138 countries in the “Quality of the education system”
category of the World Economic Forum’s 2016  2017 Global Competi-
tiveness Report.
The FEPS, as one of the most prestigious institutions of higher educa-
tion in Egypt, has been closely connected with Egypt’s policy circles and
state bureaucracy from its beginnings. Its purpose was never simply to
train promising academics, but rather to prepare students for future pos-
itions in the country’s political system. This “structural interconnected-
ness” was part and parcel of the FEPS’ self-understanding from its incep-
tion through to the end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. One political science
postgraduate, who wished to remain anonymous, remembered that until
2011 the main content of her research consisted of recapitulating the
achievements of the state and the government. When this student was con-
sidering writing a paper on the 2005 presidential elections — the first os-
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tensibly competitive elections in the country’s history, in which Mubarak
agreed to allow an official competitor, Ayman Nour, to run — a professor
advised her to “simply evaluate the electoral program of President Hosni
Mubarak and his development plans for the country” (FEPS postgraduate
student, personal communication, May 2016).
This is the opposite of a form of so-called critical academia, that is, one
in which academics refuse “to be enslaved” to official politics (Hage
2013). Since 2011, there has certainly been a push for more independent
and more professional social sciences throughout the Arab world, illustrat-
ed for instance by the creation of the Arab Council for Social Sciences
(ACSS) in Beirut in August 2012.3 However, the social sciences remain
“the ‘poor cousin’ of Arab research” (UNDP 2009: 202). On the eve of the
Arab uprisings, Schlumberger (2010: 10) diplomatically identified a
“sometimes problematic and less than conducive relationship between the
political sphere and the social sciences” across the Arab world. Moreover,
the Arab Social Science Monitor published in December 2015 still de-
scribed Arab social sciences as weak due to “the ever-increasing control
and censorship practiced by political authorities over all aspects of civic
life in the Arab world in the period preceding the ‘Arab Spring’” (Bamyeh
2015: 9). In addition, religious dogmas also impose serious limits on so-
cial research; topics such as atheism, existentialism, sexuality or anything
that is declared “sensitive” are still widely underrepresented in most cur-
ricula. As a consequence, “social science in the Arab world is doubly dele-
gitimized — from above by the political leaders and from below by reli-
gious leaders” (Hanafi 2014: 202).
The strong state and pressure group control over the social sciences
across the Arab world stands in sharp contrast to the specific German con-
ception of social science, where much still depends on the developments
after World War II and the process of denazification undergone by higher
education and universities. Before 1945, political science was understood
as a theory of the state (“Staatswissenschaft”); afterward, the field was
particularly strongly influenced by the scholars who had emigrated from
Germany during the Nazi period, and who brought back ideas of democra-
cy as a key focus of study when the war was over. Scholars such as Ernst
Fraenkel, Franz L. Neumann, Karl Loewenstein, Arnold Bergstraesser and
3 See their website at www.theacss.org. The creation of the ACSS was financially
supported by the Ford Foundation and the Canadian International Development Re-
search Center.
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Eric Voegelin spent years in exile in the United States, and there de-
veloped the idea that political science should share in the obligation to
contribute to Germany’s liberation from the Nazi ideology (Porsche-Lud-
wig 2009: 68).
In large part because of this history, political science in Germany is to a
substantial extent understood as “democracy science”, meaning that it has
the particular normative focus that democracy is the best political system
possible, and that studies in political science should not only provide the
necessary tools and knowledge to analyze relevant problems, but should
also contribute to building democratic societies (Alemann 1994: 15 f.).
This fundamental character has been stressed even more since reunifica-
tion in 1990 and the comprehensive replacement of political science chair
holders at East German universities, largely advocates of socialist
paradigms, with graduates from West German political science depart-
ments (the negative consequences this had for the universities’ internal dy-
namics, and the often very negative consequences for individual scholars,
are beyond the scope of this article) (Arnhold 2003: 103ff.).
For me as a graduate of the Freiburg School of Political Science, with a
decisively normative-ontological background in the tradition of Arnold
Bergstraesser, Wilhelm Hennis and Dieter Oberndörfer, this has always
been a very strong element of my own understanding of political science:
political science cannot be apolitical. This became a major challenge when
events in Egypt started to unfold as they did from summer 2013 on.
Cairo University in its search for itself
The changes of 2011 threw universities in Egypt into new legal and politi-
cal waters, resulting in many revised syllabi and newly created courses
(Sharobeem 2015: 117ff.). However, this also challenged the institutions’
longstanding customs regarding the way they conceived academic subjects
and presented them to their students. Suddenly, the universities’ raison
d'être was no longer to provide support for the regime through the inculca-
tion of ideological compliance and the provision of technical expertise;
students and some faculty members now demanded a fundamental reorien-
tation of seminar styles and teaching content. During 2011, universities
became sites of open and heated debate over the political process; students
became highly motivated to contribute to the push for a better Egypt, and
those professors and teaching assistants who wholeheartedly supported the
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ongoing transition processes finally felt free and liberated to do what they
wanted to do: engage in critical teaching and research instead of training
graduates to conform (Abd Rabou 2016: 61; Kohstall in this volume).
Traditionally, Cairo University has been the place where political, eco-
nomic, societal and diplomatic leaders received their training and their
higher education. Much like the institution’s Faculty of Law, the FEPS is
perceived as a cadre factory that has turned out many important members
of Egypt’s elite. Since its establishment in 1960, the FEPS has occupied a
unique position in Egypt’s university landscape, being the only institution
that has offered programs in both economics and political science, as well
as statistics, from 1963 on. The Department of Public Administration and
the Social Science Computing Department were also added to the FEPS in
1990 and 1994 respectively.
Throughout recent decades, many FEPS professors have held high-
ranking positions in the country’s political or economic system, and for-
mer representatives of Egypt’s top circles have often taught classes after
their tenure as well. The faculty offers study programs in Arabic, English
and French, with the first being offered almost free of charge and the latter
two requiring relatively high study fees, though still low compared to what
particularly the private American University in Cairo (AUC) demands.
FEPS’s near monopoly on the subject in Egypt (for a long time there was
no other place to study political science, except for AUC and some spo-
radically offered courses at various universities, such as the Faculty of
Commerce at Alexandria University) has only recently been broken with
the establishment of new political science departments at other public as
well as private universities, often with FEPS graduates serving as staff
members.
The year 2011 brought an important change to Egypt’s law on higher
education, namely the introduction of elections for student and university
leaders: For the first time, students were allowed to have a say in selecting
their own representatives, faculty members, faculty deans and university
presidents (Abd Rabou 2016: 62). This was not only perceived as the
(overdue) emancipation of universities from state interference, but also
brought discussions about candidates’ professional and personal merits in-
to university hallways and classrooms (Sharobeem 2015: 119 f.). Instead
of simply showing loyalty to the political system, students and professors
were suddenly discussing possible solutions to the universities’ multiple
problems; “competitiveness became a significant principle in the universi-
ty” (El-Said 2014: 62).
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This legal change was just one visible manifestation of a deeper internal
challenge: The search for a new raison d’être. The times when universities
simply produced valuable new members of the country’s elite seemed to
be over. Those students and professors who believed in the ideals of the
revolution pushed for reorientation of the old curricula, syllabi and teach-
ing styles. In parallel, those who felt close to or who were members of the
Muslim Brotherhood lobbied to give Islam more influence over university
life. Until the end of Morsi’s presidency, public events and panel discus-
sions at Cairo University saw representatives from across the political
spectrum openly exchanging their views and frankly criticizing each oth-
er’s attitudes.
With the advent of summer 2013 and the renewed change in Egypt’s
polity, this diversity of voices and opinions came to an abrupt end. Those
sympathizing with political Islam quickly disappeared from public events.
If they were not arrested or banned from teaching, they either silenced
themselves — partly out of frustration regarding the Islamists’ ignorance
and eventual failure during their short period in power — or went into ex-
ile. A similar fate befell many of the democratic activists; thousands, in-
cluding many students and professors, were arrested for participating in
unapproved demonstrations, for insulting the judiciary, or for simply ex-
pressing their opinion (Accorsi and Siegelbaum 2014).
Euro-Mediterranean studies as a vehicle for discussions about
democratization
The increasingly repressive climate had massive effects both outside and
inside the universities, which had become focal points of the societal dis-
putes and clashes after 2011. Since 2013, the state’s ongoing “violation of
academic freedom in Egypt has been institutionalized in an unprecedented
way, causing deterioration in university education and creating a great ed-
ucational recession” (Abd Rabou 2015). A presidential decree revoked
universities’ newly gained freedom to elect their own leaders in June 2014
(Maher 2014). Ever since, professors have again been hired or promoted
on the basis of pro-governmental attitudes rather than their academic mer-
its. In addition, university professors who wish to attend conferences
abroad have needed prior security clearance from the Egyptian authorities
since January 2015. Hundreds of students have been referred to military
trials or have disappeared without further notice (Saleh 2016). The noted
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AUC professor Emad Shahin received the death penalty for alleged col-
laboration with foreign secret services. FEPS professors, such as Amr
Hamzawy and Ahmed Abd Rabou, left the country in order to escape ris-
ing pressure in response to their liberal and repeated pro-democracy state-
ments.
The Euro-Mediterranean Studies Programme (EMSP), created in 2002
with the initial support of an EU Tempus grant, experienced all these ups
and downs as well. In 2007, a long-term DAAD lecturer position was es-
tablished within the program with the aim of enriching its study programs
through the perspective of a visiting European lecturer. Additionally, it
draws its instructors from the existing professors working in the faculty’s
different departments.4
The EMSP follows the model of the foreign language instructed pro-
grams (FLIP) that became possible and popular in Egypt after a legal
change in 1990 allowed public universities to offer privately paid study
programs (Gamal Eldin 2016: 59ff.). For about EGP 12,000 (€1,200;
$1,350 as of October 2016) or EGP 16,000 (€1,600; $1,800),5 students can
enroll in master’s or Ph.D. study programs offered completely in English.
Studying in English is widely believed to be advantageous for competing
in the labor market after graduation (Gamal Eldin 2016: 72), or for achiev-
ing a prestigious position within the country or abroad, including in inter-
national academic circles (Hanafi & Arvanitis 2014: 725).
These fees, still moderate in comparison to private universities in
Egypt, enable advanced study conditions: master’s classes rarely have
more than 30 students, while Ph.D. classes have no more than 10 students.
Up-to-date literature is available in the program’s own library, the “docu-
mentation center”. The multidisciplinary character of EMSP has led to the
acceptance of a range of students with different backgrounds, such as eco-
nomics, law, languages and literature. This diversity of knowledge is a
positive in the classroom setting, although some students need to make ex-
tra effort to understand theories of European integration or of international
relations, since they have never previously studied them.
The EMSP’s master’s and doctorate programs follow very similar pat-
terns: After two semesters of mandatory classes (four or five per week),
4 See the program’s website at www.euromedstudies.net.
5 The fees are not lump sum amounts, but depend on the number of courses the stu-
dent takes and the length of his/her studies; see http://euromedstudies.net/en/
masteruromed/fees.php and http://euromedstudies.net/en/doceuromed/fees.php.
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students start writing their thesis under the supervision of a full professor
from the faculty. The academic content of thesis proposals has to be ap-
proved by department councils (for FEPS: political science, economics,
statistics, public administration, or computer science). After receiving a
positive evaluation, the thesis can be registered with the faculty, leading to
an administrative process involving the faculty council and the university
council, both of which need to approve the proposal. There is at least one
year between the registration of the thesis and its defense.
Once theses have been registered in this way, the wording of their titles
can be changed only after undergoing the same administrative process,
which again requires approval from the faculty council and the university
council. This strict rule reflects the traditional understanding of political
science in the country; students are not expected to develop their own crit-
ical thinking skills, but rather to fulfil the job assigned to them by their su-
pervisor. This fundamentally conflicts with the alternative understanding
that the content of research and students’ attitudes on certain phenomena
might (or even should) change the deeper they dig into the topic. The
Humboldtian model of academic freedom, though admittedly never more
than an unachieved ideal (Karran 2009), clearly finds its limits if even ti-
tles cannot be changed after students have started their research. This poli-
cy also stands in fundamental contrast to international practices, in which
the use of preliminary working titles is a standard procedure.
A second controversial, and in my view counterproductive rule derived
from Egypt’s strict higher education law is the requirement that exams
make up 70 percent of students’ final grade, both at M.A. and Ph.D. level.
The remaining coursework, which in my case included an oral presenta-
tion, in-class participation and an essay of around eight pages, may ac-
count for only 30 percent of the grade.6 In my view, this reduces students’
motivation to engage in activities that do not require as much memoriza-
tion of facts as exams do. This means that creativity and critical thinking
remain underdeveloped.
6 Indeed, with the winter term 2016/2017, this strict rule has been slightly relaxed:
exams now count for 50 percent of the final grade, while essays, presentations and
participation constitute the remaining 50 percent.
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Focusing teaching and university activities on student development
A relatively small number of professors, mainly among the younger gener-
ation, conceive their job not simply as feeding students knowledge, but as
encouraging them to develop their own skills and interests. The concept of
“learning facilitator” (Hmelo-Silver & Barrows 2006) has only slowly
started to gain ground at Cairo University. To this end, the “Euro-Mediter-
ranean Studies Programme” set up a three-year cooperation project with
Freie Universität Berlin from 2012 until 2015, initiating an exchange of
faculty and students through workshops and conferences that helped trig-
ger fresh ideas about modern teaching methodologies at the FEPS.
Despite the restrictive external conditions, in-class discussions in my
seminars have to date been able to be conducted in a very open and confi-
dential manner. Though it usually takes some time at the beginning of
each academic year before students are able to build trust with each other
and their instructor, lively discussions start to take place after four to six
weeks. In our case at EMSP, it is a real blessing that Europe’s history is
full of discontinuities: the fact that postwar (Western) Germany success-
fully embarked on the path of democracy despite being a “democracy
without democrats” (Lepsius 1990: 64); the importance of the economic
upswing in the achievement of political stability in Western Europe after
World War II; the role of external superpowers such as the United States
and the Soviet Union in Europe; the end of the military juntas in Greece,
Spain and Portugal and the subsequent process of democratization in the
1970 s and 1980 s; the overthrow of autocratic regimes after yearlong
demonstrations in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries in Central
and Eastern Europe; and the failure of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of civil
war on European soil in the 1990 s, to name but a few.7 All these topics
can be discussed without explicit reference to Egypt and the Arab coun-
tries, but everybody is aware of the parallels and potential lessons for
Egypt’s own future. The active involvement of students in the preparation
and conduct of seminars is not yet very common in Egypt, but students
quickly appreciate that their opinions are not only tolerated in class, but
even requested.
7 See also the contribution by Fatima Kastner in this volume on a global discussion
of the transitional justice model.
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Teaching is currently also undergoing a fundamental change in Egypt
(at least at master’s and doctorate levels), from the traditional style in
which professors stand in front of the class talking and students try to keep
pace as they take notes to be memorized later, to a more interactive format
with the teacher engaging with the students in a less hierarchical manner.
Formats in which students give presentations and their fellow students re-
act to them through discussions, group work or other forms of interactive
learning are somewhat new to Egypt.8 However, many professors, particu-
larly among the younger generations, have embarked on this new way of
teaching.
A similar change is happening in the way papers and essays are written.
Many of my students were not used to developing their own research
questions or thinking about an appropriate structure for their paper them-
selves, as they were used to being told what to do and how to do it. This
has been a difficult learning process for some, even at the master’s and
sometimes doctorate levels. Yet it is an indispensable practice if students
are to be brought to a position in which they no longer simply repeat exist-
ing knowledge, but also create new expertise and perspectives by engag-
ing in critical thinking and crafting alternative approaches. A fundamental
problem is that the habit of giving feedback on papers remains underde-
veloped. More than once, after I returned M.A. student essays with de-
tailed comments and invited them to discuss their papers with me if they
had questions, the students said they had never previously received com-
ments of this kind.
Of particular relevance in this regard was a student conference called
“Euro-Mediterranean Relations: A View From Egypt” organized by our
program in December 2015 in cooperation with three professors from the
University of Dundee, Scotland. Rather than targeting experienced
scholars, this conference exclusively sought out current and former EMSP
students. The aim was to make students familiar with the proceedings of
typical political science conferences. Therefore, a call for papers first in-
vited students to submit abstracts, and then, upon positive evaluation, to
write full papers, which they then presented on panels during the full-day
conference. A total of 15 students participated in this conference and pre-
sented their papers; the international professors, including Christian
8 For a discussion of changing teaching methods, see also the contribution by Bilal
Orfali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami in this volume.
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Kaunert, Bert Schweitzer and Patricia Bauer from the University of
Dundee, as well as Kevin Köhler from the American University in Cairo,
discussed each paper and gave thorough feedback on each student’s per-
formance. Certainly, this practical hands-on experience is what students in
the social sciences in Egypt tend to be missing.
Fear as a factor at Egyptian universities
Without a doubt, making students’ intellectual development a focus of
teaching has been an important contribution to improving academia in
Egypt. However, active participation in class discussions or during univer-
sity events cannot be taken for granted, since the state security services are
once again fiercely engaged in monitoring the universities (Kirkpatrick
2014). The current government sees students as a potential source of un-
rest, and has thus imposed particularly strict controls on campuses (for a
historical account of student–state relations in Egypt, see Abd Rabou
2016: 59ff.; Pratt 2008: 59ff.). Already, the entrance to the university re-
sembles access to a high-security sector, with heavily armed policemen at
each campus gate, and thorough controls of individuals and bags using x-
ray machines and metal detectors have been in place since the clashes of
the summer of 2013. Admittedly, the fatal attacks at universities in Garissa
(Kenya, April 2, 2015) and Bacha Khan (Pakistan, January 20, 2016) have
created good arguments for those who support heavy security measures;
but at the same time, the measures offer a clear illustration of the restric-
tions under which academia in the country has to operate.
Fear has become a dominant driver in Egypt’s society, including in aca-
demic settings. Professors risk being professionally blackballed if they of-
fer critical opinions about the government’s actions too openly; some have
even received personal threats intended to bring them back into line with
the regime, sometimes simply for discussing texts critical of recent nation-
al developments. Some students have been banned from the university,
and thousands have been arrested (Abaza 2016; Abdelrahman 2017).9
The situation between summer 2013 and summer 2014, when various
places in Cairo, among them Nahda Square just in front of Cairo Universi-
9 See also the contribution by Ammar Abdulrahman in this volume on the implica-
tions of the Arab uprisings on student mobility.
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ty, became the sites of violent clashes between supporters of former Presi-
dent Morsi and his opponents, was particularly difficult. For a period of
months, Nahda Square witnessed frequent mass demonstrations by thou-
sands of individuals, particularly on Wednesday afternoons; these often
turned violent, with participants throwing stones, and security forces using
tear gas or firearms. Several times these clashes also spread to the campus,
with police storming the university in order to dissolve student demonstra-
tions (Rahim 2013). More than once our faculty building had to be evacu-
ated. I myself was exposed to tear gas twice, and we frequently heard the
use of rubber bullets and even live ammunition while in class. Classes of-
ten had to be cancelled on short notice, as students were unable to come to
university, and the semesters started late and ended early. The external
conditions for studying and concentrating were thus extremely harsh at
that time, and it was an extraordinary achievement by Cairo University as
an institution, as well as on the part of its faculty, staff members and of
course students, that these semesters were brought to a successful end,
with exams taken and assignments handed in, so that students could at
least get their certificates and celebrate their graduation.
However, one thing I have learned — something that certainly cannot
be learned by reading books alone — is what it means to live and work
under conditions of repression. Although I never experienced personal in-
terference with my work, I felt how fear paralyzed me when demonstra-
tions again turned violent, when attacks against state targets intensified in
terms of numbers and casualties, when activists were arrested in increas-
ingly frequent security raids, and when hundreds of detainees received
collective death sentences.
One of my colleagues disappeared from the public eye for days, with
even his Facebook page being taken down, leading other colleagues and I
to fear the worst. Indeed, he had been told by the security services that he
should reduce his public presence, and in order to stay safe, he elected to
take himself completely offline for a while so that nobody could find out
about him. In a workshop in Cairo on March 6, 2016, several colleagues
admitted that their reaction after publishing every new piece of work was
now one of fear, as they were worried about the potential consequences in-
stead of being happy about the achievement.
It is no wonder there is high demand among professors and students for
fellowships and scholarships abroad. Famous political scientists, such as
Amr Hamzawy, have left Egypt indefinitely for reasons of personal safety.
Two of my closest colleagues from Cairo University are now in Germany
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and the USA, and it is unclear when they will come back to Cairo. The
problem of “researchers who publish globally but perish locally” (Hanafi
2011; Hanafi & Arvanitis 2014) due to the language dichotomy between
Arabic and English has been drastically elevated: If researchers stay local,
they are at risk of disappearing — not necessarily because of imprison-
ment, but at least because of blocked career opportunities or the complete
loss of the ability to work (Mostafa & Shaban 2016). The resulting exodus
of researchers is leading to a loss of knowledge and expertise in the coun-
try, as well as a loss of important teachers at Cairo University. It is bring-
ing massive hardships for those in exile and their families, as spouses and
children are often unable to follow, and parents, siblings and other close
relatives typically stay in Egypt. This forced separation creates significant
emotional challenges for the individuals affected, and should not be for-
gotten when discussing conditions within academia in today’s Egypt.
For students, the emotional situation is often different, as those between
the ages of 20 and 25 often associate the idea of going abroad with feel-
ings of “adventure”, or regard it as a “once-in-a-lifetime chance”. Students
often have a desire to escape societal and cultural repression, if not out-
right abuse (FEPS postgraduate student, personal communication, May
2016). However, overall student activities have become broadly apolitical,
and in some cases have been completely silenced (Abd Rabou 2016: 65).
As a DAAD lecturer, I have provided students with information about
scholarship opportunities in Germany, and I have also supported those
who wish to apply for offers from the Fulbright Commission, the
Chevening awards program, and other similar institutions. Many are inter-
ested in studying abroad not only because of the potential opportunities,
but also simply to escape the repressive situation in Egypt.
Conclusion
The years since 2013 have brought considerable challenges to Egypt’s
academic sphere in general, and in political science and related disciplines
in particular. Even as the country struggles to achieve internal stability,
universities are struggling to find a stable position in post-2011 Egypt.
Many students and professors alike have lost their original enthusiasm
for the changes initiated in 2011. For them, going “back to business” is the
order of the day — that is, concentrating on their studies and teaching
without being overly involved in sensitive debates or suspicious activities.
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One colleague told me in 2014: “I will stop being engaged in TV talk
shows and newspaper columns, and just concentrate on my academic ac-
tivities” (FEPS professor, personal communication, fall 2014).
From the universities’ perspective, many ambiguities have resulted
from the strict legal framework and the government’s unclear expecta-
tions. On the one hand, Article 21 of Egypt’s constitution guarantees aca-
demic freedom and the independence of academics from state interfer-
ence. On the other hand, President Al-Sisi’s decrees have made free teach-
ing and research impossible, as everything that might be understood as
criticism of the government or one of its policies can be labelled as rele-
vant for the state’s security, thus exposing scholars to the serious risk of
their actions having negative consequences. There “is an attempt to indi-
rectly prohibit politics on the university campuses” (Sharobeem 2015:
120).
The murder of Italian Ph.D. researcher Giulio Regeni in January 2016
brought another fundamental problem of free research to light: the mis-
trust of state authorities toward researchers. Particularly when coming
from abroad, researchers often encounter a great deal of suspicion. The
typical imputation is that researchers might work as spies for foreign se-
cret services, one of the many conspiracy theories flourishing in Egypt
(Kirkpatrick 2015); as a consequence, foreign researchers’ homes are oc-
casionally searched by the authorities — that is, if they are not banned
from entry at Cairo Airport at the outset. However, I should clearly stress
that I personally have never experienced any negative responses from ei-
ther my students or my colleagues.
For their part, researchers increasingly mistrust the authorities. State-
ments by governmental representatives are usually treated with consider-
able skepticism, whether they deal with the high number of activists that
have been arrested without proper legal procedures being followed
(“There are no forced disappearances in Egypt”, Essam El-Din 2016), the
crash of the Russian airliner over Sinai in October 2015 (“Terrorism was
not responsible”, Calamur 2015), or the reasons for the devastating floods
in Alexandria in the spring and fall of 2015 (“Interior Ministry blames
Brotherhood for Alexandria floods”, Mada Masr 2015). All these state-
ments come from a regime that once insisted it had found a “complete
cure” for Hepatitis C and HIV (Loveluck 2014), and which imposed strict
rules on media coverage during its anti-terror operations on the Sinai and
after the army’s fatal shootings of Mexican tourists in the Western Desert
in September 2015 (O’Grady & Dreazen 2015). This mutual mistrust is
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certainly one of the biggest obstacles for Egypt at the moment. If it per-
sists, the chances of establishing fruitful coexistence between state offi-
cials and critical social scientists will become vanishingly small.
In their struggle for independence from governmental interference, uni-
versity representatives often act on a razor’s edge, as they cannot risk an-
gering the authorities. This is even more urgent given that universities’
budgets are regulated by the Supreme Council of Universities, and not by
the universities themselves. This council, chaired by the minister of higher
education, is responsible for “[d]elineating and planning the general policy
and guidelines for higher education and scientific research in universities,
with a strong commitment to realizing the state’s needs and meeting its na-
tional, social, economic and scientific objectives” (El-Said 2014: 60).
Many defenders of university independence see the Supreme Council’s
dominant position as the biggest obstacle to improved university perfor-
mance, and have called for a fundamental redesign of its purpose and
role,10 or even its complete dissolution (El-Said 2014: 66).
Aside from these external constraints, universities are struggling to find
their core reason to exist. As yet, it remains unclear whether Egyptian uni-
versities are today primarily responsible for training good academics, edu-
cating qualified candidates for the labor market or producing conforming
members of the existing political system. This debate is not held openly,
but particularly the younger generations of professors and lecturers still try
to come closer to achieving the first potential goal. This remains at odds
with the current rigorous university laws and rules, and with the prefer-
ences of those professors who benefited from the old regime, and who
have nothing against the restoration of the former situation. However, this
struggle will continue, and it might well be that Egyptian universities ulti-
mately experience another revolution, this time from within.
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Opening Up the Text: Arabic Literary Studies on the Move
Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge
“Until 25th January, neither the protagonist of my novel ‘Brooklyn
Heightsʼ, nor I myself believed that [political change in Egypt] could be-
come reality. […] The reality of my country surpasses the fiction of the
novel” (El-Tahawy 2011: 51 f., our translation). With these words, the
Egyptian writer Miral El-Tahawy (b. 1968) explained how the aura of
Tahrir Square during 25th January revolution fundamentally changed what
is thinkable and imaginable in Arabic fiction. When reality surpasses fic-
tion, the role of literature changes in society. Asked about the role of art in
times of political upheaval, the Egyptian playwright and performance
artist Laila Suleiman (b. 1981), who staged documentary performances
like “Lessons in Revolting” and “No Time For Art” (both 2011), stated:
“It is time for art used as a tool. I am at the moment not interested in ex-
perimenting for the sake of the process or for [the] ultimate goal of self-
expression.” When they realized how “the media and the official institu-
tions were rewriting history […] it became one of our main priorities to
[…] document certain events that were supposed to be forgotten. […] I
wanted to find out what I could do artistically with the methods of docu-
mentation,” Suleiman adds. “My tools are the tools of the theatre. It might
reach less people but it can have a much more piercing, more direct effect
than a YouTube video” (Malzacher & Warsza 2011). Indeed, since the be-
ginning of the upheavals in 2010, many Arab writers have fundamentally
revisited the roles of literature and the arts in society.
Within large portions of Arab societies, the Arab uprisings raised hopes
of fundamental political change and tangible social improvement that were
quickly shattered by outcomes such as the authoritarian counter-revolution
in Egypt and the humanitarian disaster in Syria. These developments con-
tinue to have a major impact not only on literature and the arts but also on
Arabic literary studies as an academic discipline. This article discusses
how scholars in the field have recently approached the relationship be-
tween literature and society. Without a doubt, in the last four decades,
most of them have been interested in reading modern Arabic literature
from a sociopolitical perspective (see, for example, Wielandt 1980; Har-
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low 1987; Klemm 1998; Darraj 2008), which underscores the fact that
even postmodern Arabic literature has never been fully detached from po-
litics (Pflitsch 2010: 27ff.). However, since the 1990 s, many scholars have
emphasized the importance of exploring Arabic literature for its own sake,
in appreciation of its aesthetic value, and not primarily as a medium of so-
cial and political representation. These scholars have worked hard to make
Arabic literature a more visible part of world literature (see, for example,
Abou-Bakr 2004; Ette & Pannewick 2006; Allan 2016) and have been ac-
tive in Western literary theory debates, arguing with Dipesh Chakrabarty
for the need to “provincialize” Western knowledge production and “de-
provincialize” Arabic literature (see Klemm & Gruendler 2000; Neuwirth,
Pflitsch & Winckler 2010).
The recent transformation processes in the Arab world have urged
scholars of Arabic literature to focus again on the relationship between lit-
erature and society. This is due to the fact that a new understanding of lit-
erature and art became — at least for a period of time — prevalent in Arab
societies. Many young writers were activists in the uprisings, and new lit-
erary art forms have emerged or gained visibility through the protests. In
addition, documentary forms have gained in importance. Another reason
for reading society through the lens of literature has been the increasing
demand of a Western audience to understand the Arab uprisings through
literature, which has been criticized by some Arab writers as a kind of
neo-orientalism (Rakha 2012: 162ff.). In addition, Western funding insti-
tutions have been eager to fund academic research and various forms of
cultural production related to the transformation processes, and many
scholars addressed the “Arab Spring” in literature to either implicitly or
explicitly express their sympathy for the uprisings, which has been criti-
cized as a form of biased knowledge production (Schielke & Shehata
2016: 1 f.). Though we have witnessed a return to the old question about
the relationship between literature and society, it is now posed very differ-
ently. Instead of asking “How does literature mirror sociopolitical
change?” scholars of Arabic literature instead ask “How does literature
take part in this change?”. In this way, they shift the focus of inquiry from
representation to practice.
This article discusses this new approach to modern Arabic literature,
with a particular focus on Germany. It is not meant to offer a comprehen-
sive overview of this field, but rather to selectively map the trends that we
consider promising. Though the Arab uprisings have clearly been signifi-
cant in shaping these trends, they are neither their starting point, nor do
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they represent a radical turn, and they are certainly not the only drivers of
the changes and challenges faced by Arabic literary studies. Our central
argument involves a changing approach to texts, namely that Arabic liter-
ary studies are “opening up” the traditional literary text by reaching be-
yond its mere textual reality. This expanded approach to texts has an im-
pact on academic research as well as other practices in the field of Arabic
literary studies. We therefore discuss recent trends not only in academic
research, but also in academic networking, the teaching of Arabic and
academia’s demonstration of societal commitment. These four different
yet related means of opening up the text are summarized as follows:
1) Academic research has expanded the canon of literary texts and shifted
its focus from textual representation to the sociocultural conditions and
practices of literature and literary texts.
2) More inclusive academic networking is questioning the dominant valu-
ation standards that privilege knowledge produced in the West and
calling for a sustainable exchange of views and experiences between
scholars based in the West and those based in the Arab world. This
deepening of inclusive networking opens up both textual and discur-
sive spaces to hitherto disregarded perspectives and diverse readings.
3) Unlike the prevailing Western academic practice that restricts the role
of Arabic to a language of primary sources, Arabic literary studies now
emphasize the importance of practicing Arabic as a living language of
knowledge production and academic communication.
4) Scholars of Arabic literature are demonstrating an increasing sense of
societal commitment, which involves going beyond the text and apply-
ing their academic knowledge to various societal contexts.
Research: the “Arab Spring” as a “cultural revolution”
The Arab uprisings unleashed not only a political transformation but also,
in many regards, a “cultural revolution” (see Nurtsch 2013; Pannewick
2014; Jacquemond 2015). During and after the protests, various cultural
and artistic practices left the realm of subculture and attracted the attention
of a wider audience. These practices, such as chanting slogans, creating
banners and graffiti, covering old songs, shooting hip-hop videos, autofic-
tional blogging and performing documentary theater, are part of the ongo-
ing transformation that has caught the attention of Arabic literary scholars.
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Among the growing number of publications exploring the cultural and
artistic dimensions of the uprisings, we discuss three major overlapping
perspectives:
1) Mapping the new artistic forms and aesthetics that have emerged from
the protests: Many studies begin by documenting nascent art forms and
artefacts, in particular transient artefacts such as street art or banners
(see Sanders 2012; Gribbon & Hawas 2012), while literature and the
arts are undergoing a “documentary turn” in which documentation is
viewed as an important artistic and political tool (see Prince 2014;
Heshmat 2015). Nearly all studies emphasize the creativity unleashed
by the uprisings, approaching it either from a synchronic perspective
that foregrounds the great variety of different art forms (see Pannewick
2014; Boustani, El-Enany & Hamarneh 2016) or from a diachronic
perspective that places them in a larger historical framework and traces
continuities, transformations or ruptures (see Guth 2011; Ziter 2015).
Eventually, this leads to the elaboration of particular poetics and aes-
thetics, like the “fiction of scandal” exposing scandalous realities (El-
Ariss 2012) or the rhetoric of “kifaya” (that’s enough!) evoking the
sense that life under the present sociopolitical conditions has become
unbearable (Junge 2015).
2) Discussing the re-emergence of commitment (iltizam) and the “new
political”: In recent works of literature and art, classical topoi of com-
mitment, such as the rebel, the intellectual and the people, reappear but
find different forms of expression (see Guth 2011; Botros 2015). More
importantly, the concept of who and what is considered political has
changed (see Albers, Khalil & Pannewick 2015). Focusing less on po-
litical ideology and social movements, many studies now focus instead
on “life as politics” (Bayat 2010) in which, for instance, the body, af-
fects and everyday life are seen as the terrain upon which battles over
the “new political” are carried out (El-Ariss 2013; Junge 2015; Milich
2015).
3) Focusing on the cultural practices of literature in relation to power, in-
stitutions and the economy: This approach views literature from an-
thropological and sociological perspectives. It focuses on the produc-
tion of the text in its different social and cultural contexts instead of the
literary text and its possible interpretations and thus sees literature as a
social practice. Studies with this approach focus, for instance, on the
making of Arabic bestsellers and the emergence of a new reading audi-
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ence (Rooke 2011). They also explore the social practice of writing in
urban contexts and how “specific institutional, cultural, generational
and class milieus contribute to the making of literary careers, sociality
and aesthetics” (Schielke & Shehata 2016: 1).
Though distinct in their focus, each of these approaches share a common
outcome: They open up the traditional literary text. Since the Arab upris-
ings, scholars of Arabic literature seem to have embraced different forms
of texts more openly, such as the digital, sprayed, graphic, sung or per-
formed text, and they now seem to be more attentive to the effects of texts,
such as corporeal, affective, traumatic or emotional effects. In addition,
these scholars appear more eager to focus on the conditions that contribute
to the making of texts, such as social, institutional, financial or genera-
tional conditions. In order to illustrate these trends, this article now
presents two recent research projects which are close to our own research.
Documenting post-revolutionary realities: “In 2016”
One project that has expanded the focus of research into Arabic literature
beyond the classical literary text is “In 2016: How it felt to live in the
Arab World five years after the ‘Arab Spring’”, conducted by Stephan
Guth and Albrecht Hofheinz at the University of Oslo (University of Oslo
2015). This project seeks to recreate the atmosphere of the post-revolu-
tionary realities by letting the texts themselves speak. Instead of develop-
ing a master narrative or constructing a canon of representative texts, it
seeks to bring together a broad range of different kinds of texts. Focusing
on Egypt and Tunisia, it collects fresh and hitherto mostly unexplored
sources from literature and social media published exclusively during the
year 2016. Instead of relying on comprehensive political statements or re-
ligious commentaries, the project foregrounds personal everyday experi-
ences. It thus highlights the corporeal and emotional dimensions of life
and/as politics. Bringing together “highbrow” and popular culture, joining
major issues with minor topics, and linking famous authors with anony-
mous writers, it aims to create a textual network that allows us to read be-
yond the common text(s). It strives towards what one might call a “thick
description” of the world that is expressed in the selected sources and
which, taken together, may be understood as an academic collage docu-
menting the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”. The project’s synchronic
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snapshot technique draws upon Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s historical col-
lage “In 1926: Living On the Edge of Time”, which catalogues a broad
range of literary, journalistic, academic and political texts according to
“arrays” (i.e., artifacts, roles or activities) and binary and collapsed codes
in order to create the particular atmosphere (or Stimmung, as Gumbrecht
calls it) of that year (Gumbrecht 1997). By applying Gumbrecht’s historio-
graphic and aesthetic approach to the Arab world in 2016, the project
opens the approach up to digital, visual and audio sources and thus trans-
forms the collage into a digital hypertext. With the collection of raw data
now complete, the various textual items are currently being analyzed, ar-
ranged and catalogued. Preliminary findings suggest arrays of phenomena
such as “sexual harassment”, “narrow spaces”, “closed rooms”, “vulnera-
bility”, “Facebook” or “emotionalism” are relevant, while binary codes
such as “courage vs. fear”, “idle man vs. hard-working woman”, “Rolls
vs. Volkswagen” or “piety vs. blasphemy” are also prevalent (Guth 2016 a:
229ff.). In addition, some preliminary studies have been published in a
special issue of the Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, including stud-
ies on Tunisian Facebook posts, a snapshot of recent Arab films and an
overview of popular literary genres in Egypt (Achour-Kallel 2016; Guth
2016 b; Jacquemond 2016). The project’s planned online “Encyclopedia of
2016”, though still in a nascent state, seeks to enable the reader to “click
himself/herself” through the “world of 2016” and, in this way, approxi-
mate the experience of how it felt to live in Arab contexts five years after
the “Arab Spring”. By combining the literary with the social text and the
printed with the digital text, the project opens up the literary concept of
text. In addition, it emphasizes the interwoven nature of documentation
and feeling.
Literature and art as cultural practices: “Figures of Thought | Turning
Points”
Opening up the text in contemporary Arabic literary studies also involves
a stronger focus on the contexts and conditions of textual production. In so
doing, this approach readdresses the role of literature in society, which is
one of the classical topics of Arabic literary studies. The research project
“Figures of Thought | Turning Points: Cultural Practices and Social
Change in the Arab World” run by Friederike Pannewick at Philipps-Uni-
versität Marburg revisits this relationship (University of Marburg 2015 a).
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Normally, there are two dualisms used to analyze literature in regard to so-
ciety: “either art is seen as a mirror, reflecting society, or it is understood
as a medium of political expression; either it is the social structure that
shapes and fashions the literary work, or it is the work of art that impacts
on a social context” (University of Marburg 2015 b). To escape these du-
alisms, the project reads literature and the arts as cultural practices. In oth-
er words, literature and the arts, because they construct society and are
constructed by society, are involved in the conditions of their own produc-
tion. From this perspective, the text is located within what Stuart Hall has
called a “circuit of culture”, which includes the production, consumption
and regulation of the text and the identity of its agents in addition to the
artistic and political signification of the text (see Pannewick 2014; Pan-
newick & Khalil 2015). This approach includes studies on the literary
field or the habitus of authors (see Jacquemond 2015; Lang 2016), but
may also include the visual and performing arts (see Albers 2015; Eickhof
2016) or even youth and sport practices like parkour, in which one uses
one’s body to clear obstacles (see Braune 2014).
While cultural studies have sometimes been described as a radical form
of contextualization, the “Figures of Thought” project seeks to combine
approaches from literature and art studies with those from cultural studies
and anthropology instead in order to discuss the poetics and aesthetics of a
text along with its social and cultural context. In other words, the project
goes beyond — and eventually returns to — the text. In practice, this may
involve combining a close reading with interviews or mapping intertextu-
ality with fieldwork. The approach, of course, does not refer exclusively to
the Arab uprisings but also to other turning points, such as the foundation
of the state of Israel in 1948 or the nationalization of the Suez Canal in
1956, both of which marked a change in hegemonic figures of thought and
the cultural practice of arts.
Although several cultural, social and anthropological studies of Arabic
literature and arts predate the Arab uprisings (see Jacquemond 2003;
Mehrez 2008), their attendant cultural revolution has compelled scholars
of Arabic literature to incorporate a broader spectrum of sociological and
anthropological approaches to the analysis of textual production and its
contexts. In other words, the Arab uprisings pushed interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to the forefront that are able to address and grasp more compre-
hensively the opening up of literary texts in societies undergoing transfor-
mation. Responding to the urgency and relevance of political and social
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transformation, these perspectives thus gained greater academic legitima-
cy in the field of Arabic literary studies.
Networks: Towards collaborative research with Arab academia
The processes of political and social transformation underway since the
Arab uprisings have had an impact not only on the content and focus of
academic research in Arabic literary studies, but have also affected condi-
tions and means of scientific cooperation. While scholars in this field have
never been limited to their national realm, international exchange and co-
operation has mostly taken place among colleagues working at academic
institutions in the West alone and has only rarely involved universities in
the Arab world — with the exception of Western-style universities such as
the American University of Beirut or the American University in Cairo.
As in other disciplines, knowledge production in the field of Arabic stud-
ies in internationally renowned publications is still widely dominated by
scholars based in Europe and the United States.1 Research conducted at
universities in the Arab world, particularly if published in Arabic or by an
Arab publisher, is often neglected by Western colleagues. This is due in
part to practical matters of visibility and availability, but there are also
epistemological reasons for this blind spot. These include discrepancies in
research interests and academic traditions, Arab academia’s reticence to
address presumably sensitive topics, and reservations prevailing in West-
ern academia regarding the use of Arabic as an academic language. These
limitations have far-reaching consequences. They hamper close coopera-
tion and comprehensive exchange across cultural and geographical bor-
ders, and exclude Arab scholars in the region from contributing to interna-
tionally acknowledged knowledge production. Given the current state of
affairs in our globalized world and the challenges faced by the Middle
East and North Africa in particular, a serious and sustainable exchange of
views and experiences between scholars in the West and the Arab world is
urgently needed in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of
the pressing matters that require an effective response from all stakehold-
ers.
1 For a similar conclusion regarding their respective fields of research, see the contri-
butions by Carola Richter and Hanan Badr, Florian Kohstall and Jan Claudius
Völkel in this volume.
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In recent years, the number of Western–Arab cooperation and exchange
programs has increased significantly. Moving beyond isolated exchange
between individual scholars with shared research interests, many of these
programs now function as a framework to ensure ongoing exchange be-
tween individuals and institutions. As a result, they have built up a transre-
gional network that continues to grow. The two initiatives presented in the
following illustrate the major challenges faced by this form of academic
cooperation and its achievements thus far. By discussing these initiatives,
we also identify the challenges ahead in improving Arab world-based
scholars’ access to international academic output and ensuring that their
academic contributions are recognized and incorporated into international
knowledge production. This requires an awareness in Western academia of
the need to take account of research literature published in Arabic and
thereby expose itself to hitherto disregarded perspectives and diverse read-
ings. Both examples demonstrate how opening up the text productively
can be achieved in Western academia.
Building a transregional network — an interdisciplinary postdoctoral
fellowship program
In the broader field of Middle East studies, the Berlin-based “Europe in
the Middle East — The Middle East in Europe” (EUME) research pro-
gram, which is part of the larger research organization Forum Transre-
gionale Studien, represents one of the most significant efforts in terms of
budget, plus the variety of instruments and the number of disciplines and
institutions involved. Launched in 2006 as a joint initiative of the Berlin-
Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the Fritz Thyssen
Foundation and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, EUME is a multidisci-
plinary program with a distinct research and research policy agenda.
EUME has set new academic standards in Middle East studies research by
aiming to “recollect the legacies of Europe in the Middle East and of the
Middle East in Europe in an inclusive way that aims to do justice to their
entanglements” and “rethink key concepts and premises that divide Euro-
pe from the Middle East” (EUME 2011 a: 1). With regard to research poli-
cy, EUME aims to rethink prevailing disciplinary structures in Germany
and most other Western countries. This involves exploring “problems in-
herent in the academic division of labor between Area Studies and the sys-
tematic disciplines” which exclude non-European history and literature
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from the “systematic” disciplines and thereby delegate “the study of non-
European cultures and societies to regional experts and institutionally
small disciplines” (EUME 2011 b: 7). Finally, and most significantly in
terms of international exchange, the program sets an example by establish-
ing new forms of academic cooperation and networking. A key element
here is the postdoctoral fellowship program, which allows young scholars
from Middle Eastern and other countries to pursue their own projects
within the EUME framework. In addition to providing a forum for inter-
disciplinary academic debate through a seminar held every two weeks, the
framework helps to integrate the fellows, according to their academic dis-
ciplines, into university departments or academic institutions involved in
the project (EUME 2011 b: 19). The fellowship program is complemented
by a series of summer academies. Most often held at an academic institu-
tion in the Middle East, these summer academies foster the growth of
scholarly networks by providing an additional 20 doctoral and postdoctor-
al students with the opportunity to discuss relevant topics in an interna-
tional and multidisciplinary environment (EUME 2011 b: 20). The pro-
gram thus aims to create “a platform that rests upon the idea of ‘learning
communitiesʼ (Wolf Lepenies) and the principle of ‘research with, rather
than research onʼ” (EUME 2011 a: 1). By placing scholars from different
backgrounds on an equal footing, the program provides participants with
the opportunity to familiarize themselves with different scholarly tradi-
tions, approaches and debates and thereby overcome the divide between
them (EUME 2011 b: 7–8). A network of more than 200 scholars based in
the MENA region and beyond has emerged from the project, which con-
tinues to stimulate research activities within the program as a whole and
within the specific institutions involved. The program also engages in pub-
lic outreach, organizing debates and artistic presentations in public venues
(EUME 2011 b: 8).
Towards multiperspectivity and self-reflection — an Arab-German
summer school program
A related though slightly different aim is targeted by the “Arabische
Philologien im Blickwechsel / متعـددة بـرؤى عربية دراسات نحو ” (Towards Mul-
ti-Perspectival Arabic Studies) initiative, in which the authors of this arti-
cle are directly involved. Still in an initial stage of realization, the initia-
tive has a twofold agenda: to facilitate the systematic exchange of perspec-
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tives and experiences between scholars from universities in Germany and
the Arab world, and to foster the use of Arabic as an academic language
(Arabic Philologies 2014).
The project’s summer school program format is designed to engage es-
tablished and junior scholars alike. Professors, PhD students and postdoc-
toral researchers from Arab and Western universities are invited to discuss
current, innovative approaches to Arabic philology, literature and culture.
The summer school’s tandem teaching method renders participants’ differ-
ences and commonalities visible and comprehensible. In addition to ad-
dressing issues of contemporary relevance, the summer school encourages
participants to reflect on their work at the meta-level. This involves ques-
tioning the premises and priority objectives of our work while exploring
the drivers of existing discrepancies, such as differences in epistemologi-
cal or sociopolitical conditions.2
The conceptual framework for the summer school program emerged
from Arab–German cooperation workshops held in Cairo in 2011. Since
then, two trial runs have been held at international workshops in Berlin.
The first, held in 2011, focused on the tandem teaching method and fea-
tured participants discussing a text or topic from different perspectives at
each session. The second, held in 2014, took the form of a workshop-cum-
summer school, in which potential key issues and approaches were ex-
plored and the summer school program’s concept was put into practice. In
both cases, the bilingual environment combined with an intercultural tan-
dem teaching method brought to light remarkable differences across re-
search traditions but also underscored the shared approaches and concepts.
The alternate use of two languages (German and Arabic in the first case,
English and Arabic in the second) raised awareness of the impact of lin-
guistic usage and the need to discuss the translation, or even the very
translatability, of academic terms and concepts (Milich & Sadek 2014;
Junge & Winckler 2015). In September 2017, a summer school focusing
“Entangled Perspectives on Theory, Arts, and History in the Field of Ara-
bic Literary Studies” was held at the American University of Beirut
(AGYA 2018; Fischione, Ghoname & Monaco 2018). The next summer
school which is planned to be held at the University Mohamed V in Rabat
2 For more information on why and how working conditions differ, see Florian
Kohstall’s contribution in this volume.
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in September 2018, will discuss “Interdisciplinary Approaches to Feeling,
Affect, and Body in Arabic Literature, Arts, and Culture”.
The idea behind this project was born in the spirit of optimism sur-
rounding the Arab uprisings. Originally scheduled to be held in Cairo in
September 2013, the workshop-cum-summer school was conceived with
the processes of social, political and academic transformation in mind.
However, as a result of the changes in Egypt in the summer of 2013 and
the volatile security situation, the workshop had to be postponed and was
eventually held in Berlin in 2014. Despite such challenges, projects of this
nature are more important than ever because they help to promote and sus-
tain international intellectual exchange among Arab and Western scholars
in the face of a substantial lack of intellectual freedom. Furthermore, they
advance the inclusion of younger scholars in international academic ex-
change. Finally, despite security issues, it is important to carry out pro-
grams like the summer school in Arab countries, where a broader spec-
trum of academic participants can gain access to such exchange.
Language: practicing and teaching Arabic as a modern academic
language
Conceptions of how to use and teach Arabic have undergone substantial
changes in recent years.3 A growing number of Arabic literature and cul-
ture scholars feel uncomfortable with the way Arabic has been used and
addressed in academic teaching at Western universities. Although attitudes
and teaching methods have changed considerably in recent decades, Ara-
bic is still dealt with in the West almost exclusively as a language of writ-
ten sources rather than being practiced as a living language of knowledge
production and academic communication. This is reflected in the fact that
the research literature discussed in classes is usually written in English,
German or French, rather than in Arabic. The same is true of introductory
literature or handbooks, which almost exclusively refer to non-Arabic ti-
tles. The scientific terms, concepts and approaches used are most often
originally developed in Western languages, while there is little if any dis-
3 For a comprehensive discussion of how the recent Arab uprisings have changed the
way Arabic as a foreign language is taught, focusing on the example of the Ameri-
can University of Beirut, see the contribution by Bilal Orfali, Rana Siblini and Ma-
ha Houssami in this volume.
Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge
80
cussion of the concepts and academic approaches used in modern Arabic
research literature. Finally, as is the case within the field of Arabic and
Middle East studies in general, international conferences dealing with
Arabic literature and culture are almost exclusively held in languages oth-
er than Arabic — typically English or French. This aspect of academic
practice has a significant bearing on the arguments made in the previous
section of this article; in order to realize the principle of “research with,
rather than research on”, we argue that it is imperative that scholars from
the West and from Arab countries meet on an equal footing. This implies
that scholars in the West should no longer restrict their interest to what has
already been translated — both in the literal and figurative sense — into
Western languages and concepts. Instead, the academic community should
consider what is published and discussed in Arabic, taking account of the
region’s academic traditions and recent debates. This requires the prevail-
ing practice of text consumption being opened up into a matter-of-course
use of Arabic as a living language of knowledge production and academic
communication, in both its written and spoken forms.
To achieve these goals, changes are necessary both on the levels of con-
sciousness and of capabilities. Scholars have to become more aware of the
effects of language use; however, providing students and junior scholars
with the ability to read and discuss research literature in Arabic is even
more urgent. In recent years, a number of initiatives seeking to address
this shortcoming have been created. We will present four of these initia-
tives, which function on different levels, including (1) enabling German
students to plunge into the Arabic language within the region itself, expe-
riencing the way Arabic literature is taught at universities in the Arab
world; (2) professionalizing the teaching of Arabic as a foreign language;
(3) giving German students of Arabic and Arab students of German the
opportunity to interact both on a linguistic level and in the areas of culture,
history and lived experiences; and (4) creating links between the various
efforts to promote and strengthen the teaching of Arabic as a foreign lan-
guage on both the individual and institutional levels.
Bachelor Plus in Oriental Studies — a one-year study-abroad program for
undergraduate students
Funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Bache-
lor Plus program is not restricted to any particular university or discipline.
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The program is aimed at establishing four-year bachelor’s degree pro-
grams at German universities, allowing students to spend an academic
year abroad that is fully integrated into the curriculum. The Philipps-Uni-
versität Marburg offers its Near and Middle East studies students this op-
portunity alongside a more traditional three-year bachelor’s degree pro-
gram. Students enrolled in the “B.A. Orientwissenschaft (international)”
program who spend their third year abroad can choose among selected
universities in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Iran or
Tajikistan. During the first half of their stay abroad, students attend inten-
sive language courses, and in the second half either attend regular courses
in their academic discipline at the host university or complete a five-
month internship. The qualifications acquired during the students’ years
abroad are integrated into their bachelor’s degree programs, and are dis-
played on their bachelor’s certificates (University of Marburg 2016 a; ZAS
2016).
German–Algerian joint program for professionalizing the teaching of
Arabic as a foreign language
In 2016, the Department of Arabic Studies at the University of Bamberg
launched an exchange project in conjunction with the Department of Ara-
bic Language and Literature at the University of Oran I Ahmed Ben Bella.
The idea resulted from the above-mentioned discontent with the current
situation regarding opportunities for German students of Arabic to practice
the language in an academic context, as well as from the observation that
teaching Arabic as a foreign language (TAFL) remains a developing but
still nascient field. Thus, the “Arabic as a Foreign Language in the Algeri-
an Context” (Arabisch als Fremdsprache im algerischen Kontext /
الجزائـــري الســياق في بغيرهـا للنـاطقين العربيـة اللغة ) project, funded by the German
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for an initial period of three years,
was established with the goal of creating a lasting student exchange be-
tween the two cooperating departments. The project has two complemen-
tary aims: first, strengthening German students’ ability to use Arabic as a
living language for academic teaching and communication, and second, to
establish teaching Arabic as a foreign language as an academic training
program at the University of Oran. In order to prepare a sustainable stu-
dent exchange, two exploratory workshops were held, one in Bamberg in
April 2016, and the other in Oran in October of the same year. Both fo-
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cused on the use of Arabic as a language of communication in academic
settings. In addition to activities providing insights into living and study
conditions at the two participating universities, the workshops included
lectures on teaching methods in the fields of Arabic language and Arabic
literature and culture, while also providing the German students with an
opportunity to present their own research in Arabic. Another meeting took
place in Bamberg in summer 2017 with the goal of establishing terms for a
continuous student exchange. Thus, each year, two students from Bamberg
will travel to Oran to attend language courses and regular literature classes
alongside local Arabic literature students. Similarly, one PhD student from
Oran will have the opportunity to spend an academic term at the Universi-
ty of Bamberg, thus enhancing his or her practical and conceptual skills in
the field of teaching Arabic as a foreign language (University of Bamberg
2016).
“Cross-Cultural Exchange via Translation” — tandem workshop for
German and Tunisian students
Another workshop which aimed at bringing together university students
from Germany and an Arab country was held in Tunis in January 2017 un-
der the title “Cross-Cultural Exchange via Translation — Tandem Transla-
tion Workshop for Students from Germany and Tunisia” (AGYA 2017;
University of Münster 2017). The idea behind this initiative was to allow
students studying the language, history, literature and culture of the part-
ner country to practice their chosen foreign language while also exchang-
ing ideas regarding literature, culture, history, daily life, and recent region-
al and global developments. Organized within the framework of the Arab–
German Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities (AGYA) in cooper-
ation with the University of Münster and the University of Tunis El Man-
ar, the workshop brought together students enrolled in the German depart-
ment at the Higher Institute of Human Sciences (ISSHT) at the University
of Tunis El Manar with Arabic and Islamic studies students from the Uni-
versity of Münster. Around 30 graduate and undergraduate students met in
Tunis, and were tasked with translating a selection of literary texts and
cultural essays from Arabic into German and vice versa. For many of the
participants, the workshop was a first occasion to practice the foreign lan-
guage and be exposed to it on a wider scale — that is, both in an academic
context and in daily-life situations. Forming tandem groups consisting of
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two Tunisian and two German participants, the students of both universi-
ties were able to benefit from their partners’ linguistic, cultural, historical
and sociopolitical expertise. While working on the translations, they dis-
cussed in-depth questions of language, linguistic usage and problems of
translation, as well as issues related to the mentalities, points of view and
living conditions reflected and expressed in the various texts. In the medi-
um term, the project aims at establishing exchange programs between the
two departments in particular and the two universities in general (especial-
ly within the humanities). This is ultimately intended to encompass both
research and teaching, and will involve graduate and undergraduate stu-
dents as well as postgraduate students and experienced researchers. The
tandem translation workshop was meant as a pilot project, which organiz-
ers hope to continue on a regular basis.
A professional association promoting the teaching of Arabic as a foreign
language
The last initiative we will present here functions on the broader political
and institutional level of cultural and educational policy. In September
2016, a number of academics from or close to the Department of Arabic
Studies at the University of Bamberg founded the Fachverband Arabisch
e. V., a professional association that seeks to create links between the vari-
ous efforts to promote and strengthen the teaching of Arabic as a foreign
language on both the individual and institutional levels (Fachverband Ara-
bisch 2016). The association was modeled on similar associations for oth-
er languages that have existed and wielded considerable influence in Ger-
many for several decades. It is focused on encouraging the teaching of
Arabic at all education levels — secondary schools and universities — as
well as on fostering research-based approaches to the didactics of lan-
guage and culture. The association’s creation was driven by the perception
of gaps in the current academic infrastructure. For example, Arabic is the
only official language of the United Nations for which no academic train-
ing in its instruction as a foreign language in secondary schools is avail-
able in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. At the same time, interest in
learning Arabic within secondary schools is on the rise. The association’s
current work focuses on remedying this obvious discrepancy, seeking to
establish Arabic as a foreign language regularly taught at the secondary
level by adequately trained teachers. In February 2018, the association or-
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ganized a conference addressing the issue of “Arabic as a Foreign Lan-
guage”. It also plans to establish a yearbook dealing with the same topic in
the near future.
Societal commitment: outside the ivory tower
While the Arab world is currently the center of a far-reaching transforma-
tion process, Europe is also being affected by this process in many re-
spects. Due to the vast number of Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees mak-
ing their way to Europe in 2015, many German universities and academic
institutions created programs to facilitate access and provide financial sup-
port for refugee students and scholars. Freie Universität Berlin’s “Wel-
come@FUBerlin” program, for instance, offers German language courses
to prospective students, allows them to attend selected academic seminars
free of charge, and provides comprehensive preparatory courses (through
a so-called Studienkolleg program) which ready students for academic
studies (Freie Universität Berlin n.d.). A number of German funding insti-
tutions, including the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German
Research Foundation) and the Volkswagen Foundation, provide current re-
search projects with additional grants specifically aimed at integrating
refugee scholars (DFG 2015; VolkswagenStiftung 2017). The “Philipp
Schwartz Initiative”, set up by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
offers funding to universities or academic institutions that host scholars at
risk (Humboldt Foundation n.d.), while the “Adopt an Academic” mentor-
ing program instituted by the Arab–German Young Academy of Sciences
and Humanities (AGYA) and Freie Universität Berlin provides scholars
support in their new academic environment (AGYA n.d.).
Arabic studies programs in Germany have to take account of these chal-
lenges and play a role in shaping these changes, at least to the degree pos-
sible within the framework of their academic expertise. Most institutes of
Arabic studies in Germany are already making considerable efforts in this
regard, with projects ranging from tandem language and culture courses to
providing information in the Arabic language to help newcomers integrate
into society and the workforce — generally in cooperation with the public
employment services (see University of Marburg 2016 b). However, future
challenges will probably require Arabic studies programs to engage in a
long-lasting and sustainable course of societal commitment within Ger-
many. This article suggests three possible avenues for such a commitment.
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First, using Arabic at Arabic studies departments and teaching Arabic at
secondary schools should be fostered. In order to make it easier for Arab
refugees to study Arabic literature at German universities, selected semi-
nars and lectures should be conducted in Arabic. As a positive side effect,
this would also improve the language skills of other students of Arabic. In
the long term, however, the main aim is to establish Arabic as a state-ap-
proved foreign language in German secondary schools, as demanded by
the newly founded Fachverband Arabisch. If integration is conceived not
as a one-way street, but rather as a process that goes in two directions, the
teaching and learning of Arabic will gain broader importance — and pro-
vide university level Arabic studies programs with a new task, namely that
of training instructors able to teach Arabic as a foreign language. Taking
this path, with all its challenges, would provide Arabic studies with new
and immediate relevance for German society.
Second, a greater focus should be placed on studying and teaching Ara-
bic literature written in Germany. A number of Arab and especially Syrian
writers now live in Germany, including established authors such as Nihad
Siris (b. 1950) and Rosa Yassin Hassan (b. 1974); moreover, new voices
are emerging, thus making Arabic literature written in Germany a fast-
growing and important field for Arabic literary studies. Studying this topic
may help these still marginalized authors to gain more visibility and im-
prove their reputations within the German cultural sphere (Jarmakani
2017). In the long run, some of these authors will probably shift to writing
in German, as have other Arab authors including the Syrian poet Adel
Karasholi (b. 1936), who has lived in Germany since 1959, and the Iraqi
novelist Abbas Khider (b. 1973), who came to Germany in 2000. Their
works are now an integral part of contemporary German literature. In the
same way that Arab–American literature written mainly in English creates
links between Arabic and American literature programs — or even be-
tween Arabic, American literature and Romance language departments for
works in Spanish or Portuguese (Ette & Pannewick 2006) — the study of
Arab–German literature should involve close cooperation between Arabic
and German literature departments.
Third, greater efforts should be made to translate Arabic literature and
Arab culture for a German audience. This should include translating Ara-
bic texts into German, while also ensuring that the translations are re-
viewed in German newspapers. At least for the present, the Arab uprisings
and their subsequent humanitarian disasters have generated a new interest
in literary and cultural anthologies dealing with the region (Bender 2014;
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Halasa, Omareen & Mahfoud 2014). This interest also encompasses litera-
ture written by Arab authors in Germany (Weg sein — hier sein 2016).
While Arabic literature still has a hard time achieving recognition within
the German cultural sphere (Reif 2014; Jamarkani 2017), Arabic literary
studies programs could help whet this interest, for instance by referencing
Arab authors living in Germany in an online encyclopedia, or by launch-
ing a German language journal for Arabic literature, continuing the work
of former journals such as Diwan: Zeitschrift für arabische und deutsche
Poesie (2001–2006) and Lisan: Zeitschrift für arabische Literatur (2006–
2012). Moreover, Arabic studies departments could convey their knowl-
edge about the Arab world more frequently and effectively to cultural
multipliers, social workers and primary and secondary school pupils by
engaging in public lectures and workshops.
Certainly, the options available to scholars seeking to act on their soci-
etal commitment depend largely on the prevailing academic culture, which
often limits ambitions to the purely academic realm. However, if they are
to help meet future challenges in German society, departments of Arabic
studies should be aware of their social responsibilities, and contribute
within the limits of their ability to the successful integration of refugees
and migrants in Germany. For both scholars and programs of Arabic stud-
ies, going beyond the text will be a first and vital step.
Conclusion
The field of Arabic literary studies in Germany has been affected in many
ways by the recent Arab uprisings. Though not the only drivers of change
in the field, these political and cultural transformations and the sense of
urgency and heightened relevance they have created have definitely accel-
erated developments already underway. These dynamics have fostered an
opening up of the text that is not only manifest in academic research ap-
proaches but also in academic networking, the practice and teaching of
Arabic, and demonstrations of societal commitment.
These changes are thus affecting the field of Arabic literary studies as a
whole. Indeed, faced with the fundamental changes in the literary field it-
self, Arabic literary studies have developed new perspectives on modern
Arabic literature, expanded the canon of literary forms and are revisiting
the relationship between literature and sociopolitical conditions. In addi-
tion, scholars in the field are increasingly emphasizing the importance of
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collaborative research and sustainable exchange between scholars based in
the West and the Arab world. Moreover, they are working to ensure that
Arabic is acknowledged in international academic contexts as a living lan-
guage of knowledge production and communication. In Germany in par-
ticular, scholars are also working to raise awareness of Arabic as an in-
creasingly important language of cultural and social life in the country.
While scholars of Arabic literature will certainly need to build on these
initial steps, the field itself is clearly on the move.
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An Uprising in Teaching Arabic Language
Bilal Orfali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami
Dramatic political and social changes involving geographic regions or reli-
gious and ethnic groups increase the academic interest in those places,
their people and the languages they speak. Over the past 15 years, aca-
demics and practitioners focused on teaching Arabic as a foreign language
(TAFL) have witnessed their field undergo considerable change, both in
the form of quantitative growth and a qualitative shift, with the increase in
the number of learners accompanied by a widespread interest in learning
Arabic across different fields of specialization. In the same period, the
Arab world has become an increasingly popular destination for study-
abroad programs aimed at teaching language and culture in their natural
settings. This demand for Arabic instruction from within a wider and natu-
rally more diverse student body has led to the development of new teach-
ing techniques.
This article discusses how the daily political and social experiences in
the Arab world inspired some of the teaching philosophies and practices at
the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies (CAMES) at the Ameri-
can University of Beirut (AUB) in Lebanon. The CAMES Arabic lan-
guage summer program offers intensive courses at eight different levels:
introductory, high introductory, low intermediate, intermediate, high inter-
mediate, advanced, high advanced and superior. The program emphasizes
the instruction of Modern Standard Arabic, or MSA (fuṣḥā). CAMES also
runs an intensive summer program in colloquial Lebanese Arabic. The
MSA program runs for seven weeks and offers highly intensive course-
work in Arabic. Each day, students receive six hours of classroom instruc-
tion in MSA, with additional exposure to colloquial Lebanese Arabic.
Classes are held daily from Monday to Friday, for a total of 30 hours of
classroom instruction each week. The total of 186 hours of MSA and col-
loquial instruction is the equivalent of nine credit hours at the AUB, which
are transferable to other universities (CAMES 2016). While the program




This article highlights the specific nature of studying Arabic in Beirut,
where students can experience and witness transformations in the Arab
world first-hand. Furthermore, the article describes how the abundance of
authentic material accessible to instructors at the AUB has inevitably been
accompanied by many challenges at the curricular, co-curricular and ad-
ministrative levels. Finally, this article departs from the discussion of the
CAMES Summer Arabic Program to understand the impact of the Arab
uprisings on TAFL as a field more generally.
9/11 versus the Arab uprisings
The 9/11 events in the United States in 2001 led to a major turning point
in TAFL. Policymakers and students in the United States and across the
Western world felt the need to learn more about the emerging “enemy”
who had attacked them at home. This development was the precursor of a
second wave of innovation in the field that would take place a decade later
in 2011, parallel to the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) regions. The increase in financial governmental support
for Arabic language programs following 9/11 was mirrored by the nearly
instantaneous increase in student interest. Arabic is now the eighth most
studied foreign language in the United States (Modern Language Associa-
tion 2010). In his study on the teaching of Arabic in the United States after
9/11, Chris Stone (2014) discusses the motives of studying “critical” lan-
guages, building on Mary Louise Pratt’s notion of using the language itself
as a “weapon”, rather than regarding a greater interest in language learn-
ing as a mere side effect of an act of war. Arabic became relevant not only
because it provides direct access to several cultures and heritages, but also
because it is the language of a direct threat. Studying it became a “nation-
al” necessity. This left its mark on the way Arabic is taught; communica-
tive approaches quickly came to dominate the language curricula, replac-
ing traditional methods that focused on the grammar and philology neces-
sary to access the classical written heritage.
The Arab uprisings prompted interest in the Arab region and its lan-
guage despite the budget cuts that humanities programs in the United
States have faced as a result of the world economic recession. The massive
scale of the uprisings and their multifaceted consequences captured the
world’s attention, particularly as they constituted a threat to the interests of
major powers. The changes that the 9/11 events prompted within Arabic
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language curricula became even more relevant and necessary.1 Arabic in
this context constituted a language of change, protest and revolution (see
Mehrez 2012). Traveling to the region became increasingly necessary to
follow the rapid changes taking place, yet increasingly more difficult for
students of the language. Uncensored, slang-inflected and colloquial Ara-
bic was ubiquitous on the streets and on social media, while making little
appearance in language textbooks. The traditional methods of approaching
the language were being challenged once again.
Lebanon and the Arab uprisings
Syria and Egypt were attractive destinations for learners of Arabic due to
the reasonable cost of living there and the unpopularity of foreign lan-
guages among their natives, which enabled students of Arabic to practice
the language with native speakers. However, the growing degree of inse-
curity in the countries that participated in the uprisings, especially Egypt
and Syria, triggered a shift in viable study-abroad locations. Since 2011,
this has led to the diversion of a large number of students from Egypt and
Syria to Morocco, Lebanon or Jordan. Lebanon itself was not host to an
uprising that demanded the fall of the country’s governing regime, but the
effect of the Arab uprisings more generally cannot be underestimated in a
country where refugees constitute a considerable portion of the population
(see UNHCR country profile 2016). The Syrian uprising in particular left
its mark on Lebanon on many levels — social, political, economic and hu-
manitarian. The uprising also triggered numerous debates within the coun-
try within different sectarian, social and political circles, especially given
Hezbollah’s substantial military involvement in support of the Syrian
regime. Hezbollah and the Syrian regime are widely accused of perpetrat-
ing the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minis-
ter and an influential political figure in the country as it emerged from a
long civil war and remained under Syrian military control for years. More-
over, since 2011 a large number of Syrian refugees have sought shelter
from the emergent civil war in their home country, with their presence in-
creasing pressure on Lebanon’s already weak economy. At times Lebanon
1 See the contribution by Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge in this volume for a
more detailed account on the implications for Arab literature studies in general.
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itself has experienced serious security threats, for example when clashes
occurred in northern Lebanon, where a significant Alawite community re-
sides in an area with a predominantly Sunni population. Despite this,
Lebanon has continued to be relatively attractive for tourists and foreign
students, especially safe havens such as the AUB. These students have
been able to experience closely the Arab uprisings — its agents and conse-
quences — in a relatively safe setting.
Remapping the destinations for studying Arabic abroad
The Arab uprisings clearly rerouted learners of Arabic to safer study-
abroad destinations. Jordan, Morocco and Oman quickly became the top
destinations for students from Europe and North America. An abundance
of advertisements on email lists and at conferences promoted new and
long-established programs in these countries. As noted in Mitch Smith’s
(2012) article, “many American universities will not support study-abroad
programs in countries with travel warnings, and sometimes refuse to ac-
cept transfer credits from institutions in those nations or withhold financial
aid for students traveling there against the advice of the government and
college”. Universities with strict policies regarding travel warnings have
moved some of their programs and students from Egypt and Syria to Jor-
dan, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates (Smith 2012). While almost
all colleges take such warnings seriously, some pursue a lenient policy if
they trust the academic standing of the host institution and its seriousness
in dealing with security issues. Beirut, for example, was certainly caught
up in the consequences of both travel warnings and a lack of funding, but
also became a viable alternative for students who were not discouraged by
the unrest in the Middle East, who needed to do research in Lebanon, or
who wanted to experience the Arab uprisings and their repercussions up
close (see Faddoul 2013).
The period following the Arab uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011
witnessed two waves of change with regard to enrollment in the Summer
Arabic Program (SAP) at CAMES.2 From 2008 to 2010, an average of 72
students enrolled in the SAP each year. The summer of 2008 marked a
2 For a review of some of the summer programs in Lebanon, see Samaha & Houbeish
2014. See also http://www.studyabroad.com/programs/middle+east,lebanon/summe
r+program/default.aspx.
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year of relative stability in Lebanon, and for the SAP as well, following
the disturbances related to the 2006 war with Israel (when 60 students en-
rolled). The summer of 2010 (during which 76 students enrolled) was the
last summer before any repercussions related to the Arab uprisings took
effect in Lebanon. Starting in January 2011, and in the following few
months as most applicants were choosing their study-abroad destinations,
the probability of the uprisings reaching Lebanon in a kind of domino ef-
fect was still appreciable. This explains the slight decrease in SAP student
enrollment during the summer of 2011 (65 students). In contrast, the en-
rollment rate in the summer of 2012 gained momentum, reaching 86 stu-
dents. This was one of the positive effects of the Arab uprisings, as felt in
the TAFL field in Lebanon. The growing interest in Lebanon was boosted
by the difficulty of pursuing studying abroad in Syria or Egypt. Even
though the political situation in Lebanon was not wholly stable, students
who enrolled in the SAP were willing to take on the associated level of
risk. It is worth noting that the American University in Beirut campus and
the surrounding Ras Beirut area are particularly attractive to students from
abroad, as they have been safe havens in the midst of many past conflicts.
Smith (2012) quotes AUB Director of International Programs Katherine
Nugent Yngve as saying: “The benefits of studying in Lebanon outweigh
the risks. (...) Many US students tell us that they feel the State Depart-
ment’s travel warning is an unfair impediment to studying abroad at the
AUB, as do their parents, and sometimes their study-abroad advisers.”
Starting in 2013, a general sense of disillusion regarding the prospects
for improvements in political and security conditions resulting from the
Arab uprisings began spreading in Lebanon and other countries in the
Arab world. As a result, SAP enrollment decreased (63 students). At this
point, Lebanon was struggling to deal with the repercussions of the Syrian
crisis.3 The tension felt across Lebanon diverted many students away from
CAMES. However, this relative decrease stabilized in the following two
years as Syria fell into civil war (60 students in 2014, 62 students in
2015).
3 See also the contribution by Ammar Abdulrahman in this volume on the implica-
tions of the geographical closeness of Syria and Lebanon for the field of archaeolo-
gy.
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A shift in learners’ motives
The decrease in the number of learners applying to study Arabic in
Lebanon since 2010 has been outweighed by the increased levels of moti-
vation within the student body. The students who joined the SAP after the
Arab uprisings were those who were willing to take the risk of traveling to
the Middle East. They were interested both in the events surrounding them
as well as in the ongoing transformations, not only of political regimes but
also of the surrounding culture and values. Many expressed the fact that
they appreciated the opportunity to be in the Middle East, and felt better
equipped to understand the nature and events of the Arab uprisings than
peers who had shied away from the region. Students were thus eager to
learn about the instrumental, social, cultural and intellectual dynamics that
had led to the uprisings.
Additions to the curriculum
The wide scope of the teaching materials used at CAMES includes text-
books that are supplemented with readings and materials adapted from
current events. Although the program has adopted the Al-Kitaab fii Taʿal-
lum Al-ʿArabiya series by Al-Batal, Brustad and Al-Tonsi, the resources
added to the curriculum by instructors and coordinators expose learners to
real-life events in the comfort of their classrooms, while encouraging them
to find out more about various issues that emerge during their stay in
Lebanon outside class time. For example, one of the classes taught a unit
on prominent women in the Arab world, and connected that theme to the
Arab women’s rights movement that was actively establishing a presence
in social media and organizing demonstrations in Beirut. The final class
discussion helped students connect the dots between the movement they
were witnessing in Beirut and the issue of sexual harassment, which was a
major concern at that time in Tunisia and Egypt.
Lectures in the program also shifted in focus to help students gain a bet-
ter sense of the changing face of Beirut and Lebanon. One of the general
lectures in the summer of 2013 contrasted Lebanese folk music with rising
forms of alternative music then gaining ground in Beirut as a result of new
realities in the Middle East. For example, Mazen El Sayyed, known as El
Rass, is an Arab hip-hop rapper who sings in support of political and so-
cial change, thereby rebelling against the status quo (Marrouch 2013). The
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Arab uprisings inspired his song Min thaa’er (From a rebel), which was
used as an example in the general lecture that showed how the fusion of
Modern Standard and colloquial Arabic in his lyrics spoke equally to the
Arab masses and to the educated elites.
In addition to lectures, the SAP offers a set of clubs for students to learn
about Arab culture. The Arabic calligraphy club, for example, sheds light
on an important traditional art form that was used during the Arab upris-
ings as a means of expression and as an element of an emerging form of
graffiti (Nippard 2011; https://beirutwalls.wordpress.com/). A well-known
Lebanese graffiti artist, Yazan Halwani, was invited to address the club
and its participating students. Halwani gave an overview of how graffiti is
helping young Arab artists to creatively voice their discontent with the po-
litical and social situations in their countries using words and imagery in
different forms and colors. Students learned to decipher the graffiti in-
scriptions in class and went on a field trip with the artist to inspect walls in
Beirut that had become an important platform for this art both regionally
and internationally. Students also had the chance to see Halwani at work
and produce their own graffiti-style writings.
Learning about graffiti and expressing oneself in Arabic in this creative
art form was approached not only from a cultural perspective, but also
from a linguistic one. Different graffiti walls were analyzed to identify dif-
ferent grammatical forms, such as imperative verbs in the famous kun maʿ
al-thawra phrase, or the active participle (ism fāʿil) in malik al-ghāba
rākib dabbāba (The king of the forest is driving a tank). Eventually stu-
dents learned about specific stylistic forms in Arabic such as parallelism
and rhymed prose (sajʿ), and practiced producing similar slogans and
phrases. The graffiti and music lectures and other activities and material
used in CAMES highlighted the importance of colloquial variations of
Arabic, a topic we discuss further in the next section.
Increasing interest in colloquial Arabic
The Arab uprisings brought to the fore a closer connection between collo-
quial dialects and Modern Standard Arabic, and encouraged learners of
Arabic as a foreign language to make additional efforts to acquire at least
one form of colloquial Arabic. Academics and practitioners in the TAFL
field had already been shifting toward more structured integration of both
colloquial Arabic and MSA as complementary forms of the same lan-
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guage. The third edition of the Al-Kitaab series presents learners with a
number of Arabic dialects to choose from to complement the MSA portion
of the series. Other series, such as Munther Younes’ ʿArabiyyat Al-Naas,
have also been published, solidly integrating colloquial and Modern Stan-
dard Arabic into everyday lessons.
One of the catalysts which increases students’ motivation to acquire and
even master ʿāmmiyya (colloquial) Arabic is that most of the popular
chants and slogans of the Arab uprisings found on social media and else-
where online were colloquial.4 In the case of CAMES students, the Levan-
tine dialect that students learned in class allowed them to read political
slogans relating to the Syrian uprising and communicate with the increas-
ing number of Syrian refugees arriving in Lebanon. At times, CAMES in-
structors found themselves teaching Damascene and Beiruti colloquial
forms in the same class, delving into the peculiarities of each as well as
the differences between them. One of the most popular Syrian soap op-
eras, Bāb al-Ḥāra (Gate of the Neighborhood), came to be used in the
classrooms as support material in ʿāmmiyya lessons. The series depicts
Middle Eastern society and the popular upheavals that took place during
the period of Western-power colonialization, when Syria was under
French control and Palestine was occupied by the British forces. In the dif-
ferent episodes shown in class, the vocabulary and themes raised provided
students with numerous insights; although the events in the televised se-
ries dated back to the 1930 s, much of what was portrayed echoed the
events and situations happening in the context of the Syrian uprising. Stu-
dents benefited tremendously from the overlap between the language used
in the series, that heard in Beirut among refugees, and that reported in the
news and on social media as used in Syria.
In response to the aforementioned need and demand for ʿāmmiyya,
CAMES launched an ʿāmmiyya track in the summer of 2013, allowing
students aiming to acquire the Lebanese dialect a chance to focus more
specifically on this goal. The material and resources used for students in
this track are based on Educated Spoken Arabic (ESA), a mixture of MSA
and colloquial Arabic. In 2014 and 2015, two different levels of the track
were offered to accommodate students.
4 On the importance of intercultural exchanges for stimulating students’ motivation
see also the contribution of Sarhan Dhouib in this volume.
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Social and community service
Many of the CAMES students wanted to help in the refugee crisis that has
resulted from the civil war in Syria. This prompted CAMES to increase
students’ involvement in social service and community work. The stu-
dents’ interest stemmed both from their commitment to humanitarian
causes and from the opportunity to interact in Arabic with socially disad-
vantaged Lebanese and Arab groups, including Syrians and Palestinians
who knew few or no foreign languages. Students needed to practice their
colloquial Arabic in a setting that would allow them to interact meaning-
fully with locals and refugees from different age levels and backgrounds.
CAMES organized weekly trips to orphanages, retirement homes and
refugee camps, and designed various activities for participants to engage
in. These activities included reading Arabic and English books aloud to
small groups of children, creating and performing sketches and short plays
which addressed the problems faced by the participating groups, inter-
viewing elderly people, and reporting on their experiences in articles pub-
lished in the CAMES SAP newsletter.
In 2014, CAMES worked with NASMA, a grassroots non-governmen-
tal organization located in the Hamra neighborhood close to the AUB that
supports families living in different parts of Beirut, including the refugee
camps. At its resource center, NASMA receives underprivileged children
between the ages of seven and 14 from the surrounding neighborhoods
and offers them after-school support, in addition to other social and artistic
activities organized at its summer camps.5 In 2013, NASMA started ac-
commodating an increasing number of Syrian refugee children. Through-
out that summer, CAMES and NASMA developed a series of activities
that were carried out during the students’ several visits to the NASMA re-
source center. In preparation for their visits, representatives from NASMA
introduced the organization and its beneficiaries to the students. Following
this introduction, students brainstormed in small groups regarding possible
ice-breaking activities that would help them interact with the kids. They
also focused on the importance of doing fun and enjoyable activities. The
language level of each group of students determined the information and
topics they would share with the children. The activities implemented in-
5 For information about NASMA, see http://daleel-madani.org/profile/nasma-learnin
g-and-resource-centre.
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cluded educational tasks, such as setting up a map of Arab countries and
providing facts about them. This activity in particular sparked some very
interesting conversations between the kids and the students, specifically
on the countries most involved in the Arab uprisings, namely Egypt,
Tunisia, Syria and Libya. Students later said they had benefited from hear-
ing another view of the events, and that it had been rewarding for them to
see how young children understood what was going on around them. In
another activity, each person (both the children and the students) drew his
or her home or dream house, and wrote down a small paragraph describing
it. This revealed some insights into the children’s (and students’) social
conditions and their needs or dreams. In many cases, the children would
take the lead in teaching the CAMES students how to say certain words,
correcting them and helping them express their ideas — an experience of
great value from a language-learning perspective.
In addition to weekly group visits with NASMA, CAMES established
an optional language exchange partnership with the Syrian Jusoor NGO
and the Civic Engagement Office at the AUB. Most of the participants
were Syrian university students with a weak command of English who
were teaching Syrian students in special schools for refugees. These stu-
dents formed tandems with CAMES students learning Arabic, and met on
a weekly basis to discuss various topics in English and Arabic. The experi-
ence was very successful and rewarding to students on both sides, and in
many cases the partnership continued via Skype after the summer pro-
gram.
Distributing food to elderly people was another initiative executed via
FoodBlessed, a local hunger-relief initiative founded in 2012 and run by a
group of volunteers in Lebanon.6 Here too, the focus was on learning the
language via social work activities. Students learned the names of dishes
and their ingredients, as well as recipe instructions and related vocabulary.
Moreover, they were able to converse with the elderly in ʿāmmiyya and re-
port on their experiences in class or in essays.
6 For information on these programs, see http://daleel-madani.org/profile/foodblessed
and http://www.foodblessed.org.
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Daunting challenges and solutions
While all the changes previously mentioned brought new materials and
dynamics to the TAFL classroom, they also posed certain challenges. The
ʿāmmiyya material in the textbook was not sufficient to accommodate the
students’ needs. Coordinators responded by organizing workshops and
weekly meetings with instructors to devise a convincing pedagogical cur-
riculum able to incorporate ʿāmmiyya without jeopardizing the MSA cur-
riculum that needed to be covered for the transfer of credits and to satisfy
the requirements of each language level.
One of the biggest challenges for CAMES’ Summer Arabic Program
following the Arab uprisings was channeling students’ interests while also
teaching the language and culture objectively. Lebanon has a complex his-
tory of relations with Syria that has seen good days and bad days. Teach-
ing challenges arose as some of the instructional content brought up sensi-
tive topics discussed in the Lebanese context. Teachers in the program
came from different segments of Lebanese society, and thus had different
opinions about issues such as Hezbollah’s military participation in Syria or
the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Students also had conflicting
opinions that often clashed with those of the teachers or their classmates,
especially since some students were so-called heritage language students
from a Lebanese, Syrian or Egyptian background (Kelleher 2010).
Some of the uprisings were easier to discuss in the classroom than oth-
ers. For instance, the Egyptian uprising was always a “safer” topic than
the Syrian uprising because of its geographical distance. Still, when the
need arose to bring up the Syrian situation in class, CAMES instructors
found ways to work with the material available. For instance, instructors
selected scenes from the Syrian Bāb al-Ḥāra television series for a listen-
ing activity featuring dialogue that could well have been drawn from the
post-uprising period in Syria. Instructors were able to maximize the bene-
fit of watching these scenes and connect the listening to a speaking activi-
ty; students were asked to choose a current news article and a scene from
Bāb al-Ḥāra and compare them. Students’ linguistic gains were comple-
mented by a critical thinking exercise, as they were asked to assess the ac-
curacy of the news articles they were reading by cross-checking informa-
tion from different sources in order to compare terminology, writing style
and even rhetorical devices.
Another way CAMES managed to depoliticize the situation and still in-
volve students in current events was to deal with the events from a social
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and humanitarian perspective. In this regard, instructors worked on devel-
oping the community service programs, which offered students an interac-
tive opportunity to practice their language skills, especially colloquial
Arabic. This was also partly in response to a growing interest, especially
among US students, in them seeking out “short-term volunteering-abroad
experiences that go beyond the traditional model,” as observed by Chris-
tine Farrugia (2015), senior research officer at the Institute of International
Education. According to this study, students seek out opportunities in
which they can engage with community members in various contexts
rather than just receiving knowledge in class by interacting with their pro-
fessors and peers. Along these lines, the CAMES SAP had already been
organizing visits to senior citizen centers and orphanages since 2007, in
response to students having repeatedly expressed the wish to do so in their
end-of-program evaluations. In light of the events of the Arab uprisings,
CAMES was able to take its community service initiative in a new direc-
tion by facilitating student engagement with refugee children, especially
Palestinians and Syrians. Through this community-based activity, students
who chose to come to Lebanon with an interest in exploring a society in
transition were given the opportunity to witness the direct effects of this
change on some of its youth. The importance of this community service in
linguistic terms is that students not only interacted with native speakers,
but also contributed to designing the activities implemented in the pro-
gram.
Conclusion
The Arab uprisings had a major impact on the curriculum used in teaching
Arabic as a foreign language at the AUB. The changes came in response
to demands by students, who asked for more exposure to colloquial Arabic
and more interaction with native speakers. The change was gradual, and in
addition to the curriculum changes, manifested itself in various social
work activities and cultural clubs. These changes helped open up the gates
of the AUB campus to the city of Beirut, and gave refugees and other un-
derprivileged groups access to an academic institution from which they
could benefit in various ways.
It will be interesting to continue to track the effect of the Arab uprisings
on curricula in the Arab world, in Europe and in the United States in order
to be able to generalize about the effect of the uprisings on the TAFL field
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as a whole. The methods devised in the CAMES Summer Arabic Program
already provide some models that can be emulated and developed further
when dealing with the refugee crisis in various Arab states and in Europe.
These methods benefit from the participation of refugees and represent
one way of helping them integrate into their new settings.
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Justice in Transformation: Rethinking Theory and Practice of
the Global Transitional Justice Model
Fatima Kastner
When the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire
on 17 December 2010, he may not have intended to trigger a social-politi-
cal tsunami that swept across North Africa and the Middle East (MENA),
leaving behind fallen authoritarian regimes and former dictators de-
throned, imprisoned or even lynched. However, among the reasons that
might have forced him into such an act of despair was his bitter hunger for
justice and a better life. His dramatic self-immolation was a hopeless call
for humanity that was shared by a multitude of protesters throughout the
Arab world, who then generated that revolutionary wave that is referred to
as the “Arab Spring”. Although each individual protester represents a
unique human being with specific personal experiences of injustice, what
is common to all demonstrators across the region are the grave human
rights violations committed by the former regimes during their hold on
power. Facing these dramatic popular uprisings and the following delicate
transitional phase, in which the old order did indeed fall but has not yet
completely vanished, socio-legal scholars from Arab and Western coun-
tries have emphasized the need to initiate processes of political transitions
in accordance with the global transitional justice model in order to help
post-revolution societies overcome their precarious situation of passage
from authoritarianism and dictatorship to a new order of society. By this
means, according to the general reasoning, they can determine how best to
address systematic abuses of human rights committed in the past and dur-
ing the time of transition in order to reconcile divided societies, strengthen
democratic institution building and to realize a new and just social order,
which is above all worth living (Fisher & Stewart 2014).
However, by general definition, classical judicial transitional justice in-
struments such as ad-hoc, special and hybrid international criminal tri-
bunals, or non-judicial restorative and restitutive mechanisms, such as
commissions of inquiry, truth and reconciliation commissions, lustration
policies and reparation programs, can be set up only when severe injustice
and systematic human rights abuses, as typically practiced during periods
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of dictatorship, autocratic suppression and civil war have come to an end
(Schabas & Darcy 2004; Teitel 2015; Mihr 2017). That means transitional
justice can only be put to work after a certain regime change and a politi-
cal process of consolidation have already taken place, or at least after a
somehow pacified and stabilized social environment has been realized
(Olsen 2010; Eser, Arnold & Kreicker 2012). This includes, for example,
the replacement of governments and the renewal of important state bodies
and institutions such as the security services and the judicial system in or-
der to provide grounds for processes of reconciliation, democratization
and the establishment of the rule of law (Hinton 2010; Engert & Jetschke
2011; Hazan 2017). In the case of the post-“Arab Spring” societies, some
former government leaders did indeed fall and new executive powers took
their place, but overall, the hopes and dreams of most of the protesters did
not come true. In fact, some turned into true nightmares, as documented
by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Syrians and other refugees
from the MENA region to Northern Europe, fleeing the deadly threats of
civil war, systematic terrorism and inhuman living conditions in their own
countries.1
However, the transitions being experienced in the aftermath of the Arab
uprisings are not finished yet, and the future of most of the fragile state
entities that have seen some kind of regime change appears to be more
than just uncertain (Gephart, Sakrani & Hellmann 2015). Even though
some political reforms and transitional justice strategies have been already
launched in countries like Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt, observers
are quite skeptical about the short term results, since transitional justice in-
struments are highly time consuming measures (Fraihat 2016). One illus-
trative example of this is certainly Argentina and the decades-long fight of
its civil society against painful silence and imposed impunity concerning
the perpetrators and those responsible for the mass crimes committed dur-
ing the former military regime in the years 1976–1983. It clearly shows
that post-conflict justice sometimes can only be achieved, if at all, after
decades of efforts to combat politics of repression and systematic human
rights abuses by means of domestic as well as international criminal tri-
bunals, including regional human rights courts (Teitel 2003; Sikkink 2011;
Mihr 2017). Thus, given that function of time in regard to the possible ef-
1 See the contribution on the precarious and lawless situation in Syria by Ammar Ab-
dulrahman in this volume.
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fectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms, it might be simply too early
to evaluate the outcomes of transitional justice policies in post-“Arab
Spring” societies at least from today’s perspective.2 However, how would
it be the other way around? Have the Arab uprisings altered the discourse
of socio-legal studies on transitional justice? Have any lessons been
learned from the extraordinary revolutionary transitions in the MENA re-
gion? Could they potentially even have an effect on future attempts to jus-
tice in transition?
In the following, I will try to give a tentative answer to these questions.
Given the embryonic status of most of the social transitions in the region,
it is of no surprise that I have to highlight the speculative nature of my
statements. However, after a short historical overview of the emergence of
the normative concept of transitional justice as a global model of dealing
with systematic human rights abuses, I will first outline the crucial steps in
developments that have shaped today’s understanding of transitional jus-
tice as a certain set of legal and non-legal means that count as tools with
which to foster post-conflict justice and both enable democratic institution
building as well as processes of reconciliation in any specific transitional
society in the world. In a second step, I then ask whether and to what ex-
tent the processes of transitions experienced so far in the aftermath of the
Arab uprisings have challenged or modified this general liberal under-
standing of the present global transitional justice model. Lastly, in a third
step I will reflect on some possible learning effects from the ongoing dy-
namic processes in the MENA region that might enlarge the existing tool-
box of transitional justice and thereby expand or eventually even trans-
form socio-legal discourse on transitional justice.
Lex Transitus: On the evolution of the new global legal regime of
transitional justice
The normative concept of transitional justice emerged historically in the
period after the geopolitical caesura of 1945. Its first appearance resulted
from the exceptional context of the institutionalization of the international
criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War.
2 For a personal account on the difficulties of “working through” the times of repres-
sion see the contribution by Sarhan Dhouib in this volume.
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Although some legal scholars have criticized the ambiguous legality of
these trials, which contradicted fundamental moral principles in interna-
tional criminal law such as “nullum crimen sine lege”, the lasting influ-
ence of this first attempt to implement transitional justice cannot be ques-
tioned today (Schabas & Darcy 2004; Eser, Arnold & Kreicker 2012; Teit-
el 2015). Indeed, in the following years international criminal courts were
established to conduct transitional justice trials that relied strongly on the
legal principles which had been created by the international tribunals of
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Both tribunals dealt with war crimes committed
before and during the war by the former leaders of the warring parties
Germany and Japan. From the very beginning, the trials were tainted by
the desire to punish and replace former members of the Nazi regime and
the Japanese empire who were considered most responsible for systematic
or widespread human rights violations, and to establish international law
as a new tool in determining the accountability of individual actions as
well as international aggression (Safferling 2011). Notably, the latter, with
the invention of a new legal principle called “crimes against humanity”,
set a novel precedent that had never been used before in international hu-
man and humanitarian law and therewith initiated an extraordinarily dy-
namic chain of legal and institutional developments in the postwar era that
radically changed the very nature of the international legal system
(Bonacker & Safferling 2013). Since that time, numerous international
criminal courts have been created on a global level to deal with large-scale
human rights violations, including, for example, the international extraor-
dinary tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, East Tim-
or, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Following the massive waves of societal and
political transitions that occurred in Latin America, Central and Eastern
Europe, and Africa in the early 1980 s, these bodies were institutionalized
with the goal of achieving recognition for victims and bringing the perpe-
trators of abuses to justice, with the broader additional aims of promoting
peace, the development of democratic institutions, and the rule of law.
Other post-conflict, post-authoritarian and post-dictatorial countries, such
as Argentina after the end of the military dictatorship, South Africa after
the end of the Apartheid regime, and Morocco after the end of the so-
called “Years of Lead”, used truth and reconciliation commissions to deal
with their violent pasts. Such commissions have also been established in
other states in transition with a history of repressive rule, including South
Korea, the Solomon Islands, El Salvador, Ghana and the Fiji Islands. The
general goal of transitional justice tools, be these ad-hoc international
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criminal tribunals or truth and reconciliation commissions, is to overcome
the former repressive state system by contributing to politics of human
rights, democratization and national reconciliation (Teitel 2015; Mihr
2017).
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations such as the
United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank have increasing-
ly acknowledged these politics of dealing with past human rights viola-
tions by, for example, granting public sector loans and supporting econo-
mic development dependent on specific transitional justice policies. Not
least due to these redefined lending conditions and standards of develop-
ment aid from international donors, dealing with past human rights viola-
tions has become a global model for action in world society that has taken
the transitional justice model from its beginnings as a normative exception
to its present status as a global political rule (see Kastner 2016).
While international organizations have played a key role in the global
proliferation of the transitional justice model, the International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a transnationally operating NGO, has served
as a further very influential creator and disseminator of this normative
concept. This NGO has its headquarters in New York, but also maintains
regional offices in Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, the Maghreb re-
gion and the Near East. In establishing the ICTJ in March 2001, its cre-
ators laid the foundations for a global culture of post-conflict justice (Bo-
raine 2006; Kastner 2010; Teitel 2011). The ICTJ has monitored political
transitions with the aim of promoting peace, bolstering rule of law re-
forms, and supporting democratic governance in more than 50 countries
worldwide. It has collaborated in creating and implementing international
criminal tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, and other alterna-
tive instruments of transitional justice in post-conflict societies around the
globe.3 ICTJ staff members make their expertise in dealing with past sys-
tematic human rights abuses and state rebuilding after political transitions
3 Transitional justice processes have been initiated to date in: Argentina, Bolivia, Bu-
rundi, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Côte D’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, Uganda, Uruguay, and
Zimbabwe. Compare the list provided by the International Center for Transitional
Justice: http://ictj.org/. See also the list provided by the website of the United States
Institute of Peace: http:www.usip.org/library/tc.
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available not only to local protest groups, but also to national and interna-
tional institutions such as national human rights organizations, the Euro-
pean Union and the United Nations (Kastner 2017 b). They advise diplo-
mats and legal scholars in matters related to the judicialization of transi-
tion issues, and help social interest groups, research organizations and
governments with the work of reconstructing and documenting human
rights violations, as well as preparing and using databases and archives.
They provide information on survey methods and techniques for inter-
viewing victims, train people to work with witnesses, and help establish
witness protection programs. ICTJ members also offer advice on conduct-
ing public hearings and contribute to the development of programs provid-
ing restitution and compensation for victims. Their work now also in-
cludes consultation on the creation of memorial and commemorative sites,
and on formulating and implementing recommendations for political and
structural reforms after the respective transitional justice instruments have
completed their work. The accumulation and global dissemination of this
special expertise in dealing with past state-aided human rights violations
has also been reflected in a series of notable international conferences,
guidelines and resolutions of the United Nations on the normative concept
of transitional justice, which even led the United Nations to declare 2009
the International Year of Reconciliation.4 As a matter of fact, transitional
justice is now viewed as a key element of the United Nations’ toolbox for
dealing with post-conflict issues, with the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping even having established a new Security Sector Reform and
Transitional Justice Unit (Kastner 2017 a).5 This has further promoted and
solidified the process of transnational networking, professionalization and
standardization in the realm of activities related to dealing with past hu-
man rights violations. In sum, the enlarged normative concept of transi-
tional justice has become a conventional instrument for dealing with the
past, which has spread globally thanks to the consultation and training
programs of the ICTJ and the launching of countless academic journals
and books, new research institutes at universities, and other highly special-
ized international, transnational and local NGOs in the field of post-con-
flict justice (Kastner 2015 a).
4 Compare the UN resolution A/ERES/61/17, adopted by the General Assembly at its





As a result of the formation of this increasingly dense context of know-
how transmission, a world political arena has emerged, in which various
actors involved in the politics of dealing with the past appear as protago-
nists and disseminators of specific norms, standards and institutions of
transitional justice. Within this multidimensional, constantly self-reinforc-
ing transnational social field a functionally specified global legal regime
of transitional justice has emerged to advocate the following: firstly, insti-
tutionalized international normative expectations, such as the obligation of
the international legal system to investigate past state-aided human rights
violations and the victim’s right to truth; secondly, behavioral routines and
post-conflict measures, such as victim oriented processes of truth seeking,
and reparation and reconciliation programs; and, thirdly, standardized non-
judicial institutions, such as historical commissions of inquiry, truth com-
missions, and truth and reconciliation commissions, as well as judicial in-
stitutions such as ad-hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals.6
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, a per-
manent and independent supranational judicial body that prosecutes the
perpetrators of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity —
when national courts of the contracting state parties are either unwilling or
unable to deal with these crimes —, so far represents the ultimate culmina-
tion of this ongoing process of evolution of the normative concept of tran-
sitional justice into a global legal regime, which I have called “Lex Transi-
tus” in reference to scholarly works which address in critical and analyti-
cal fashion the changing frames of normative orders under the structural
conditions of globalization (Teubner 2012; Neves 2013; Calliess 2014;
Kjaer 2014; Kastner 2015 b; Teitel 2015; Thornhill 2016).
Moreover, in the course of this process, we can observe the world cul-
tural institutionalization of a form of cosmopolitan ethics that resembles
what was described in connection with the Holocaust and the moral out-
comes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as the increasing consolida-
tion of a global morality and the associated moral imperative of memory,
atonement and commemoration (see Levy & Sznaider 2011). States’ ap-
proaches to past state-aided atrocities, war and genocide are now directed
by global institutional models that dictate extremely ritualized procedures
for confronting past human rights violations. In the context of this global
6 Compare Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter: http://www.un.org/documents/c
harter/chapter7.shtml.
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diffusion of discourses and practices of remembering and dealing with vi-
olent pasts, the actors involved — individuals as well as collective actors
— are constantly observed and evaluated by a transnational civil society
network. Even if they merely stage a superficial show of compliance with
world cultural norms, standards and institutions of transitional justice, as
is the case in many post-conflict states, they are nevertheless confirming
them even against their own political will (Sikkink 2011; Calliess 2014;
Karstedt 2014). As part of a general process of the dissemination of global
cultural patterns of behavior and normative patterns of expectations,
which simultaneously overlays the dominant functional structures of glob-
al society and the international political system of nation states, transition-
al justice tools can be described, at least from a macro-sociological point
of view, as transcultural transformers (Holzer, Kastner & Werron 2015).
One should take care not to overestimate the evolutionary potential of
their broad sociocultural effects, but we should also not make the mistake
of underestimating them (Kastner et al. 2008). Only then will we also gain
an explanation for the exceedingly remarkable phenomenon that — de-
spite the empirical fact of the global diffusion of the normative concept of
transitional justice and with it the worldwide proliferation of specific
norms, standards and institutions of post-conflict justice — to date there
has not been a single case in which, quite literally, the work of dealing
with past systematic crimes has been “successful” (on this rather paradoxi-
cal effect, see Kastner 2010).
Reconfigurations of the present normative concept of transitional justice
emerging from the “Arab Spring” experiences
Transitional justice has become a conventional global model for action in
dealing with past systematic human rights violations. As a result of the
different forms of local contextualization that have occurred worldwide so
far, the normative concept has massively changed since its invention after
the Second World War from an originally pure, criminal, legal, that is to
say, retributive normative concept to a hybrid, that is to say, a restorative
cross societal oriented post-conflict justice model (Kastner 2015 b). This
in turn has changed the significant actors working in the field of transi-
tional justice. Initially dominated by professional international lawyers, it
is now primarily influenced by human rights activists, diplomats, scholars,
policymakers, donors, international organizations, and transnational non-
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governmental organizations, such as the ICTJ. These new and diverse ac-
tors in the field of post-conflict justice conceive the aims and mechanisms
of transitional justice not primarily in retributive terms, that is to say, from
a strictly criminal law and perpetrator oriented perspective, but also within
more holistic cross-societal categories (Boraine 2006). This hybridization
of the concept of transitional justice in the form of an increasing amalga-
mation of legal and social norms also explains the newly achieved recog-
nition of victims’ perspectives within the international criminal law sys-
tem, as well as the redefined central role of victims within the framework
of transitional justice policies (Bonacker & Safferling 2013). Indeed, one
of the decisive new institutional elements of the transitional justice con-
cept are truth and reconciliation commissions, where the central procedu-
ral focus of investigation no longer lies on the crimes committed by for-
mer perpetrators, but on the testimonials provided by the victims and the
harm they endured (Kastner 2010). The severe and controversial socio-le-
gal debates that accompanied the implementation of these victim oriented
commissions as a non-judicial means of confronting the needs of post-
conflict societies in transitional contexts have mirrored the dynamic, adap-
tive and hybrid nature of the normative concept of transitional justice in a
very demonstrative manner. This is also one of the reasons why the en-
larged normative concept is frequently criticized as having a corrosive ef-
fect on the international legal system’s values rather than fostering univer-
sal principles (Hazan 2017). In particular, the controversial discussion on
accountability as one of the key aspects of the international criminal legal
justice system, which notably ensures that those responsible for massive
crimes committed in the past are held accountable for their wrongdoings,
as well as the continuing debate on non-Western notions of finding justice
for past abuses that accompanied the installation of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission especially, strongly unsettled and
rearranged the field of transitional justice studies (Teitel 2015). To take a
case in point, during the suspense-packed course of the South African
transition process, leading figures such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and
Nelson Mandela emphasized the need for a genuinely African approach to
transitional justice, primarily by focusing on social forgiveness and collec-
tive healing guided by a local justice concept called Ubuntu (An-Na’im
2013). They argued that a localized manifestation of transitional justice
was very much needed in this context, since purely individual prosecu-
tions along the lines of the Western conception of liberal legality would
not generate the desired outcome for the entire society (Boraine 2006).
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The concept of Ubuntu ultimately did indeed have great influence on the
societal, political and moral justification for the transitional justice process
in post-apartheid South Africa, and was explicitly legally laid down in the
first post-apartheid South African constitution of 1993, though the term it-
self does not appear in today’s valid constitution (see Cornell & Muvan-
gua 2012). Quite similar strategies of combining particular local notions of
justice with the globally enacted strategies of the international criminal le-
gal system, in the sense of combining locally legitimate rituals of justice
and reconciliation with standardized elements of the global transitional
justice model, were also carried out in other post-conflict African societies
such as Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda (Lugano 2017). Have any similar
genuinely regional approaches to transitional justice emerged from the
post-revolution transitions in Arab countries?
Given the short period of time since the outbreak of the popular up-
heavals in the year 2011, it is surely too early to give any satisfactory an-
swer regarding possible effects that these transitions might have on the
normative concept of transitional justice. However, what can be said to
date is that current endeavors in the MENA region to initiate politics of
transitional justice have been largely shaped by the objective of establish-
ing classical national retributive judicial institutions rather than by mech-
anisms derived from the global transitional justice model. Aside from
some exceptions like the recently established truth commissions in Tunisia
and the Kingdom of Morocco, most attempts, such as the trials against for-
mer President Mubarak in Egypt and other efforts made in Libya and
Yemen, were in fact purely national retributive proceedings (Gephart,
Sakrani & Hellmann 2015).
Following the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” or the “Sidi Bouzid Re-
volt”, as it is referred to in the Arab world, the Truth and Dignity Commis-
sion in Tunisia was established by law in 2013 and formally launched in
2014 in order to investigate the systematic nature of human rights viola-
tions committed by the Tunisian state since 1955. The Commission was
given a four-year mandate (2014 to 2018) with the possibility of a one-
year extension. Its purpose is to use both judicial and non-judicial mech-
anisms. The Commission held its first public hearing in Tunis on 17
November 2016. Therefore, possible outcomes are as yet quite uncertain.
The other exception is the Kingdom of Morocco with the implementation
of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission on behalf of the present
monarch Mohammed VI. Its aim was to address gross human rights viola-
tions committed during the so-called “Years of Lead” (1956 to 1999).
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However, this first attempt to transitional justice in the Arab-Islamic
world, which was launched without the country having experienced a
regime change or a revolution, was indeed initiated and realized as early
as in 2004, long before the outbreak of the Arab uprisings (see Kastner
2015 a: 277-359).
Given the economic and financial distress and social instability of most
of the post-revolution societies, the preference for classical national crimi-
nal trials rather than for alternative approaches according to the global
transitional justice model might be simply the consequence of the persis-
tence of the old regime’s institutions (army, police, judiciary, etc.), or
might be due to other particular reasons, like the need to correspond to in-
ternational obligations (Safferling 2011; Fraihat 2016).
A vital factor that is shaping current socio-legal debates on transitional
justice is the unique feature of the political, cultural and religious aspects
of the MENA region. Compared, for example, to the transitions in Latin
American societies starting in the early 1980 s, in which authoritarian
regimes and bloody dictatorships were replaced by a political culture of
liberal democracy, post-revolution Arab societies do not seem to share
such a political consensus about the best way forward. In fact, the concept
of liberal democracy seems to have lost its brilliance, and is no longer
seen by a majority of the population as the only solution, but is rather re-
garded as part of a larger “neo-colonial” problem (An-Na’im 2013;
Lugano 2017). This is paired with another unique pattern in the post-revo-
lution Arab societies — notably the rise of so-called political Islam, a long
and strongly suppressed religious political movement that is currently dis-
rupting all societies in the Arab world. With the lack of a consensus about
a common political strategy, it might also be difficult to define the specific
goals of potential processes of transitional justice in post-“Arab Spring”
countries. Therefore, possible alterations to the global transitional justice
model emerging from the experiences in the aftermath of the Arab upris-
ings may not be based on liberal Western notions of justice but rather on
genuine regional, cultural conditions, such as Islamic morality, Islamic
ethics and Islamic law (Baxi 2015; Fraihat 2016). The resultant challenge
for our present understanding of the global transitional justice model is
then the question of how and to what extent a combination of these contra-
dicting value systems would indeed be socially applicable. That is to say,
how can a generally secular and democratically oriented notion of a gen-
uine liberal transitional justice model indeed engage with some illiberal el-
ements of so-called political Islam, for instance with regard to the rights of
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religious minorities and gender equality (An-Na’im 2013; Al-Azm 2015)?
Though at this point one should also recall that neither religion in general,
nor the contested category of Sharia in particular was originally behind
the motives of the protest movements at the outbreak of the Arab upris-
ings, where there was, on the contrary, an urgent call for universal values
and human rights. However, the unexpected collapse of a multitude of to-
talitarian Arab regimes only allowed the advent of what had been massive-
ly oppressed for decades by the former regimes of repression. This could
also be an explanation for why there are so many references to Sharia in
almost all the recently reformed and newly adopted constitutions in post-
revolution Arab societies (Sakrani 2015). They show an increasing pro-
cess of de-legitimization of secular concepts of justice and re-legitimiza-
tion of illiberal elements and religion both as an instrument and as a cen-
tral goal of politics, which is in fact criticized by local lawyers and human
rights activists as well as socio-legal scholars from abroad (Gephart,
Sakrani & Hellmann 2015; Fraihat 2016).
A further peculiarity of the transitions in the MENA region, which is
regarded as a centric element that has to be taken into account for future
attempts to transitional justice, is the attention being given to the issues of
poverty and unemployment as well as corruption and other economic and
financial wrongdoings committed during the former authoritarian and dic-
tatorial regimes that drove the revolutions of the “Arab Spring” (Fischer &
Swart 2014). This newly developed access point, which highlights econo-
mic injustice and economic problems as important challenges to transi-
tional justice’s aims of social peace and reconciliation, could serve as a
source for innovative approaches to future attempts to transitional justice,
since the conventional global model does indeed prioritize civil and politi-
cal rights over other rights (Teitel 2015). Therefore, both legal academia
and scholars from the social sciences are increasingly debating the need to
expand the current liberal model of transitional justice in the direction of
economic crimes, and therewith economic accountability, in order to be
able to address the systematic nature of economic abuses and financial
criminality. Though at this point one has to admit that current debates
about the inclusion of economic and financial wrongdoings in the current





In this article, I have argued that transitional justice has become a global
model for action in dealing with past systematic human rights violations.
As a result of the differing social foundations and local contextualization
of transitional justice that occurred in a multitude of countries in Latin
America, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania since the
early 1980 s, the normative concept of transitional justice has undergone
continuous change since its invention following the Second World War,
evolving from an originally purely perpetrator oriented retributive legal in-
strument into a victim oriented restorative post-conflict justice model. The
intense socio-legal debates that accompanied this transformation from an
originally pure criminal law model into a more holistic tool that connects
legal with social norms mirrored the very dynamic, adaptive and hybrid
nature of the normative concept of transitional justice, which has evolved
into a functionally specified global legal regime that I call Lex Transitus.
Legal academia and scholars from the social sciences are currently dis-
cussing two possible alterations to the present global model of transitional
justice emerging from the “Arab Spring” experiences. One of these
changes may be based on regional cultural factors, such as Islamic morali-
ty, Islamic ethics and Islamic law. This poses a potential challenge for the
present liberal, secular and democracy oriented conception, insofar as it
remains unclear how and to what extent a combination of these contradic-
tory value systems, that is, combining locally legitimate notions of justice
with standardized elements of the global transitional justice model, would
be socially, politically and legally applicable. A second alteration emerg-
ing from the post-uprising transition policies already realized in some
Arab countries could be the demand to include economic and financial
crimes within the present normative concept of transitional justice. How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether these local solutions can or will in fact
reconcile divided post-revolution societies in the MENA region and thus
have any ability to inspire future attempts to transitional justice.
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Philosophy in Transition — Philosophy of Transition
Sarhan Dhouib
For Fradj Belhajamor, my fellow student, who was persecuted during his stu-
dies and who, after many years in German exile as a philosophy teacher, re-
turned to Tunis and died on 28 October 2013, his first day of teaching.
The transformation of philosophy, as practiced or as it should be practiced
in a situation of tumultuous change from dictatorship to a democratic soci-
ety or post-dictatorship — as, for example, in Tunisia — occurs on multi-
ple levels.
The liberation from authoritarian directives and fear-driven self-censor-
ship offers us the chance to introduce themes into scholarly discussion,
and therefore also into the field of philosophy, that reflect critically on
contemporary society, social affairs and culture (Moser & Seidel 2016).1
These topics include a discussion of experiences with injustice, human
rights violations and limits to freedom of expression, for example, but also
issues of transitional justice and the culture of remembrance. In post-dicta-
torial society, these issues prove to be particularly charged inasmuch as
they can become an engine of social and political transformation (Dhouib
2012 b, 2014).
At the same time, the politico-societal protest movements of the “Arab
Spring” are drawing the attention of European and North American
philosophers, and offer them the opportunity to reflect on critical analysis,
justice, freedom and humanism — as prominently shown by Alain Badiou
(2011), Seyla Benhabib (2011), Judith Butler (2015) and Slavoj Žižek
(2012), for example. Of particular to me personally, however, are the joint
reflections by Arab and German philosophers made in the context of col-
laborative international projects and stimulated by the societal upheavals
in various Arab states. I will address some of these below.
On another level, however, this transformation is also about developing
a philosophy that can illuminate changes in contemporary philosophical
models and guide intercultural and interdisciplinary exchange on a global
8
1 For a similar observation in the field of political science, see the contribution by Jan
Claudius Völkel in this volume.
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level. Transcultural philosophizing in this way follows a universalistic ap-
proach, seeking strategies of universalization and interculturally recog-
nized principles of validity. In this sense, this philosophizing is interested
in the expansion of normative concepts, drawing from extra-European cul-
tural spaces and their philosophical approaches. Moreover, the recognition
of cultural diversity and a plurality of forms of knowledge is central to this
philosophical perspective. The sensitivity toward differences — whether
this be within a culture or between cultures — leads to the demand that
philosophers contextualize their guiding experiences and questions more
strongly, both temporally and spatially. A further consequence lies in the
aspiration for increased participation by philosophers with varied life
backgrounds in this discourse. Transculturality thus does not emerge from
the primacy of one dominant discourse over the others, but is rather the
result of patient and open communication as well as constant critical en-
gagement with one another (Dhouib & Dübgen 2016; Triki 2011).
However, the transformation of philosophy also consists in the critique
and modification of a historically informed philosophical practice and its
institutions. One aim of the academic transformation toward more demo-
cratic structures and more accessible education overall is to combat cultur-
al and intellectual poverty. The decentralization of academic structures to
promote education in disadvantaged regions, thus opening up direct and
affordable access to knowledge for the people who live there, is one
means of realizing the right to education every human being deserves (El
Khouni 2016).2 The provision of support for the transformation of any sci-
entific or scholarly practice, however, consists generally — and this ap-
plies worldwide — in the empowerment of young scholars as well as in
intercultural and interdisciplinary dialogue.
Assuming a dual role as actor as well as observer, I would like to de-
scribe and reflect from an autobiographical perspective on specific events
and projects in the context of the transformation of philosophy and philo-
sophical practice in North Africa. I am concerned with the following ques-
tions, to which even today I have found no final answers: Can philosophy
in an authoritarian state be understood as a form of resistance? What role
can it take in a post-dictatorial society, and how can it contribute to soci-
2 For a discussion on the circulation of information and knowledge from a computer




etal transformation? What institutional change must it go through itself,
and what are the strengths of transcultural philosophizing?
Where there is power, resistance rises — Tunisia before the revolution
When I came to Germany in 2013 to do a doctoral dissertation on
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, I had studied in Tunisia and France, a
path whose detours and difficulties were shaped by the power structures of
the dictatorship under Tunisia’s longtime ruler Ben Ali. Without doubt,
even under Ben Ali, the Tunisian educational system figured among the
Arab world’s best; the state’s propaganda carried constant reminders of
this assessment. The country possesses hardly any natural resources, un-
like other Arab countries. Oil flows from olive presses, not from oil der-
ricks, and the education of its people is one of the country’s most impor-
tant resources — or so believed the country’s founder, Habib Bourguiba
(1903–2000), who created an institutional system based on that of France,
which persisted structurally under his successor Ben Ali and remains in
place today. One learns French as a second “mother tongue” in elementary
school; at least in the 1980 s, mathematics, natural sciences, physics and
French literature in the original French were taught in college-preparatory
school. As in France, in the last year, before graduating with school quali-
fications that would enable them to attend university, students also studied
the subject of philosophy. This amounted to a full eight hours per week if
one had decided to pursue Lettres for one’s qualification and four hours if
a student had decided to focus on natural science, mathematics or technol-
ogy. When I came to Germany, the land of poets and philosophers, it sur-
prised me that many first-year philosophy students had not yet had any
philosophy instruction. In Tunisia’s college-preparatory schools, philoso-
phy was taught across its entire global range, from the Greeks and classi-
cal Arab philosophy to the European Enlightenment thinkers and the post-
modernists. Some of our teachers at the university promoted a philological
approach, perhaps in order to impress us or make clear to us the great dis-
tance that we, mere students, had to traverse to attain the philosophical
knowledge. This meant that, at best, one should also read the works being
studied in their original languages. It was thus clear to me early on that if I
seriously intended to engage with modern European thought, I would
someday have to learn German.
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Tunisia’s education structure had clear political dimensions. For exam-
ple, under Ben Ali there was a university police force, called “University
Security” (al-amn al-ğāmiʿī), that observed and monitored intellectual ac-
tivities at the university. Teachers and lecturers of all stripes were also
spied on by colleagues and students; one thus had to pay careful attention
to how criticism was formulated, to which subjects one taught in the class-
rooms, and to how one responded to questions — to the real questions, the
intelligent questions, but also to the questions that served as traps. For ex-
ample, once I was sitting on campus with some fellow students during a
break following a lecture on Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, continuing
the debate we had begun in the class on the relationship between theory
and practice. We were so engrossed in the discussion that we failed to no-
tice the secret service employees, ears cocked, reporting everything imme-
diately to their boss. Only a few minutes later, we were summoned by
University Security and asked how we had arrived at such ideas. We were
released with a warning about avoiding discussing such issues outside the
seminar. We never learned what the consequences were for our professor.
One way of escaping the repressive system (and at the same time, a
very good way of acquiring further training) was to continue one’s studies
overseas. France regularly provided highly sought-after scholarships for
outstanding academic achievements. However, the Tunisian state was al-
lowed to make the final selection of scholarship recipients, a process that
typically took place on the basis of loyalty to the regime. Although I was
head of my class in the philosophy department of the Faculté des Lettres et
Sciences Humaines at the University of Sfax, I had to finance my DEA
studies at the Université Paris 1 Sorbonne in France by giving additional
private lessons. Because I was not allowed to leave Tunisia for several
months without losing my job as a teacher in a college-preparatory school,
I bounced back and forth between my college-prep school in Djerba and
my university studies in Paris for two years, with my school director al-
ways breathing down my neck. Unlike France, Germany chose its fellow-
ship recipients on its own, using clear criteria. The transparent procedures
practiced by Germany — by the German Academic Exchange Service
(DAAD) and the Goethe Institute — changed my academic life. With
there being no DAAD office in Tunisia, I had to go to the German em-
bassy to apply for a fellowship to pursue my doctoral studies in Germany.
Those who went overseas were not completely free of the constant ob-
servation. The regime’s ears were eavesdropping in Germany, too. Once,
in October 2004 — this was during “campaign season” in Tunisia, and one
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of my former professors, Mohammed Ali Halouani, was running as an op-
position candidate against Ben Ali — as I boarded a late-evening bus in
Bremen, I was jostled by a Tunisian, apparently accidentally. We quickly
fell into conversation about the upcoming election, and our conversation,
in which I hardly got a word in edgewise, ended with his harsh condemna-
tion of academics with political ambitions. Like Halouani, he said, they
lacked any skills useful for governing. The Arab peoples, he concluded,
had no need of a democracy of intellectuals, and needed to be governed
with the stick (bil ʿaṣā). The overseas spying was one dimension of the
secret service’s program of intimidation. Sometimes you knew whom you
were speaking with, but sometimes not.
Fellowships that had not been approved by the regime were suspect. In
official political jargon, they were termed “illegal financing” from over-
seas, and this was often synonymous with treason. On this path abroad,
many doors were opened and many doors closed. The day that I left
Tunisia — Friday, 10 January 2003 — was a genuinely sad day. I still oc-
casionally think back to the December 2002 farewell from one of my col-
lege-preparatory classes at the Houmt Souk high school in Djerba. The
weather on that day was as gray as that which welcomed me in Germany,
with the gloom that often weighs on the souls of Mediterranean natives in
Germany. Some students felt my departure to be a betrayal of them, al-
though they had a very good teacher on the horizon who would prepare
them further for graduation. One young female student, the best of them,
was both sad and angry. If our teacher goes, who will stay with us? Leav-
ing is not a solution, she said. But I simply desperately wanted to get my
doctorate.
Arriving means going beyond oneself
My move to Germany was a radical change of scene. When you work on
German idealism as a Tunisian doctoral student, and dare to take your first
steps into conferences and workshops, you very quickly find that not ev-
eryone is wholly receptive to your voice. To be sure, many Europeans
work with a considerable sense of mission on all other possible cultures
and languages; but does a Tunisian, an Arab who works on Schelling,
have anything to say?
Challenged in part by colleagues at the University of Bremen who in-
vited me to lectures, I only began to engage systematically with modern
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and contemporary Arabian philosophy, in parallel with my work on
Schelling, in Germany. I have with great irritation noted the contention,
which has been expressed to me ever since at conferences, but which also
appears widely in secondary literature, that there has been no philosophy
in Arab countries since Averroes (Ibn Rushd), a figure well known even in
Europe, but who has been dead since 1198. In Germany, as in other Euro-
pean and North American countries, the focus of interest is commonly on
Islamist and fundamentalist authors, such as Abul Ala Al-Mawdudi (Pak-
istan) and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt). Texts by critical modern Arab philoso-
phers, such as Nassif Nassar (Lebanon), Georges Tarabichi (Syria), Fouad
Zakariyya (Egypt), Fathi Triki (Tunisia) or Mohammed Mesbahi (Moroc-
co), are rarely translated and are largely ignored. For my engagement with
modern and contemporary Arab philosophy, the Institute for Philosophy at
the University of Bremen was an island of attentiveness. A formative ele-
ment of my scholarly training in Bremen (quite apart from the many con-
versations and discussions with colleagues) was my inclusion in various
intercultural exchange projects, such as the interchange between the UN-
ESCO chairs in philosophy in Bremen (Prof. Hans Jörg Sandkühler) and
Tunis (Prof. Fathi Triki), but also Latin American philosopher Raúl For-
net-Betancourt’s international network (Sandkühler & Triki 2002; Fornet-
Betancourt 2007, 2011).
Intercultural philosophizing starts from a position that people’s lan-
guage, thinking and even perceptions are culturally conditioned, and that
values, concepts and norms cannot be considered independently of their
concrete contexts because they derive their meaning only from this con-
text. At the same time, dialogue on these concepts, values and norms,
along with the struggle for a common basis and the issue of their univer-
salizability, remains a task for the field of philosophy (Sandkühler & Triki
2002). In our philosophical encounters, we questioned and vigorously dis-
cussed the conditions of philosophy of a chaired life, views of humanity
and the world, forms of the interpenetration of power and knowledge, and
questions of human dignity (see, for example, Poulain, Sandkühler & Triki
2009).
Engaging intellectually with contemporary Arab philosophy under the
auspices and modes of inquiry of intercultural philosophy became an im-
portant task for me, through which I removed myself from the trap of
identity-related discourses. An intercultural approach seems to me fruitful
for the transformation of philosophy, particularly in the Arab world. It is
interesting that this access to my own philosophical tradition became
Sarhan Dhouib
128
available to me in Germany and Europe. One rediscovers oneself in the
language and perspectives of others.
Several times I took the results of this UNESCO collaboration from
Germany to Tunisia in the form of publication copies for my Tunisian col-
leagues. The customs officials asked me once, “What are these gray book-
lets?” “The main thing is they’re not yellow booklets,” I answered. The
color yellow was used for religiously conservative books. “Nothing about
human rights, is there?” one of them pressed further. “No, no, only about
classical German philosophy. Kant and Hegel,” I answered. The admira-
tion that even this high-school graduate apparently showed for German
philosophy protected me from him looking more deeply into the volumes’
contents. I was allowed to pass.
“First comes Christmas, then comes New Years, and then the revolution.”
The days of the early protests in the Arab countries in late 2010 were like
a countdown whose results no one could predict. Many Tunisians sat
feverishly in front of their computers and mobile phones and followed the
news both day and night. This exceptional state was perhaps comparable
to the late summer and autumn days of 1989 in Germany. At this time, I
was working on an essay about the transculturality of human rights, which
I wanted to submit to a Goethe Institute competition. Engaging critically
with the two Maghreb philosophers Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri and Fathi
Triki, I was examining the intercultural transfer of human rights and the
potential of their transculturality with regard to articulating the conditions
for their universalization (Dhouib 2013).
In Germany, there was hardly any reporting on the protests at this point.
As I spoke with a friend about the events in Tunisia, and wondered out
loud why the European media was reporting so little on these hot days in
December, he answered with a self-mocking tone: “First comes Christmas,
then comes New Years, and then we’ll be able to talk about the revolu-
tion”.
On a Monday, three days before the transfer of power in Tunisia in Jan-
uary 2011, I flew from Frankfurt via Paris to Rabat for a research project
focusing on school textbooks. As I transferred at Paris’ Charles de Gaulle
airport, I glanced at the headlines, and still remember that in France at this
point the question being discussed was how Ben Ali could be militarily
supported. A little later, as sympathies in Europe turned toward the
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Tunisian revolutionaries, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy per-
formed a 180-degree political about-face, with friends and allies becoming
enemies. On my way back, the Libération newspaper carried a cover photo
showing a young Tunisian woman holding up a poster reading “Ben Ali
dégage” (Ben Ali resign!) (Libération 2011).
In Rabat, on 14 January, I met with a Moroccan colleague, an instructor
and human rights activist, at a café in front of the Moroccan parliament
building, in order to discuss the portrayal of human rights in Moroccan
school textbooks and the role of civil society in supporting the implemen-
tation of a human rights culture. After we parted, my colleague went to the
train station and there heard the most recent news. He immediately called
me and congratulated me on a great event in my country: “Ben Ali harab!”
(Ben Ali has fled). In a state of great joy and great confusion, I hunted for
more information, for more people to talk to. I sent a few text messages to
friends in Tunisia. In a small magazine kiosk on Avenue Mohammed V, I
found a miniature black-and-white television. “I am Tunisian,” I told the
magazine seller, and asked whether I could watch the news with him. He
looked at me and said, “How great that a poet can change the destiny of a
people!” That was a “yes”. Every Arab understands the allusion to the text
of the Tunisian national anthem that was contained in this reply: “When
the people will to live / Destiny must surely respond.” In the weeks of the
Arab uprising, this verse from the poem “The Will To Live” by Tunisian
poet Abou El Kacem Chebbi (1909–1934) developed into a formula for
liberation, and was repeated in slogans such as “The people’s will” (aš-
šaʿb yurīd) on demonstrators’ signs in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli and Damas-
cus. At the first German–Arab conference that I organized immediately af-
ter the revolution, philosopher Mohammed Ali Halouani took this verse as
an opportunity for reflection on freedom and the positive associations in
the Arab context with the idea of a national people (Halouani 2012). This
drew critical comments in a reply from the German perspective, as the
concept of a national people is not entirely unproblematic in the context of
Germany (Schmidt 2012).
As the German media were finally filled with news about the Arab up-
risings, the DAAD advertised a number of exchange programs that were
tailored to the “Arab Spring” states and were intended to support the pro-
cess of scholarly transformation. With a few Arab DAAD fellows, primar-
ily Egyptians, we participated in the Bonn discussion on the future design
of DAAD funding for academic transformation in Egypt and Tunisia. A
few of our suggestions were adopted and incorporated into the DAAD
Sarhan Dhouib
130
transformation program. In the context of this program, I was able to initi-
ate and carry out two large exchange projects: initially, a series of four
German–Arab conferences that took place in Tunis and Kassel between
2011 and 2014, and which addressed the issues of human rights, democra-
cy, tolerance and justice.
Beginning in 2013, a research project followed on the issues of respon-
sibility, justice and the culture of remembrance; the project was led by me
until 2015, and primarily involved young Arab and German academics.
The interdisciplinary and intercultural engagement with working through
(Aufarbeitung) injustice under authoritarian states, as well as with the
forms of speech and modes of silence under dictatorship, became impor-
tant themes of academic reflection within our exchange project (Dhouib
2018 c). Without a detached analysis of the linguistic norms that shaped
discourses under dictatorship, without a subtle decoding of the “public si-
lence” (Meskini 2012), and without an examination of the subversive and
counter-discourses, it becomes difficult to speak about democratization or
to dream of a “humanistic democracy” (Said 2004; Turki 2016).
The relevance of a dual critique
A first conference took place in October 2011 in the Centre d´Art Vivant
Zoubeir Turki, located in the Park Belvédère in Tunis. This was the first
philosophical conference in Tunisia following the revolution. The Centre d
´Art Vivant is an important site rich in memories for the generation of old-
er Tunisian philosophy professors; the Club Taher Haddad, in which even
Michel Foucault offered some of his Tunisian lectures, met here and a li-
brary that was an important point of contact for many Tunisian intellectu-
als, but which had been closed during the Ben Ali era, also stood here. The
Centre d´Art Vivant is a site of resistance for the younger generation too.
This was where the art of the revolution was exhibited, with young artists
who were not only responding to the uprising, but who with their graffiti,
posters and actions were themselves a part of the movement, a largely
peaceful, angrily witty, creatively critical movement. We met surrounded
by the art, a visual confrontation of philosophy with non-philosophy that
continued with the graffiti on the way back to the hotel, and further on our
way to the presentations. In addition to German colleagues, Algerian,
Egyptian, Lebanese, Moroccan and Tunisian lecturers participated in the
first meeting, some of whom also attended the following conferences
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(Dhouib 2012 a). The fear instilled under authoritarian states cannot be
shaken off from one day to the next. This fear was not entirely gone; it
expressed itself in hesitant answers, in cautious reticence, in the circumlo-
cutions that required interpretation or the meaningful silence that was not
difficult to interpret. Yet beside, between and above this fear, one could
also sense the excitement, the joy in our own loud voices, and the enthusi-
asm in the discussions. To what degree do cultural identities and the cul-
tural pluralism often associated with them stand in opposition to the tran-
sculturality of human rights? What are possible strategies for legitimizing
human rights? How will the Arab and Islamic declarations of human
rights, which were ratified by authoritarian states, be reflected in a post-
dictatorial phase? Are human rights (including the United Nations’ 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) based on a particular view of hu-
man beings? A transcultural perspective on human rights is emerging —
this became clear in the first conference’s discussion on the issue of cul-
ture, identity and human rights from a transcultural perspective — initially
through what Abdelkébir Khatibi (1938–2009) termed a “dual critique”
(Khatibi 1983): The critique of the dogmatic tendencies in the Arab–Is-
lamic cultural area, but also of the hegemonic structures of the “Western”
states. For example, self-criticism from the Arab perspective emerges in
the engagement with the Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990)
and the Arab Charter of Human Rights (2004), in which the tension be-
tween universality and particularity in the Islamic context, and between
the recognition of cultural rights and the failures to institutionalize these
rights, is examined (Serbagi 2012). However, it also appears from a
“Western” perspective if it reflects on the political “betrayal” of the idea of
the universality of human rights. Bremen philosopher Georg Mohr, for ex-
ample, argues for a “properly understood universality”, that is, for “non-
colonial universality”, in which the legitimization of hegemonic power po-
litics becomes impossible (Mohr 2012).
In order to inspire the speakers from diverse cultures and disciplines to
fruitful and constructive discussion, and call into question the rigid divid-
ing lines between the “Arab world” and the “West” with regard to the uni-
versality of human rights, each presentation was followed by a short re-
sponse in which the Arab and German participants could offer reciprocal
comments on one another’s contributions. The response was one element
of a dialogic structure of collaboration, and additionally served to reveal
another view on the issue being addressed. This dialogic structure is also
intended to contribute to breaking down academic hierarchies in Germany
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and especially in Arab universities, and has established itself as a model
for all subsequent conferences and for the publication of the presentations.
Along this path of collaborative philosophizing, one challenge was com-
municating in different languages, and the continual efforts to calibrate the
translation of thought and the thinking in translation.
What’s the Arabic for “culture of remembrance” (Erinnerungskultur)
and “working through the past” (Aufarbeitung)?
In the summer of 2012, I met with colleagues from the fields of German
language and literature, philosophy, and sociology in the Café de Paris on
Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis for a joint brainstorming session, with
the goal of developing a theme for an exchange project we wanted to sub-
mit to the DAAD. The topography of individual streets, the proximity or
even the neighborhood of resistance and repression, of past and present, is
a challenge both emotionally and intellectually. For example, across the
street from Café de Paris is the Café l’Univers; in his time as a lecturer at
the University of Tunis (1966–1967), Foucault regularly sat here with in-
tellectuals and Tunisian students, who — like the philosophers Zeïneb Ben
Saïd-Cherni and Fathi Triki — he had influenced (Ben Saïd-Cherni 2018;
Triki 2008). Many even today still expressly regard themselves as his fol-
lowers, continuing to pursue his discourse-analytical approach. Not far
away, on the same street, stands the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, in
whose cellars intellectuals — women and men of all political orientations
— were tortured. And finally, only a few hundred meters away from the
Café de Paris are the DAAD offices, which were established in 2012 for
the promotion of academic transformation in North Africa.
I threw the term “culture of remembrance” (Erinnerungskultur) into our
brainstorming session, and we tried to translate it into Arabic. Like the
concept of “working through the past” (Aufarbeitung), the word was very
German, bound closely with the German language, culture and history
both in subtle and less subtle ways. A literal translation, such as ṯaqāfat
aḏ-ḏākira, makes little substantive sense, and so only a more or less cir-
cuitous description seemed suitable. At the same time, it was precisely this
issue of remembrance culture and the question of working through injus-
tice that was so virulent for the Arab world, which was on the way to be-
coming a post-dictatorial world, or so at least we hoped. The establish-
ment of a democratic system is bound closely with working through expe-
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riences with injustice.3 Numerous novels and testimonials composed in re-
cent years, as well as in the preceding decades under the dictatorship,
await contemplation by the scholarly world; such works include Cristal by
Gilbert Naccache, al-Qauqaʿa (The Capsule, 2008) by Mustafa Khalifa,
and Bil-ḫalāṣ yā šabāb! 16 ʿāman fī suğūn sūrīya (On the deliverance! 16
years in the Syrian prisons, 2012) by Yassin Al-Hajj Salih. Even if the
“culture of remembrance” and “working through” were not yet themes be-
ing addressed by Tunisian and Egyptian universities (in Morocco, the is-
sues were already being discussed), they began to be so in the course of
the authorized Responsibility, Justice and the Culture of Remembrance
project — and not only in a cross-Arab comparative sense. In Tunis, but
also in the rather more neglected province of Medenine in Tunisia’s struc-
turally disadvantaged south, workshops and seminars were carried out, a
small amount of international research literature was acquired and made
available to students, and in the German–Arab conferences we discussed
issues including the differences between the German and Arab concepts of
“working through the past” (Dhouib 2018 c). Given the political changes
beginning in 2014, the thematization of specific experiences of injustice in
Egypt was by contrast still possible only in mediated form, for example
through the literary discussion of fictional texts. Unfortunately, some
Egyptian colleagues were no longer able to participate in the project.
The discussion of director Hichem Ben Ammar’s film Against Forget-
ting (Gegen das Vergessen) in the project’s first workshop in Germany in
2013 served as prelude to a reflection on testimony and torture that contin-
ued over the course of the year. This documentary film on the history of
torture and on the working through of Tunisia’s past was created in the
context of the Contre l´oubli — Project for Working through the Past in
Tunisia led by cultural studies scholar Hamza Chourabi. The project was
located at the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Memorial. In this film, members
of the leftist “Perspectives” movement were interviewed about their time
in prison under Bourguiba, about torture and abuse, and about the impor-
tance of literature and communications between prisoners. The film also
tells the story of a random meeting between a torturer and a torture victim
following prison, and reflects on violence as an anthropological constant
among human beings, as well as the (im)possibility of reconciliation and
3 For a discussion on the application of a transitional justice model to different coun-
tries, see the contribution by Fatima Kastner in this volume.
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reparation. Such topics were addressed incisively, for example, in Fathi
Ben Haj Yahia’s narrative about his prison experience (Ben Haj Yahia [Fr.
trans. 2011]).
One of the prisons from the “dark years”, formerly located near the
“Faculty of 9 April” (Faculté des Sciences Humaines et Sociales de Tu-
nis), has been destroyed. Today only individual piles of rubble on a broad
piece of ground can be seen. This site of torture and dehumanization and
the site of free and humanistic education were located nearly side by side.
The name “9 April”, borne by both the prison and the college, recalls an
important date in Tunisia’s national history. The date 9 April 1938 marked
a bloody event in the struggle for independence. It is an irony of history
that this prison, which held the “freedom fighters” of that era even during
the colonial period, persisted after independence in order to torture the
new oppositional elite.
How should such a lieu de mémoire (site of memories) be handled?
Should it be preserved, and if so, under what auspices? These are ques-
tions for which new answers must be found again and again. We — the
German, Tunisian and Moroccan lecturers and students — had the oppor-
tunity in June 2014 to inspect the site with one of the film’s witnesses,
Ezzedine Hazgui. In his stories, the walls of this hated building rose from
the ruins once again.
Philosophy and witness
As a Tunisian, one knew a great deal and suspected more; this was shown
not least in the many whispered jokes in circulation under the dictatorship
(Maataoui 2018). However, this circumstance has not been the subject of
public reflection, and certainly not of scholarly contemplation. This is the
threshold that must now be crossed. In the course of the project, a number
of Tunisian philosophers such as Zeïneb Ben Saïd-Cherni and Salah Mos-
bah reported — for the first time in this public form — on their experi-
ences in detention and in prison, and posed the question of whether and
how testimony can be given. Numerous testimonials, as well as novels
about prison experiences, have appeared in the Arabic-speaking world in
recent years. Often, though not always, the testimony of Arab philoso-
phers who underwent these experiences with their own bodies possesses a
particular value. Not only is it descriptive and a document of injustice;
their nuanced, conceptually exact reflections on injustice show the transi-
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tion from concrete experience to philosophy (Dhouib 2018 a). However,
providing witness has proven to be a task that is complex, tedious and
sometimes full of detours. To me, a short car trip with my former profes-
sor Fathi Triki serves as paradigmatic of the difficulty of speaking and, at
the same time, the great need to speak of what has been experienced. Triki
was my most important exchange-program partner in all my projects. I
had asked him numerous times in Arabic whether he too had been impris-
oned, but my questions were always brushed vaguely aside. “You know
how it was...,” (māk taʿraf kifāš) he responded in Tunisian dialect. What
was I supposed to know, and why? Because I am Tunisian? At that trau-
matic time in his life, I probably wasn’t even born yet. I felt that any fur-
ther questions would be rude. Why couldn’t I insist? As Triki drove my
wife and me to our hotel in his car, we spoke in French, and he suddenly
recounted a memory from prison directly, concisely and vividly that gen-
uinely shocked us. Somewhat stunned, we said our goodbyes. What role is
played by the language in which one communicates memories? To whom
can one recount them, and when is the best moment to speak about them?4
The issue of compensation, raised in the context of the discussion on
transitional justice and the work of the Tunisian Truth Commission, was
rejected by all the philosophers interviewed in the project. Personal com-
pensation was impossible, they said; however, anchoring the value of hu-
man beings and their fundamental rights in the still-to-be-written Tunisian
constitution was the most important political response to the injustice ex-
perienced. This stance, which rejects material compensation, can also be
found in the testimonies of the philosophers Zeïneb Ben Saïd-Cherni
(Dübgen 2014) and Salah Mosbah, which are slated to appear in the Ger-
man language in 2018 (Dhouib 2018 a). A portion of their reflections on
the multifaceted nature of transitional justice was published in 2016
(Dhouib 2016).
Do women go to school in your country?
At the University of Bremen’s Institute for Philosophy, I was once allowed
to give a lecture on the status of philosophy in the Tunisian educational
4 See also the contribution in this volume by Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge
on literary means of expressing emotions in these situations.
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system. After my presentation, a student asked whether women in Tunisia
were allowed to go to school. I initially thought it was a joke. By contrast,
my German host, who had some experience with German–Arab exchange
programs, understood that it was not a joke, and answered in my place
with a story. When he was at a conference in Tunisia, he and his German
colleagues were asked: Where are your female German philosophers? Be-
cause at this meeting, all the participants on the German side were men,
while the Tunisian contingent had many women as well (Ben Saïd-Cherni
2008).
Prejudices of this kind have also led me in my seminars on modern
Arab–Islamic philosophy to begin with what I do not offer and what we
will not do in the seminar: no research on terrorism or fundamentalism, al-
though such phenomena can certainly be regarded from a philosophical
perspective. Students’ initial questions are of course strongly influenced
by the media, and reflect what one finds in the press, on television and on-
line about the Arab world.5 But unfortunately, academic discourse also of-
ten suffers from this asymmetric attention. Instead of philosophers engag-
ing with philosophers, focus is always placed on Islam or the political
events in the Arab region. This became clear to me particularly in a con-
versation with Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, who died in exile in
Berlin on 11 December 2016. In the summer of 2016, I had several con-
versations with him that touched me deeply. Sadiq, as he wanted to be
called, sought to bring about societal, political and philosophical transfor-
mation in his critical works throughout his life (al-Azm 1968 [Engl. trans.
2011]; 1969 [Engl. trans. 2014]). Not only did he serve as an important
point of orientation for an entire generation of Arab intellectuals as a
philosopher, but also as an actor within civil society. In one of our conver-
sations, he referred — not without bitterness — to the difficulties con-
fronted by the Arab philosopher. While he worked under difficult political
and academic conditions in his country, and thus frequently changed both
physical locations and roles (as an academic, a public intellectual and a
civil-society actor), in the “Western” context he was rarely in demand as a
philosopher, but often instead as an “expert on Islam” or a “Middle East
expert”. “Expertise” on the “homo islamicus” was regularly expected from
him. This is not only meant as a criticism of neoliberal language — a lan-
5 See the contribution in this volume by Carola Richter and Hanan Badr on the preva-
lence of colonial concepts about the Arab region in communication studies.
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guage in which cultures and people are treated as commodities, and a
judgment on them in the form of “expertise” is possible according to mar-
ket economy rules. Rather, the aim is also to inquire into the reasons why
such a skewed perception, in which the voices of Arab philosophers are
hardly to be heard, is continually reproduced.
Currently, there are still few annotated and scholarly translations of
Arab philosophers. Instead of asking how certain themes are addressed by
these philosophers, the question is posed: “What does Islam say about
this?” In this way, fundamentalist and Islamist approaches are pushed to
the foreground, while the Arab world’s critical and enlightened philosoph-
ical approaches remain largely unknown. The “Philosophy in the Modern
Middle East” (Philosophie in der Nahöstlichen Moderne) series, recently
created by Anke von Kügelgen, seeks to resolve the above-mentioned
asymmetric perception. The anthology Toleranz und Intoleranz in der ara-
bischen Moderne (Tolerance and Intolerance in the Modern Arab World),
which I am currently producing within the context of an AGYA tandem
project, will appear in this series of volumes.
German–Arab exchange in times of political transformation not only
enables us to think through questions of human rights, experiences with
injustice and the culture of remembrance from a dual perspective, and to
advance the idea of a transcultural philosophy. It also serves to dismantle
prejudices and blinders. With the demand for a dual substantive critique
comes the demand for a dual critique of philosophical practice, which also
encompasses issues such as gender equality and the promotion of young
talent. Dual critique means, for example, a (self-)critical look at scholarly
infrastructure and practice in Arab countries, in which the achievement of
equality, promotion of the young and decentralization remain critical
tasks. It also includes a (self-)critical look at academic life in Europe and
Germany, particularly with regard to the issues of equality of opportunity
and support for young talent, as well as tolerance for an Arab world
which, in its complexity, cannot be equated with Islamism.
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Communication Studies in Transformation —
Self-Reflections on an Evolving Discipline in Times of
Change
Carola Richter and Hanan Badr
Monday morning: You wake to the alarm clock set on your mobile phone.
You get up to check the news posted by your overseas friends on Face-
book before watching the latest world news on TV. On the way to work,
you quickly use WhatsApp to tell your friend that you cannot make the
meeting scheduled for that night, then read your local newspaper app on
your tablet.
These daily actions describe ordinary media usage on an average day,
and hint at the sweeping changes we have witnessed in our media use.
Over the course of recent years, rapid developments in media technology
have substantially changed our communication practices, and indeed are
changing them still. Most likely, we continue to take actions fundamental-
ly similar to those of generations before us — waking up, reading newspa-
pers, connecting with friends — but we do these things in a different way,
influenced by new technologies. This process is what communication
scholars have termed mediatization, a term that refers to the incorporation
of all kinds of new-media technologies into quotidian practices (Hepp &
Krotz 2014).
The phenomenon of mediatization is taking place on a global scale and
has been felt in every society. In particular, it has greatly facilitated the
transnational transfer of concepts, products and content.1 Hence, since the
beginning of the digital era in the 1990 s, and even more so since the ad-
vent of Web 2.0 in the mid-2000 s, communication studies have started to
shift their focus from the mass consumption of media to individualized
forms of media production and use. However, mainstream studies on me-
diatization published in the leading journals in the United States, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Germany have often eschewed dealing with political
9
1 For a perspective of computer sciences on this phenomenon, see the contribution by
Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi in this volume.
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content to an odd degree, as if the rise of new media had stripped the pub-
lic of its political interests. Over the past decade, the majority of studies
published have addressed issues such as how American college students
share music files and cute cat pictures via social media, how women uti-
lize cameras on their smartphones, or how school life is changing through
mediatized day-to-day activities (e.g., Pettegrew & Day 2015; Hjorth
2014; Hepp & Krotz 2014). Moreover, communication studies in the area
of new media have long concentrated heavily on researching “developed”
societies in the northern hemisphere, such as Europe, North America,
South Korea or Japan.
On the other hand, research on internet communication focusing on
China, Africa and the Middle East over the past decade has often brought
the political dimension to the forefront. In this case, the research has ex-
plored authoritarian regimes’ regulation of the media, media usage by
protest groups, exile-run media and so on. Communication studies have
thus seemed to divide the mediatized world into quotidian practices in the
“West” and political effects in the “rest”.2 It is interesting to observe how
these two theoretical strands, which address the same global phenomenon,
that is, mediatization, have shaped the development of communication
studies in recent years. In particular, a rather techno-deterministic ap-
proach is evident that has reduced the countries of the “rest” to the status
of receivers of Western technology yearning for freedom; at the same
time, this discourse has essentialized the “West” as a homogeneous entity
— which it certainly is not.
However, a review of the research findings produced within communi-
cation studies on media change and the transformation of communication
seven years after the Arab uprisings reveals interesting developments. The
previous period’s wave of techno-deterministic euphoria has been coun-
tered by more cautious evaluations of media effects and interventions
from social scientists hailing from different disciplines. In the following
sections, we lay out the rationales behind these two different approaches
by referring to mainstream communication studies literature of the last
decade, as well as to our own work in the field, in which we have com-
bined theories and models developed in the West with case studies exam-
ining Arab societies. Subsequently, we ask whether scholars located in the
2 Here we borrowed a phrase from Stuart Hall, who pointed out the academic world’s
construction of “the West and the Rest” with regard to power relations in 1992.
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Arab world can contribute to a reorientation within the field of communi-
cation studies and, if so, how they can achieve this. We conclude by stat-
ing that the Arab uprisings have indeed provided a major catalyst for re-
thinking the impact of media on political and social change within the
field of communication studies.
The Arab world in focus
As Egyptian sociologist Mona Abaza argues, the Arab uprisings “have re-
vived academic interest in the region in a clearly positive manner” (Abaza
2011). The events have raised scholarly awareness of the role of media
and its connection to social and political change in a region that has long
lacked such attention. However, with this attention, predefined concepts
and externally imposed theories have also gained ground. Moreover, in
shifting their research interests quickly, many media scholars have also be-
come what Abaza terms “overnight Middle East experts”. Scholars re-
ferred to the events in the Arab countries as long as they seemed to sup-
port particular approaches favored by academics, but stopped doing so as
soon as their concepts proved no longer able to encompass the complexi-
ties of the interactions between the region’s media, society and processes
of transformation.
Iran’s 2009 Green movement was the first event to stimulate communi-
cation scholars’ research into the role of social media in political up-
heavals (Kamalipour 2010). Indeed, it seemed to be a wake-up call de-
manding closer scholarly attention to the political potential of social me-
dia. Later, the obvious role played by social media in the Arab uprisings
significantly boosted research on media effects in communication studies.
After 2011, the investigation of the role of communication within social
networks and in the use of digital media more broadly became a focal
point of research in relation to the Arab world. When some Egyptians
went so far as to name newborn children “Facebook”,3 with many others
exuberantly thanking social media, there was clearly something extraordi-
nary going on.
3 See CNN, February 21, 2011, available on http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/m
east/02/21/egypt.child.facebook/.
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With the aim of assessing the type of knowledge relating to the Arab
uprisings actually produced by communication scholars, we analyzed all
journal title entries in the time span from 2011 to early 2015 in the Web of
Science Core Collection — thus, looking only at journals listed in the So-
cial Science Citation Index (SSCI). Globally, this collection includes the
most influential communication studies journals. Using the topical
Boolean search terms “Arab spring OR Arab* OR Egypt OR Tunisia OR
Libya OR Syria,” we identified 148 original articles that referred to the
media in the Arab world. Only 66 of the 148 articles actually dealt with an
Arab country or local social phenomena; the majority of the articles (83)
simply referred to the “Arab Spring” as a marker, symbol or cultural con-
cept, while in fact investigating different topics such as Facebook use by
young people in South Africa or the Occupy Wall Street movement. Often,
the term “Arab Spring” acts as a specific imagined construct that is trans-
ported and reproduced in these research settings, leaving little room for in-
vestigation of the complex and structural factors behind the actual upris-
ings and the role of (social) media in them. Although the most simplistic
causal explanations for the so-called Facebook revolution have today been
strongly questioned by most researchers, the argument that the revolution
was triggered by specific communication tools such as Twitter and Face-
book continues to be accepted uncritically and reproduced through decon-
textualized references to the “Arab Spring” in cases when writers seek to
highlight the political effects of the media. There has been little robust de-
bate between those propounding a euphoric determinism for social media
effects (most of whom can be found in the field of communication studies)
and those (typically found in area studies) who are more suspicious of no-
tions of social determinism and political economy (Badr 2015). The evi-
dent disconnect between communication studies and area studies, with
some exceptions, helps explain the prevalence of this decontextualized
reference to the “Arab Spring” in communication studies.
Of the remaining 66 articles which investigate the Arab media in depth,
an overwhelming majority of 52 papers — or 79 percent — focus on in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) and new media, while on-
ly 14 — or 21 percent of the relevant literature — discuss other aspects of
Arab media. This demonstrates how communication studies follow fash-
ionable trends and immediately appealing catchwords. Recent research fo-
cusing on the Arab world in particular seems to be obsessed with ICT,
neglecting the fact that television remains by far the most widely used
medium in the Arab world, reaching almost every household (Dubai Press
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Club 2010). Even in Egypt, the most populous Arab country and one with
a relatively advanced technical infrastructure, internet penetration had not
exceeded 25 percent of the population in 2011, and rose after the events of
the Arab uprisings only to about 32 percent in 2014.4 In other countries,
such as Syria, Libya or Yemen, which also witnessed uprisings, internet
penetration rates were and remain far lower.
The return of the school of “massive effects”
In light of these imbalances, how can we explain the limited focus of the
published communication studies research? One part of the explanation
seems to be the scholarly uncertainty regarding how to grasp the new and
developing phenomenon of mediatization. Indeed, all established explana-
tions seem to be outdated. Danish scholar Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, for ex-
ample, has summarized the debate over the subfield of political communi-
cation and its failed adaptation to what he termed “sociotechnological
changes” (Nielsen 2014: 7). He criticizes the inability of communication
studies to adapt to new circumstances that were evident even before the
Arab uprisings, and which have largely been shaped by the worldwide ex-
plosion in internet use. The mediatization of nearly all aspects of life, ac-
celerated by the increasing interactivity of internet functions — also
known as Web 2.0 — certainly brought huge challenges for communica-
tion studies. Nielsen (2014: 6) describes, for example, how audiences are
fragmenting (or perhaps can no longer even be described as audiences,
since they produce content at the same time they consume it), how media
organizations are changing, and how processes of individualization are
taking place. Under these circumstances, he further argues, relying on
what he calls “zombie concepts” — concepts such as agenda-setting or
public opinion, or a focus on what the media do with people instead of
what people do with the media — might put communication studies on the
wrong track, thus rendering the discipline irrelevant at the very least.
Over the last decade, there has been growing sentiment among scholars
that traditional US-inspired communication studies approaches, with their
focus on media effects, might be missing the point of current develop-
4 According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) statistics: http://www.it
u.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2015/Individuals_Internet_2000-201
4.xls.
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ments (Lynch 2008). The result has been a steady growth in research bor-
rowing from other social science disciplines, such as media analysis de-
rived from cultural studies, or critical media studies inspired by the Frank-
furt School (Punathambekar & Scannell 2013). Interestingly, however, the
Arab uprisings have accelerated this shift, while at the same time reviving
the almost-forgotten paradigms of modernization and technological deter-
minism — paradigms that seemed to offer convenient explanations for
complex realities because they had a long tradition in communication
studies — despite the fact that these approaches have largely been discred-
ited. As in the 1960 s, “massive effects” allegedly produced by the media
are today being overemphasized, with researchers attributing new media
with an overly influential role in triggering changes in human behavior, as
well as in political and social structures. Marc Lynch diagnosed this trend
before the uprisings, and concluded that, “as in the earlier generation of
Western media-effects research, the absence of serious empirical research
and undertheoretized causal mechanisms allow a politically convenient
and superficially plausible ‘massive effects’ assumption to go largely un-
challenged” (Lynch 2008: 18). This can be explained by a colonial legacy
that shaped assumptions about the “rest”, which was initially hidden be-
hind benevolent rhetoric but which became clearer through the subsequent
reliance on explanations citing the triumphant advance of Western tech-
nology in the Arab world. Indeed, this trend became clearly visible in me-
dia reports and academia during the Arab uprisings. In one of his TV in-
terviews, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg even explained why social
media platforms were so important to the entire world: “Here we use
things like Facebook to share news and catch up with our friends, but
there — they’re gonna use it to decide what kind of government they
want, to get access to health care for the first time ever, to connect with
family hundreds of miles away that they haven’t seen in decades. Getting
access to the internet is a really big deal!”5 Interestingly, he seemed to for-
get that “here” (in the United States) too, social media is used in political
communication; indeed, political and societal changes are accelerated by
particular patterns of media practice. Moreover, most of the people “there”
(in the non-Western world) also use Facebook and other social media for
entertainment and personal purposes, sharing information about football,
5 Mark Zuckerberg on CNN, August 21, 2013, available at: https://www.youtube.co
m/watch?v=F8N3wGjiPYg.
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music and cute cats just like their Western counterparts (Wheeler 2005;
Braune 2013).
The demystification of media technology has often been neglected by
scholars. Larry Diamond, a well-known political scientist, coined the term
“liberation technology”, which he defines as “any form of information and
communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social and
economic freedom” (Diamond 2010: 70). Similarly, the idea of having
found a tool able to facilitate democratization processes has guided a con-
siderable bulk of scholarly literature since 2011, particularly among publi-
cations dealing with the Arab uprisings. Badr (2015: 2–4) summarizes the
main arguments in this strand of literature. In particular, she identifies a
revival of the normative concept of a Habermasian public sphere. After
having been widely discussed in Germany for 20 years, the concept of the
public sphere appeared prominently in Anglo-Saxon scholarship only after
Habermas’ book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was
translated into English in 1989. With the importance of social media in the
Arab uprisings, the concept of the public sphere and its potential expan-
sion due to technological innovation experienced a second revival. The
dominant hypothesis here is that online media opened up an otherwise re-
pressive and controlled public sphere. Specifically, the internet is seen as
fertile ground for contestation mechanisms, where political and social ac-
tors can engage with one another to express contrasting and divergent
views, thus forming counter-publics. This again, so the argument goes, fa-
cilitates inter-media agenda setting, that is, a spillover of themes from in-
ternet sources into the broader public: “Social media, therefore, break the
monopoly of traditional elites and successfully put neglected topics on the
media agenda” (Badr 2015: 3). It was hoped that these possibilities facili-
tated by technology would lead to newly empowered citizenry.
Challenging concepts
Beyond our review of the major communication studies journals, other
perspectives in recent years have also sought to bear witness to the pro-
cesses of social and political change in the Arab world, in China or Russia,
and even in the West following events such as the NSA surveillance scan-
dal. In contrast to what has been called the “utopian” perspective of social
media effects, a “dystopian” counter-discourse has arisen. One of its most
prominent proponents is Evgeny Morozov. He argues that digital media
9 Communication Studies in Transformation
149
have primarily helped authoritarian institutions such as regime elites to
find new and more effective ways of controlling and repressing their peo-
ple (Morozov 2011). Developments in the Arab countries and elsewhere
show that the internet also harbors the potential for information manipula-
tion and government surveillance, and does not necessarily function as a
liberation technology, as optimistically presumed (Badr 2015).
Similarly, other scholars explicitly referred to the Arab uprisings to in-
dicate that the power of social media effects had been overestimated.
Lynch (2013) spoke of a “Twitter devolution” and a “Tahrir bubble”. If we
embed this insight into a broader global context, the “normalization the-
sis” comes into play. According to this thesis, normalization processes
happen through commercialization mechanisms, citizens’ behavior and the
procedures by which actors such as the state acquire new skills, thereby
transferring offline power constellations to the online sphere (Anstead &
Chadwick 2009). The innovation therefore becomes normalized.
The naïve expectation that the internet will become a platform for ratio-
nal deliberation and idealistic inclusion needs to be viewed through this
perspective. The current debate among European journalists on dealing
with the flood of hate speech in online comment sections clearly illustrates
how far online deliberations are from being rational or inclusive; on the
contrary, they foster the growth of radical polarized positions within the
political culture. South of the Mediterranean, in Egypt, we witnessed the
emergence of Facebook as a real “battleground”, pitting followers of dif-
ferent political positions against one another (Badr 2013). Thus, while a
highly optimistic depiction of technology prevailed in communication
studies shortly after the Arab uprisings, more nuanced perspectives on (so-
cial) media and its contexts emerged later, seeking to expand the under-
standing of the role of the media in social and political change beyond this
initial techno-deterministic view. This development has relied on general
shifts in the field of communication studies, which started with the advent
of the internet but gained a new dynamism with the uprisings of 2011. To
be sure, however, different approaches within communication studies —
postcolonial vs. modernist, normative vs. descriptive, and quantitative vs.
qualitative — all continue to coexist, each finding self-serving evidence in
the Arab uprisings to legitimize their own findings.
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Arab inroads?
In the early 2000 s, various scholars at US universities — often those from
an immigrant background — began pushing back against the blind appli-
cation of Western theories in globalization research. As a part of this ef-
fort, they started a debate regarding the de-Westernization of media and
communication studies (Curran & Park 2000). Since that time, the
question of how “different conceptions about knowledge, humanity, iden-
tity, individualism and community” could help to “produce legitimate”
knowledge about societies under investigation (Waisbord & Mellado
2014: 366) has come to the fore. In this light, our own questions in the
context of the de-Westernization debate can be summarized as follows:
Did the uprisings bring more attention to specifically Arab academic con-
tributions to mainstream communication studies? And how can significant
local inroads into communication studies be made possible?
To answer these questions, we investigated the background of the au-
thors of the 66 journal articles mentioned above. Indeed, about a third
were written by scholars with Arab names. However, most of those
scholars were located abroad, and affiliated with US or British universi-
ties. Only six of the lead authors were actually affiliated with universities
in the Arab world, with half of them working at American universities in
the region. Previous investigations of knowledge production by Arab so-
cial scientists have also indicated that only a negligible number of contri-
butions by local scholars are published in the widely read, high-impact
journals. For example, Sari Hanafi and Rigas Arvanatis analyzed the so-
cial sciences’ “politics of citation” (2016: 255) within the context of the
Arab uprisings, and found an “evident hierarchy […] of knowledge pro-
duction” (275), with the “highest level of legitimacy (and the highest cita-
tion factor)” accorded most commonly to those “from U.S. foreign-policy
Ivy Leaguers”. Only on the lower level of the hierarchy do they locate
“peripheral knowledge producers” that “include Arabs writing from within
the region, in Arabic” (2016: 276). We can draw similar conclusions from
our investigation into high-impact communication studies journals: Arab
media scholars do not participate in process of knowledge production in
the field of communication studies unless they publish in English or out-
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side their region. Academic knowledge generated in Arabic remains large-
ly unknown and disconnected from international research.6
At the same time, it is not clear whether local scholars would have
come to different, more independent conclusions, as many of them are ei-
ther involved in activism, and have thus endorsed the euphoric discourse
of new media empowerment, or have been coopted to produce politically
biased research. Furthermore, we also have to acknowledge local authors’
tendency to refer to well-known Western markers and constructs that cap-
ture the readers’ attention. Therefore, it comes as little surprise that 54 of
the 66 articles analyzed refer explicitly to the “Arab Spring”, the “revolu-
tion”, the “revolt” or the “uprisings” in order to frame their findings. Even
if their research took place well before the incidents, authors evidently
sought to make their contributions more appealing by stating that what
they analyzed “paved the way for the Egyptian revolution of January
2011” (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2014), for example, or referred to the upris-
ings in Egypt in order to pose the question: “Can Twitter usage promote
social progress in Saudi Arabia?” (Chaudhry 2014).
However, as Mohammad Ayish — one of the closest observers of Arab
media scholarship — and Harris Breslow have pointed out, the general
problem is that the Anglo–American empirical and quantitative mass com-
munication paradigm still dominates in the Arab world (Ayish & Breslow
2014: 59). Similarly, Walter Armbrust (2012: 48) detects a focus on the
causal effect of new technology. In her review of audience studies carried
out by Arab scholars, Noha Mellor even concludes that “Arab researchers
here place themselves in a knowledge hierarchy above the subjects of their
research, who are regarded as passive receivers of information, and poten-
tial victims of western propaganda” (2013: 212). Ayish and Breslow urge
researchers to step back and abandon purely media-centric analysis, and to
engage instead in interdisciplinary approaches that link communication re-
search insights and techniques with those of neighboring disciplines. In
this regard, Ayish and Breslow suggest three main areas of research inter-
ests: 1) the political economy of the media with regard to institutions, gov-
ernance and information flows; 2) the increasing mobility of information
flows and people within the media, and 3) the changing nature of the pro-
duction of identity with regard to the media (Ayish & Breslow 2014: 57).
6 See the contributions in this volume by Florian Kohstall as well as Barbara Winck-
ler and Christian Junge on a similar discussion on the (in)visibility of local knowl-
edge.
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In fact, these recommendations accord with the current focus of critical
communication studies in general (Punathambekar & Scannell 2013).
Accordingly, three research strands are needed in Arab media research.
First, a more cultural studies-oriented approach needs to be developed. In
the last decade, this approach has become more prominent, particularly in
Great Britain but also in other European countries and the United States.
Cultural studies analyze the complex relations of media and people by
looking at the interrelatedness of production processes, media use and
content. Although this research trend promises to offer better contextual-
ized interpretations of social phenomena, it has not yet garnered numerous
followers among local or foreign scholars doing research in the Arab
world. There are few examples in Arab communication research depart-
ments of critical cultural studies focusing on class, race and gender in rela-
tion to the media. Enclaves do exist, but these are primarily in fields ori-
ented toward arts, literature or anthropology. In this context, mediated
forms of communication such as graffiti, music or slogans have been ana-
lyzed (see Aboubakr 2013). Lebanese–American scholar Marwan Kraidy,
for instance, has focused on the “human body as medium in the digital
age” (Kraidy 2013: 285), thus emphasizing the interrelatedness of produc-
tion, usage and content offline and online. Moreover, Tarik Sabry (2011)
has come up with an attempt to map “Arab cultural studies”, identifying
the most prominent media scholars of Arab origin. However, most of the
scholars who propel this kind of research are based in the West, living and
working in the United States or the United Kingdom. On the one hand,
this indicates that concepts from abroad are being transferred to (or even
sometimes imposed on) the Arab world. But on the other hand, those dias-
poric researchers of Arab descent are able to use their own biographies to
build necessary geographical bridges, as well as the conceptual bridges be-
tween contextualized knowledge and innovative media studies. This po-
tential means that Arab scholars in the West can also produce meaningful
explanations regarding mediatization in an Arab context.
The second underrepresented element of communication studies in the
Arab region is the political economy of the media. Political economy
refers to the interrelations between economic processes and specific politi-
cal circumstances (see Richter & Gräf 2015). The term was coined by
Marx in relation to his critique of modes of production in 18th century Eu-
rope. It experienced a later conceptual revival within the Frankfurt School
founded by Adorno and Horkheimer, and was also adopted by left-wing
scholars to criticize neoliberal policies and the deregulation of media re-
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forms. In non-democratic countries, mainstream communication re-
searchers subscribed for a long time to the assumption that economic lib-
eralization in the media sector would stimulate democratization. Given the
lack of public service logic, the state media simply embodied the hegemo-
ny of the ruling class. Pluralism due to competition was envisaged as the
main outcome of liberalization (Rozumilovicz 2002). However, the real
outcome of the privatization of media markets in most Arab countries has
in fact been to increase the influence of the ruling political regimes. Major
media outlets such as TV stations were often sold to loyal business elites
or simply newly founded by family members of the rulers (Richter & El
Difraoui 2015: 12). While this is certainly of local importance, the obser-
vation also sheds light on the corporate globalization of the media: Al-
waleed bin Talal, a Saudi prince, for example, is not only the owner of the
most popular pan-Arab entertainment media conglomerates but is also a
major shareholder in Twitter, while Egyptian Coptic billionaire Naguib
Sawiris controls most of the telecommunications markets in Africa (Sakr
2013: 2295). To date, important questions regarding the political economy
of the Arab media have been taken up only haphazardly by local scholars,
while research on the issue has again been shaped by observers from
abroad such as Naomi Sakr, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen and Donatella del-
la Ratta (2015), who recently published on Arab media moguls.
The last aspect of communication research we mention here deals with
methodological questions. At the beginning of this article, we noted the
criticisms of scholars seeking to detect causal relations between media and
its effects, and specifically the impact of new media on political and social
change. Influenced by political science and social movement research,
communication studies have tried to illuminate these interactions using
quantitative methods, for instance by measuring which audiences use what
media, how often, for what purposes and with what effects. Others study-
ing everyday-life activities related to the media and communication have
often neglected to consider the potential of the media or media use to
bring about social change, thus remaining simply descriptive in their stud-
ies. In general, both strands need to overcome their predefined limits; me-
dia use should always be linked to effects, but the assumption of causal
mechanisms should be avoided. Therefore, in order to identify dynamics
of change, future communication studies need to develop methods and
theoretical models for the analysis of communication processes and media
practices that avoid today’s pitfalls. Challenging mainstream trends in cur-
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rent media studies also means shifting the scholarly focus toward under-
represented fields and approaches in the Arab region.
Perspectives
Finally, we conclude with a few words on how communication studies can
benefit from knowledge production induced by the Arab uprisings. Our
core argument in this article is that we need to focus less on technology
and more on people-centered analyses of media practices. One could, for
example, investigate how the journalistic profession is being transformed
by the use of social media. Here, one could ask how exactly journalists ap-
ply social media in gathering news, and what this means for the profes-
sion’s ethical standards. The notion of citizen journalism is also related;
this phenomenon could be analyzed through participatory observation, for
example, with the goal of establishing exactly how local communities in
Cairo, Baghdad or Berlin utilize various media tools to articulate their po-
litical causes and problems.
This demands an approach in which communication researchers active-
ly seek to integrate insights gained from other disciplines. At the same
time, other disciplines that have acknowledged media as important spaces
of action should be more open to engaging with the knowledge produced
in the field of communication studies. In particular, scholars with a local
knowledge of the culture and politics of the Arab region can build bridges
between area studies and communication studies. The boom in “Arab
Spring studies” has been noticeable in various disciplines, but invisible
boundaries have evidently prevented core findings from being shared
across neighboring social science fields. This needs to change!
Establishing stronger networks of interdisciplinary cooperation to en-
able better circulation of knowledge can also help in adapting seemingly
universal concepts and models more meaningfully to local research phe-
nomena. The account of Susan O’Rourke, a journalism instructor teaching
in Oman, is quite telling in this regard. She tells of the difficulty of trans-
ferring an undergraduate journalism program from New Zealand to Oman:
“Although the view was expressed in New Zealand that […] teaching ma-
terials should just ‘be taken off the shelf’, it quickly became apparent that
this would not be possible and that much further contextualization to
Omani society would be required”, because in communication studies, “a
complex interaction of culture, language (both visual and written), theory,
9 Communication Studies in Transformation
155
intellectual freedom, creativity, imagination and personal opinion occurs”
(O’Rourke 2011: 111). This observation demonstrates that the notion of
universal journalistic practice, for example, has its limitations.
The production of more “legitimate” knowledge will also require ex-
changes during which scholars from different geographical and cultural
backgrounds can learn from each other. In fact, one result of the Arab up-
risings has been the creation of just such networks in communication stud-
ies, as the events showed the need to rely more heavily both on local and
transcultural scientific knowledge in order to deepen the field’s under-
standing.7 This motivated partners around the world to engage more
strongly with each other.
Both of the authors of this article are involved in various projects of this
kind, one of them being the AREACORE network (www.areacore.org).
AREACORE is an acronym for the Arab–European Association of Media
and Communication Researchers. The network was founded as the result
of an intensive summer school in Berlin in 2013. With funding provided
by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), communication
scholars from seven Arab countries and Germany were brought together to
form an academic network; it has been growing ever since. As of 2016,
the network consisted of 11 partner universities in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria,
Oman, Yemen, Qatar, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Germany. In
addition to the training courses focusing on adapting media concepts such
as investigative journalism and data journalism to regional requirements,
AREACORE launched two major projects aimed at producing sustainable
knowledge shaped by this process of academic exchange. At the annual
Media and Digital Literacy Academy in Beirut (MDLAB) summer school,
about 50 students and scholars come together every year to reflect critical-
ly on various media artefacts and develop their own media production
skills. The second major AREACORE project is an online platform for lo-
cally produced audiovisual lectures on media systems in each partner
country.8 This offers a global audience access to authentic knowledge re-
garding the specific characteristics of the individual societies and their
media systems. However, these represent only a few steps on what will be
a long road of mutual learning and cooperation between communication
and media scholars.
7 For a similar perspective on the benefits of intercultural cooperations, see the con-
tribution by Sarhan Dhouib in this volume.
8 See http://www.areacore.org/ims.
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Conclusion
The major upheavals in the Arab countries certainly posed new questions
for and gave new direction to the field of communication studies. While
its research agenda opened up to include the Arab countries, technological
determinism remained a major component in the interpretation of the
events. A decontextualized perspective, focusing only on the media and
excluding its interactions with society and politics, failed to provide an-
swers to vital questions regarding the media and transformation. However,
the construction of bridges between scholars in and outside the region
promises to enrich the discipline, offer it fresh insights and widen the cir-
cle of internationally legitimate media studies knowledge.
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Webs of Change? The Transformation of Online Social
Networks and Communication Infrastructures from a
Technological Point of View
Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi
Free speech is mankind’s most valuable achievement. If not censored, it
allows people all over the world to express their feelings, their thoughts
and, most valuably, their knowledge. In the recent past, the internet has
become the dominant communication channel by which information and
data is exchanged. At any given moment, billions of bits and bytes are
traveling around the earth at the speed of light. People are able to form
groups and meet in virtual reality even when scattered around the globe.
However, as technology has improved, authorities have increasingly felt
the urge to monitor, censor or even prohibit communication via the inter-
net, as the vast network allows information and ideologies to spread ex-
traordinarily rapidly.1
From a computer scientist’s point of view, the Egyptian upheavals were
technologically the most interesting of the Arab uprisings. The Egyptian
government managed to shut down the country’s internet access (nearly)
completely, with the intention of hindering the revolts’ growth. Paradoxi-
cally, this decision may have even intensified the revolt, as it led to an ef-
fective communications blackout for more than 80 million people. As ex-
plained in Eaton (2013), participants in the demonstrations of January 25,
2011, mainly used Facebook (>85%) to organize and plan activities relat-
ed to the revolts, as well as to inform Egyptians and the outside world
about the ongoing events. Other internet-based services such as Twitter,
Flickr and YouTube were used in a similar manner around that time (Man-
sour 2012). On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian government decided to
block all access to Twitter, and the prohibition on Facebook followed one
day later (Dainotti et al. 2011). Internet access more broadly was entirely
shut down during the night of Thursday, January 27, with the block lasting
10
1 See the contribution by Carola Richter and Hanan Badr in this volume for a com-
munication studies’ perspective on these phenomena.
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through Friday, January 28. The Egyptian government instructed internet
providers to shut down their services (Cowie 2011 a). On February 2,
Egypt returned to the internet (Cowie 2011 b). According to Dainotti et al.
(2011), Libya carried out a similar procedure around two weeks later, on
February 18. While activists had previously suspected that their digital
communications were being spied on, these steps indicated that even their
connectivity itself was in danger.
In this article, we review the technology and infrastructure used for on-
line social communication, and discuss the technological weaknesses that
allow these networks to be spied on, censored and blocked, thus hindering
the dissemination of information. We present the current state of techno-
logical developments within the computer science field, particularly focus-
ing on tools for secure, anonymous and untraceable communication. We
offer an evaluation of the degree to which the Arab uprisings affected aca-
demic thinking in the field of computer science, especially regarding top-
ics such as privacy, anonymity, and security in networking and communi-
cations. We provide a brief overview of recent changes in academic think-
ing. Finally, we analyze and explain recent advancements in technology,
and predict possible future trends in the areas of privacy, surveillance and
censorship.
Computer science fields affected by the Arab uprisings
In the following section, we describe how internet services can be — and
have been — blocked, and how the internet as a communication platform
can be shut down by governments at will.
Researchers in computer science reflect on current events and some-
times include them in their research activities as case studies. Here, it is
worthwhile discussing which fields in the computer science research
sphere have been affected by the Arab uprisings. According to the German
Research Association’s (DFG) classification system, the field of computer
science is clustered into eight subject areas, the most prominent being
“theoretical computer science”, “software engineering and programming
languages” and “computer architecture and embedded systems”.
These three subject areas investigate the basic foundational elements of
computer science, including theory as well as the engineering aspects of
software and hardware. The theoretical aspects of computer science are
highly abstract and analytical, and often involve the simplification of prac-
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tical experience. The hardware-related subject area, which relates to com-
puter architecture and embedded systems, aims to accelerate and improve
hardware solutions over long-time scales. Software engineering and pro-
gramming languages offer tools to fully harness the potential of the hard-
ware, and to support ongoing trends such as parallelization, distributed
computing, and device and technology-specific programming. These sub-
ject areas are therefore comparatively minimally affected by current
events or singular use cases.
One further subject area is “information systems, process and knowl-
edge management”. This focuses on the application and integration of IT
solutions in business processes, and focuses on long-term application sce-
narios. It is based on the assumption that computer science plays a vital
role in business processes, and often also acts as an enabler or cost-saving
measure for specific business cases.
Two subject areas that have attracted increasing interest in recent years,
and which are relevant to the events of the Arab uprisings, are “massively
parallel and data intensive systems” and “interactive and intelligent sys-
tems, image and language processing, computer graphics and visualiza-
tion”. Both of these fields are related to the identification, processing and
interpretation of large amounts of data. This trend is known as “big data”.
Processing digital information, either from advertisements, metadata, so-
cial networks or communications, allows customers to be clustered, rev-
enues to be increased thanks to improved advertising and recommenda-
tions, and the future behavior of customers to be predicted. The same con-
cept of deep data analysis can be used to observe communication patterns
on the internet, identify discussion and communication topics, and initiate
reactions to them. For instance, the communications may be reported to a
third party or blocked. Thanks to advancements in the area of data-inten-
sive systems and data processing, more and more information can be ob-
tained from a steadily growing amount of data sources. Thus, advance-
ments in this field contributed to the surveillance of internet users in the
Arab world during the Arab uprisings, as well as worldwide.
The two remaining subject areas comprise trends that support the flow
of information and counteract surveillance and the control of communica-
tion. These are “security and dependability”, and “operating, communica-
tion, database and distributed systems”. The subject area of “security and
dependability” aims at providing solutions to support the security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, as well as availability and
privacy. Thus, progress in this field directly affects what data can be ob-
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tained from users against their will. Secure communication over the inter-
net — that is, communication that is confidential and anonymous —
would allow internet users to exchange their ideas freely. However, secure
communication still leaves traces that allow for the identification and
blocking of this communication.
Here, the subject area of “operating, communication, database and dis-
tributed systems” provides various solutions with which to overcome
these threats. Specifically, in this article we elaborate on what research
questions were identified in response to connectivity interruptions and ob-
servable communication trails during the Arab uprisings. In the field of
communication and distributed systems, various approaches have emerged
to obfuscate communication trails, to support anonymous communication,
to hide communication patterns and even to avoid the internet in digital
communication. Combined with security considerations, these novel dis-
tributed platforms promise to support digital communication that cannot
be spied on, blocked or censored. In the following section, we describe the
main principles and building blocks of the internet before presenting and
discussing the advancements in computer science, specifically in the area
of secure communications, that have been initiated thanks to observations
made during and after the Arab uprisings.
A brief description of the internet
Before we describe the internet itself, we will first explain basic concepts
of its technology. According to Kurose and Keith (2007), the internet is a
computer network which connects billions of devices, such as PCs and
smartphones, which we denote as hosts. Communication links and packet
switches are used to interconnect those hosts physically. From another
point of view, the internet is a complex infrastructure that offers various
services. In order to combine the physical devices and to guarantee specif-
ic services, rules are needed that bring the internet’s components to life.
Those rules, or more precisely protocols, define a communication struc-
ture that is followed by two or more devices (hosts and packet switches) in
a network in order to exchange information. More specifically, protocols
define actions and corresponding reactions that are performed upon events
in the network — for example, upon the sending or receiving of a mes-
sage. Access to the internet is typically granted by an organization we de-
note as an internet service provider (ISP).
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Two important protocols have to be discussed here in order to under-
stand the delivery of data via the internet: the Internet Protocol (IP) and
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). The Internet Protocol assigns
addresses to computers in a network in order to enable data delivery, in the
form of data packets, from a given source host to an arbitrary destination
host.
Unfortunately, the Internet Protocol itself gives no guarantee that the
packets traversing the internet will reach their destinations reliably. The
purpose of the Transmission Control Protocol, which is often used in com-
bination with the IP, is twofold. One purpose of the TCP is to secure the
reliable delivery of packets between two communication hosts. Reliability
in this context means that all packets are guaranteed to reach their destina-
tion and the order of data is preserved during delivery. For this reason, the
TCP comprises different techniques that control the traversal through a
network. The second purpose of the TCP is to identify and separate differ-
ent applications running on a single host. For example, a user may be
streaming music from an internet radio station while simultaneously re-
trieving the latest news from an online magazine, thus engaging in two
different applications at the same time. Since the internet today consists of
billions of connected devices, the task of finding the device associated
with a given internet address is not an easy task. Rules have to be defined
and followed in order to enable data to flow efficiently from a source com-
puter to the correct destination. For a proper explanation, we here intro-
duce the terms forwarding and routing. By forwarding, we mean the pro-
cess that takes place when a single computer hands over incoming packets
to another computer. Routing describes the whole process of finding a path
from a given source computer to a desired destination, using a set of po-
tential intermediary nodes that forward data packets to their final goal. Al-
gorithms and rules that specify a forwarding strategy for participating de-
vices are termed routing algorithms or routing protocols. A device that de-
cides how to forward a given packet, on the other hand, is usually called a
router.
The internet, which has become one of the most complex infrastruc-
tures humanity has ever created, today consists of many different devices,
routers and routing protocols that in combination yield the great variety of
services we use every day. Despite its complexity, the internet is made up
of multiple smaller networks that are controlled and managed by different
organizations, typically internet service providers, so that a certain hierar-
chy is formed. The parts of the internet managed by different organiza-
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tions are called autonomous systems. One indispensable protocol that con-
nects all existing autonomous systems is the Border Gateway Protocol.
One of the several tasks of this protocol is to announce an autonomous
system’s existence to other autonomous systems on the internet. Further-
more, the Border Gateway Protocol ensures that all autonomous systems
on the internet know how to route messages to a specific autonomous sys-
tem.
Technical possibilities of censoring communication on the internet
The Arab uprisings and the resulting blockade of the internet in Egypt and
Libya prove that the surveillance and censorship of internet traffic are de-
sirable goals for certain governments. During the Arab uprisings, these
were elements of state campaigns to oppress certain groups of interest
such as activists, insofar as the technology available at that time permitted.
Technically, we can differentiate between two main types of attacks on the
internet or network traffic in general. Passive attacks on network traffic al-
low an adversary to monitor communication without any interference that
could be detected by a participant. As the word “passive” suggests, adver-
saries in this case do no more than “listen” to the forwarded data packets
without changing their content. Active attacks, on the other hand, allow an
adversary to read, manipulate, delete or even block the content of network
traffic. Since secret surveillance of communication did not play a major
role during the Arab uprisings (passive attacks alone are not sufficient to
block a whole country’s internet access), we will focus on active attacks
on network traffic in the following discussion. These attacks share the
common feature that they are at least partially noticeable to internet users.
By “partially noticeable”, we refer to the fact that the content of censored
websites might be blocked. However, a user may only notice the absence
of such content if she or he can compare a non-blocked version of the site
as a reference. Next, we will present some commonly used techniques in
active network attacks.
Search engine censorship
As a constantly growing system, the internet contains more than 46 billion
sites, according to estimates from de Kunder (2015) in August 2015. How-
Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi
166
ever, the number of websites any given person visits with any frequency is
very small in comparison to the overall size of the internet. Much like a
search catalog in an enormous library, a web search engine is a system,
usually accessed via a web browser, that enables a user to search the
World Wide Web for a given search term.
Normally, a search engine returns a sorted list of popular websites that
contain the search term in any form. According to NetMarketShare (mar-
ketshare.hitslink.com), the most extensively used search engine is Google,
with a market share of 70.2% in July 2015, followed by Bing (10.3%), Ya-
hoo (9.5%) and Baidu (7.1%).
Search engine censorship is probably the simplest form of blocking ac-
cess to websites. The normal procedure of a search engine is to start with a
list of known websites, called seeds, and to follow all newly found hyper-
links in a recursive manner; this activity is called web crawling. All web-
sites found by the web crawler are stored by the search engine provider in
a database for later use. When a user initiates a search query, the search
engine compares its index database with the given keyword(s) in order to
identify matches between the search term and stored websites. A service
provider may return all or no matching results to the user, and may filter
some results out.
One example of the exclusion of search results in Germany and France
is given in Zittrain and Edelman (2002). The authors studied internet fil-
tering initiated by governments with the aim of restricting access to web-
sites deemed illegal under local laws, for example those that offered anti-
Semitic, Nazi-related or radical Islamic content. However, since the tech-
nique of search engine censorship is simple, bypassing this mechanism is
also uncomplicated. A website that is well known to a person or a sympa-
thizing group can be accessed directly without the use of a web search en-
gine. Alternatively, other search engines can be used. Sometimes the use
of a proxy server can help to circumvent local restrictions. We provide
more details on proxy servers in the section on proxy routing.
Deep packet inspection
Actively hindering people from accessing specific sites on the internet is
more costly than simply monitoring network traffic. The well-targeted fil-
tering and surveillance of information traversing the internet requires ac-
cess to the internet’s infrastructure in order to carry out the attack. Dis-
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carding arbitrary packets or randomly distorting the global functionality of
any service is no real benefit to an attacker, as this happens on a small
scale in the network in any case. Large projects designed to engage in
packet filtering (or any other similar projects) are only effective if they
pursue a specific goal, with their intervention placed at the right location
or advertised to the right group of people, thus ensuring they are on the
main routes of the targeted data flow. Furthermore, potential attackers
must have access to the parts of the network in which interventions are
worthwhile. We take a closer look at how packets can be filtered and dis-
carded in a network using the example of Tunisia, a country in which fil-
tering and deep-packet inspection were present long before the Arab upris-
ings emerged (Wagner 2012).
In order to investigate packets in depth, a government must be capable
of intervening in network traffic at specific, critical internet locations. For
example, the Tunisian government had to engage in direct manipulation of
the border gateway routers that run the Border Gateway Protocol.
At this point, we have to remember that the Border Gateway Protocol
enables routing (the forwarding of packets) between different autonomous
systems. The border gateway routers are best suited to monitoring connec-
tions between the national network, the Tunisian part of the internet, with
the other networks and other parts of the internet. Among routers located
at the border with other countries, selected internet gateways inside
Tunisia are interesting targets for an attack. Internet gateways are typically
locations or addresses in a network that offer access to the internet as a
service to all participants in the network. In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, the
Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) provided the gateway that served all
Tunisian ISPs (OpenNet Initiative 2009). Since this agency was subject to
the influence of the Ben Ali regime, it was the institution that intercepted
network traffic.
At these gateways, it is theoretically possible to investigate packets that
traverse the internet. Thus, packet filtering can be done very easily. When-
ever an unencrypted packet traverses a gateway under surveillance, fire-
wall-like programs search for specific keywords deemed suspicious by an
inquisitive government in the passing data stream.
The work of Clayton, Murdoch & Watson (2006) describes in detail
how TCP connections associated with specific keywords can be terminat-
ed by an attacker. As one example, China forces suspicious connections to
close by answering queries with special TCP packets. In much the same
manner as a normal firewall, which allows desired packets to be forward-
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ed while dropping undesired packets, any government — for instance,
those in Tunisia or Egypt — is capable of controlling the forwarding
mechanism of packets entering its national network. The government can
decide whether to forward, observe or drop messages. If we take Tunisia
as an example, the Tunisian Internet Agency was created in 1996 with the
goal of controlling national network traffic, and was instructed to start the
process of internet censorship in the country in 1997 (Wagner 2012).2
However, deep packet inspection techniques operate more subtly and
unobtrusively than we might think. A normal user might blame lost con-
tent on technical problems that seem to originate with the browser or the
internet service provider. Even trickier is when TCP connections are prop-
erly closed by the attacker, and the user receives nothing more than a noti-
fication that a technical problem has occurred. In such scenarios, it is not
clear whether some third person blocked access to a service, or the service
itself failed due to technical problems. Moreover, the Tunisian govern-
ment, like others, already had the capability to analyze and filter specific
URLs and emails under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. A telecommunications
law passed in 1998 even allowed the Tunisian authorities to examine the
content of personal email messages (OpenNet Initiative 2009). This goal
can be accomplished with commercial filtering software that scans various
websites or messages on the internet and searches them for specific key-
words. Whenever those keywords are found on a website, queries to the
website are detected with packet-filtering methods and blocked. Email
messages that are not encrypted can be manipulated or censored after de-
tection. This technique is often combined with IP address blocking. Well-
known websites or web servers on the internet can be identified through
their IP addresses. With the use of IP address blocking, connections to
known addresses on the network are directly blocked. From a technical
point of view, this kind of attack is a simple firewall setting that blocks the
traffic to or from a specific IP address or whole address blocks.
2 See the contribution by Sarhan Dhouib in this volume on surveillance methods in
Ben Ali’s Tunisia that go beyond computer networks.
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Disconnection of networks
As noted above, the internet has grown to become a system connecting
billions of devices. We have already discussed the Border Gateway Proto-
col, whose goal is to connect different autonomous systems and announce
their existence to each other. In other words, the linkages between all the
different autonomous systems form the internet as we know it. The Border
Gateway Protocol — or rather, the routing entries in a border gateway
router — are necessary for packets to find their way from their starting
point to an arbitrary target on the internet.
In 2011, during the uprisings, the Egyptian government exploited the
nature of the Border Gateway Protocol in order to stop some messages
from leaving the country. Technically, the Egyptian government simply
deleted the Border Gateway Protocol entries in the border gateway routers
that connect Egypt to neighboring countries. After this had been done,
packets addressed to any target outside Egypt were no longer able to find a
path forward toward their destinations. Packets that reached a border gate-
way router responsible for the forwarding of the packet across national
borders were simply lost, since border gateway routers without routing en-
tries normally do not know how to forward incoming packets.
A more drastic method would be to disconnect border gateway routers
from the physical network, or even to cut the cables connecting different
devices. The drawback to this method is mainly the increased material
costs. In any case, the deletion of routing entries at border gateway routers
is enough to fulfil this purpose.
Solutions for combatting surveillance and censorship in general
While techniques for surveillance and censorship are numerous, so are
techniques and technologies that allow these mechanisms to be bypassed.
As long as there are multiple autonomous systems present on the internet,
or at least multiple devices that do not belong to one organization, there
will be a way to communicate unreservedly and freely. Here, we present
an assorted collection of techniques that can be used to avoid both censor-
ship driven by active attacks and surveillance carried out through passive
network observation. These solutions originate from the computer science
subject areas of “security and dependability” and “operating, communica-
tion, database and distributed systems”.
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Encryption
The wish to hide confidential information from prying eyes leads to the
oldest known tool for thwarting surveillance: encryption. One of the first
encryption algorithms known from historical records is the Caesar Cipher,
invented by Julius Caesar, in which letters are simply shifted by a known
number of positions in the alphabet. Subsequently, only those people who
are privy to this secret are able to reconstruct the original plain text.
Hence, communication partners always have to share a common secret,
usually denoted as a key, to be able to encrypt and decrypt data. Encryp-
tion has remained a commonly used method for transferring information
in an unreadable form to the present day. However, procedures have be-
come increasingly advanced. Simple methods like the Caesar Cipher suf-
fer from small key sets; today, smart algorithms are able to reconstruct the
unencrypted plain text even without prior knowledge of the secret used to
encrypt the information.
By contrast, modern encryption algorithms rely on more complex meth-
ods to translate plain text into cipher text. In theory, the reconstruction of
the encrypted text would require an attacker to guess the correct key out of
a very large pool of possible combinations. When a sufficiently large key
is used, discovering it — and thus gaining access to the original message
— would require billions of years of analysis using current hardware and
software. Encryption in general can only be used to protect the content of
communication from being seen by unauthorized persons — a property
termed confidentiality. However, such methods are not enough alone to
provide anonymity, privacy and security. Even with an encrypted message,
attackers could still determine the identities of the communicating part-
ners, and hinder them from exchanging further messages or initiating fur-
ther actions online.
Proxy routing
Anonymity on the internet is usually implemented through proxy routing.
The main goal of this technique is to prevent the true sender, receiver, or
sender and receiver simultaneously from being identified by other partici-
pants in a network. This goal is achieved by forwarding messages to one
or multiple relaying participants (proxies) in the network before they are
sent on to a specified destination. Optionally, messages are often encrypt-
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ed. The strategy of routing messages via additional participants is neces-
sary in order to conceal the full path a message is traveling, and thus also
the origin and sometimes the final destination of a message as well.
The best known example in this field is the Tor project (torproject.org),
which allows its users to contact (web) servers without revealing their own
IP addresses or locations. Using Tor, requests for a website are routed
through an encrypted connection and between several Tor servers before
they reach the destination web server. The last participant in the message
forwarding chain, called the exit node, makes the connection to the web
server and requests the desired website. The website data is then passed all
the way back to the initial requester. Although Tor is designed to provide a
certain level of anonymity by concealing the user’s address, the system is
helpless against the manipulation or censorship of websites or other infor-
mation on the destination server. However, the proxy routing method has
the additional potential capability of allowing one to circumvent regional
search engine restrictions, for example. If a proxy is used to forward mes-
sages and queries, a search engine will believe the request has originated
at a location near the proxy. If the proxy is located in a region in which no
restrictions are imposed on search results, it will be able to forward those
results back to the original requester without any limitations, assuming the
proxy itself is not malicious.
Decentralization of service provisioning
The Arab uprisings were characterized by the strong use of social media
tools and familiar internet platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube, to organize demonstrations, share informational content or sim-
ply criticize the government. Social media was also used to communicate
with countries outside the Middle East and North African (MENA) region,
and to exchange information with people living in other countries in-
volved in the Arab uprisings (Howard et al. 2011). According to the Insti-
tute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), informa-
tion was disseminated more quickly over Facebook than over the Arab TV
channel Al-Jazeera (Stepanova 2011).
As a response to the revolutionary movements in North Africa, the
Egyptian government instructed mobile phone operators and internet ser-
vice providers to suspend their services. As a result, users were cut off
from most parts of the internet. Several governments had done this before;
Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi
172
for example, Nepal cut off internet access entirely in 2005, as did Myan-
mar two years later in 2007 (Richtel 2011). The cases of Nepal, Myanmar
and Egypt are rare examples that could be repeated any time, virtually
anywhere. They show clearly that governments of countries with simple
internet infrastructures are capable of stopping national internet traffic al-
most entirely. In such cases, most internet services and therefore social
media tools are not reachable as the providers’ servers are mostly located
in the United States, as is the case for Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Ya-
hoo.
Another problem arises with traditional client-server approaches: a lack
of privacy and trust. Centralized servers constitute a single point of service
provisioning, with all users acting as (passive) clients that simply use the
service. These servers represent single points of failure, making it easy to
intercept and manipulate the information they provide. The recent revela-
tions regarding the US National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance pro-
grams offer evidence that major internet services such as Facebook, Yahoo
and Twitter, all of which are based on this client-server architecture, are
well suited to being spied on. Edward Snowden revealed how the NSA us-
es its PRISM program to investigate packets traversing the internet in
2013. The essential basis for this to happen is that almost all information
about the users of these services is gathered centrally at the providers’
servers. The providers are able to censor content and opinions, read pri-
vate and confidential messages, modify or market user data, or shut off in-
ternet services in oppressive countries that want to reduce communication
on specific topics, as was the case during the Arab uprisings. Although the
majority of users remain unaware of the risks of using centralized online
social networks, and ignore the possibility of their communications being
manipulated or intercepted, for some users in the world it is crucial — or
even vital — to have the opportunity to communicate and organize with
friends in a secure, confidential and anonymous way.
Distributed social networks, on the other hand, work to alleviate the se-
curity and censorship risks posed by centralized online social networking
sites. Two significant trends have emerged in the area of distributed social
networking: private-server approaches and peer-to-peer (P2P) approaches.
Under private-server approaches, users set up private web servers and con-
nect them to create a distributed social network. With this approach, cen-
tral storage points are eliminated, and control over the data being ex-
changed remains with the users or their friends. However, the risk of data
misuse and censorship remains, as any of the participating web servers
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may be compromised or shut down. Diaspora (diasporafoundation.org) is
one prominent example of the private-server approach. This project was
initiated in 2010 by four New York University (NYU) students who want-
ed to create a Facebook-like network based on a decentralized structure in
which control over user content would remain with the users themselves.
In contrast to the centralized server architecture, peer-to-peer-based on-
line social networks, such as LibreSocial (libresocial.com), formerly
known as LifeSocial (Graffi et al. 2010), began gaining prominence a few
years ago. All participants in a peer-to-peer network essentially share
equal rights and duties. User-related information is distributed among and
hosted by all network participants in a decentralized manner, without the
need for dedicated servers. The peer-to-peer architecture therefore enables
data sharing or information dissemination even though the information is
never stored on a central server. Users are expected to be active in the net-
work only temporarily, and the functioning of the network does not rely on
the assumption of any permanently online servers. While these research
projects are quickly advancing, they have not yet yielded concrete final re-
sults.
Darknets: Anonymous communication with the help of peer-to-peer
networks
Darknets are defined by Biddle et al. (2003) as content distribution net-
works in which resources and infrastructure are provided by their users, in
a manner similar to peer-to-peer networks. Thus, content is introduced by
network participants and is exchanged directly between users who are in
contact with each other. In darknets, each node can be contacted only by a
highly restricted set of trusted individuals. Strangers are not allowed to es-
tablish contact, as this would allow them to observe communication pat-
terns and gather information that might be misused, such as what files
were queried or served. Another characteristic of darknets is that single
hosts cannot be found using regular internet tools, since they are connect-
ed to other members of the network in an arbitrary fashion without being
registered in a search engine or any other central server. The advantages of
private P2P networks, another term for darknets introduced by Rogers and
Bhatti (2007), center on the high degree of anonymity and privacy provid-
ed. While the actions of people using regular social communication appli-
cations can be observed and traced back to individuals, users in private
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peer-to-peer networks communicate only with contacts that are assumed
not to be tracing them. Security can be further enhanced through the use of
encrypted communication between nodes.
The last few years have seen a growing need for anonymous communi-
cation. Three primary kinds of anonymous peer-to-peer networks have
formed as a response. In the first category, communication paths inside the
network are hidden from potential observers. One common approach to
providing anonymity in these networks is to use multi-hop relaying. Under
this model, individual nodes simply forward chunks of data without know-
ing the identity of the originator or the destination node. When a query is
sent out, it leaves a trail that is used to send the requested data item in re-
verse, hop by hop, along the same path traveled by the initial request. In
addition, communication is encrypted in order to provide confidentiality.
The second category is made up of group-based networks, in which all
users in the network are assumed to be trusted. The network’s users only
remain anonymous to entities outside the network but not to those inside
the network. These networks can only be trusted as much as each of their
participating members. From a technical perspective, every individual
member of the group is considered to be trustworthy, and communications
are encrypted with a group key, thus preventing entities outside the net-
work from gaining insight into interactions within the network.
Finally, in the third category of friend-to-friend networks, connections
are established only with selected trusted friends, each of whom acts as
trusted proxy routers for traffic from their other friends. While in group-
based approaches, the whole group of participants is considered trustwor-
thy and the goal is to preserve users’ anonymity to potential outside at-
tackers, in friend-to-friend peer-to-peer networks, only a few friends are
trusted, while the other members in the broader network are not trusted. A
simple approach to forming a friend-to-friend network is to connect only
to trusted friends, thereby establishing an unstructured peer-to-peer net-
work.
The use of encryption to hide message content, proxies to prevent com-
munications from being traced to the senders or recipients, and decentral-
ization to create self-operated and self-organizing communication net-
works are the primary viable ways of engaging in secure and private com-
munication online. These approaches are typically less user-friendly than
the more common centralized communication tools used widely on the in-
ternet. Encryption keys have to be managed, proxies operated, and com-
plex protocols and the effects of these communications have to be con-
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trolled. However, since the technical security challenges of these solutions
have for the most part been solved, the research community’s focus is
shifting toward creating more user-friendly versions of the tools.
Influence of the Arab uprisings on the computer science field
A sharp change in thinking within the field of academic computer science
after the uprisings cannot be ascertained directly. Only selected subject ar-
eas within the academic computer science field have been affected by, or
have themselves affected, the events of the Arab uprisings. Research on
big data analysis has enabled communication patterns and topics in large
networks to be identified, thus allowing surveillance-minded authorities to
track down activists and limit the free flow of information. However, re-
search in the area of security and communication systems reacted to the
events by creating a set of solutions that will enable secure communica-
tions in the future. Although the immense communications collapse during
the revolutionary protests in the Middle East and North Africa cannot be
seen as having triggered a new era of technological thinking, the Arab up-
risings do offer an illuminating example of small changes in the way the
internet is being used today.
The Snowden affair in 2013, also known as the NSA scandal or the
PRISM affair, probably had more impact on people in Europe and the
United States than the Arab uprisings did. Following Snowden’s revela-
tions, people realized they had been systematically monitored by a foreign
agency and government. The threat of surveillance thus moved closer. The
way people regarded their privacy changed drastically. However, the tech-
nology used for communication purposes online still utilizes well-known
architecture.
One explanation for the fact that mainstream computer science trends
have not changed due to single incidents such as the Arab uprisings is that
the political revolutions did not lead to a technical revolution. No surpris-
ing new technologies or systems emerged after the uprisings in North
Africa. All the software and systems used or shut down during the Arab
uprisings had been developed long before the civil riots began. In this
case, a technical evolution seemed to precede the political revolution.
Social media and communication tools played a peculiar role during the
Arab demonstrations. Many articles since have analyzed the use of social
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter at that time, but few have
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analyzed the technology behind those systems. Without going too deeply
into detail, we can say that social media platforms are mostly based on
technologies that had already been widely used for many years before the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa took place. The most sig-
nificant change in these systems has come as access to online social media
has become easier and simpler over time. In contrast to decades past,
smartphones, tablets and computers, combined with cheap and easy-to-use
communication platforms, rule the internet today. Using the internet no
longer requires special knowledge. Anyone able to read and write can post
his or her thoughts online in a few seconds.
The protests and demonstrations during the Arab uprisings were not
driven by social-media platforms themselves, but rather by their users.
However, inexpensive and easy-to-use platforms such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, Google and YouTube are gaining increasing popularity among internet
users. Those systems are open to all, and the more they are used, the more
they become interesting to other users who want to express themselves.
In the previous chapter, we introduced techniques of engaging in secure
and anonymous internet communication that are not provided by most on-
line social networks today. We know from interviews with people in the
Middle East and North Africa that state surveillance and censorship had
begun years before the Arab uprisings started. To avoid being spied on by
the government and being arrested for distributing censored content, some
people in the region used secure communication tools that utilized some of
the methods described above.
One of our anonymous interview partners described problems with
tools such as Textsecure or Signal, which provide secure communication
on smartphones, as follows:
“I am a technologist, the problem is not with us; the problem is for the real
people. They need easy-to-use solutions. And they come at times when things
are urgent; they need solutions that work easily and out of the box. Although
Textsecure is easy to use for us, it is difficult to use for others. I have written
guides and manuals before, but there are many different challenges and situa-
tions; thus they are not always reusable” (interview by the authors).
Thus, it is evident that although technical solutions for avoiding security
risks and massive censorship do exist, most people lack the knowledge
that would allow them to use these techniques properly. Researchers are
aware of this problem, and creating user-friendly expressions of these sci-
entific solutions is becoming an increasingly important goal.
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The Arab uprisings illustrate that specific circumstances at a specific
time and place may drive the use and popularity of social media tools.
However, it is always the people using social platforms to express their
feelings, post pictures and share emotions who define the platforms — not
the other way round. The Arab uprisings may ultimately serve as an im-
portant catalyst that drives the development of free internet, free commu-
nication, and use of the tools necessary for these goals in the Middle East
and North Africa. From a scientific point of view, however, the events in
the MENA region have had comparatively little influence on academic re-
search within the computer science field. Indeed, it can be observed that
the use of technology and social media in the MENA region has been only
a small part of a bigger process that might affect computer science and the
natural sciences as a whole. An ever-increasing number of people around
the world are affected by technology and find pleasure in its use. How-
ever, most users prefer tools that are easy to use, even if they are insecure.
This ongoing change in the cost, usability and design of technical devices
might ultimately produce research focusing on the interactions between
complex technology and human beings.
Even outside the academic research sphere, there are many community-
driven projects that focus on the challenge of creating communication sys-
tems resistant to surveillance. Many of these projects share source codes
and ideas in an open fashion, with the aim of being fully transparent to all
users and developers, and thus exposing potential mistakes and security is-
sues before they become problematic. The more people inspect a project’s
source code, the more likely it is that security problems or vulnerabilities
that compromise privacy will be detected and avoided. Similarly, an open-
source project model makes it less likely that malicious code will be in-
cluded, since users can inspect the code before its execution.
In the future, computer scientists will be more aware of the implications
of their work. Therefore, computer science as an academic discipline
might become increasingly interested in understanding changes in social
media platforms and their underlying technologies. In general, all natural
science fields might diverge into different areas of new expertise that over-
lap with existing fields. The reason is that various fields are growing at
different rates, and the technology being used is becoming increasingly
complex and implications have to be considered much earlier.
Although the uprisings in North Africa have had only a small impact
within the computer-science field itself, they have helped stimulate and
extend existing research efforts, primarily in the areas of security and
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communications. The effort to facilitate secure and private communication
is a long-time area of research that is today being expanded thanks to real-
life use and demands for better technology exposed by the MENA events.
However, other technological areas have also been affected. For example,
an article written by Kelev Leeraru (2011) describes how computational
analysis could have been used to forecast the region’s revolutions. Big da-
ta and computational analysis are up-and-coming research fields, in which
the Arab uprisings could play an important role as a case study used to
teach new self-learning analysis methods and machine-learning algo-
rithms, with the aim of producing better predictions about political unrest
in the future.
Instead of changing technology itself, political unrest such as the Arab
uprisings changes the way technology is used both by civilian populations
and political agencies and governments. The Arab uprisings clearly
demonstrated that most regimes lacked and continue to lack broad knowl-
edge about the internet and its underlying technology. Governments still
have to learn about the relatively new media, and how to use the internet
for their strategic purposes. Shutting down communications within a
whole country and cutting off millions of people from the internet does
not give the impression that the Egyptian government was prepared for
such heavy use of modern communication platforms by its citizens. On the
contrary, it seems that the governments in the region shut down all com-
munication paths on the internet in an act of panic following the percep-
tion that they were quickly losing control of the situation.
The commercialization of the internet represents another immense
problem that will likely persist. As long as large parts of the internet are
maintained by organizations or companies subject to a given regime’s con-
trol, it is likely that internet service providers will continue to be forced to
block content or internet access. Current research trends such as peer-to-
peer networks or darknets are still rarely used in practice. The distributed
data structures offered by decentralized services offer privacy and efficien-
cy advantages, but suffer on the other hand from a lack of central technical
control, thus presenting challenges with regard to including new partici-
pants and maintaining technical quality levels. Similarly, the decentralized
nature of peer-to-peer networks seems to frighten many companies and in-
ternet service providers from putting effort into their further development.
In other words, most companies are not interested in maintaining systems
that cannot be controlled, since their business models demand an emphasis
on usability and practicability. However, the open-source community is
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working to address these drawbacks, in many cases without commercial
exploitation as a primary goal. Nevertheless, financing these communities’
work can be a challenge, a factor that once again returns us to the issue of
commerce.
Conclusion
The techniques and systems for combatting surveillance and censorship
that are described in this article were not developed out of an urgent ne-
cessity. Techniques and systems such as encryption, the Tor project and
LibreSocial, as well as all the attacks we have described, were developed
before the Arab uprisings began. Neither the methods used to block inter-
net access, nor the solutions used to evade such blocks evolved during the
uprisings. Rather, these events have been used within academia to high-
light the relevance of previous research work in the context of new politi-
cal events.
Complete national internet shutdowns had taken place before, in Myan-
mar in 2007 and in Nepal in 2005. Years after the events in the MENA
region, other countries continue to block and monitor specific services on
the internet. Turkish internet service providers, for example, still frequent-
ly block access to Twitter, Facebook and other social networks. On July
22, 2015, following a suicide attack in Suruc, Turkish ISPs blocked local
access to the Twitter social-networking service.
Technology most directly affects the people using it. The truth is that all
regions in the world are connected through the internet, and ideas find a
way to flow even around blocks and censorship. Ideas might carry the
spark of revolution as they help people imagine different, potentially bet-
ter realities. As former Google CEO Eric Schmidt said in an interview
with Jerome Taylor (2010): “The internet is the first thing that humanity
has built that humanity doesn’t understand, the largest experiment in anar-
chy that we have ever had.” While information flows can be blocked,
speakers punished and information falsified for a certain amount of time,
technology progresses nevertheless, and new forms of secure communica-
tion will be developed. In the end, information will flow.
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The Damage Done: The “Arab Spring”, Cultural Heritage
and Archaeologists at Risk
Ammar Abdulrahman
The spread of radical organizations such as Al-Qaida, Al-Nusra and the Is-
lamic State (Daesh) throughout the Middle East poses a clear threat to our
cultural heritage. Deemed “idolatrous” by these organizations, many cul-
tural artifacts that predate Islam have been destroyed or are targeted for
destruction. This war against cultural memory began in 2001, when the
Taliban demolished a Buddha statue in Afghanistan in a highly publicized
explosion. More recently, Daesh publicly ordered the demolition of
Raqqa’s Lion sculptures, and radicals in Iraq explicitly targeted ancient
Assyrian artifacts in the Mosul Museum, publishing a video of their de-
struction online in 2015. Subject to targeted bombings and deliberate bull-
dozing at the hands of Daesh, much of the archaeological site of Nimrud
— the location of the ancient Assyrian city of Kalhu with its palaces and
sphinx-adorned temples — were also destroyed in 2015. The world’s most
renowned ancient city, Palmyra, was the site of deliberate obliteration as
Daesh systematically destroyed its art and architecture — publicly. Having
survived centuries of shifting power dynamics, wars and religious battles,
the loss of these cultural artifacts is unprecedented.
Cultural heritage in areas of violent struggle involving radical Islamist
groups1 has been utterly abandoned to fate. The fate of these precious an-
tiquities is not limited to destruction. Indeed, many artifacts are smuggled
into the black market, where they yield high returns used to finance the
radical groups’ military campaigns. There are cases of organized crime
networks being involved in illegal archaeological digs (e.g., Mari/Tell
Hariri) or the raiding of facilities storing antiquities (e.g., Heraqla). And
many of those desperate to survive the crushing economic impact of ongo-
ing conflict have taken advantage of the lack of protection and surveil-
11
1 This was, for example, discussed at the 2016 UNESCO conference in Berlin, as




lance in broad areas along the Turkish and Iraqi borders. Most of the arti-
facts illicitly traded find their way into markets in European and other
Western countries.
This archaeological massacre is taking place in plain view of all civi-
lized societies. International organizations tasked with the protection of
cultural heritage, such as UNESCO, ICOMOS and ICOM2, have limited
their response to denunciations. Political leaders in Western countries have
provided no meaningful response. The global archaeology community
thus faces massive challenges in stopping the destruction of sites of cultur-
al heritage and their artifacts throughout the Middle East. Focusing on
Syria as a case study, I explore these challenges and what’s at stake for our
shared cultural heritage and the field of archaeology specifically here.
Syria — cultural heritage for humankind
Since the 18th century, the Middle East has attracted Western archaeolo-
gists, adventurers and missionaries alike. Thanks to the discovery of a
wealth of ancient sites, archaeologists began organizing missions to ex-
plore the area in earnest (Mithen 2006: 40 f). The geographical area cur-
rently comprising Syria quickly became a focal point of archaeological
study as archaeologists sought to identify the cradle of human civilization
and explore its relation to modern human culture. This archaelogical re-
search — which includes the excavation, identification, classification and
preservation of this heritage — has been a major contribution to hu-
mankind.
Humans have inhabited Syria for more than one million years. The ter-
ritory witnessed the earliest passage of prehistoric man, Homo erectus,
from Africa to Europe. Moreover, the Dederiyeh site in northwestern Syria
was home to an important branch of the so-called Neanderthal man, which
later developed into Homo sapiens. Around 10,000 BC, a number of small
groups settled in the Euphrates valley, where they pioneered agriculture
(Moore et al. 2000) by planting seeds, domesticating animals and building
homes.
2 Abbreviations: UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization), ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) and ICOM
(The International Council of Museums).
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By 4000 BC several major cities began to emerge in the Jazira region in
northeastern Syria, including Habuba Kabira on the Euphrates river
(Strommenger 1980) and Hamukar. As these transit and trading hubs be-
gan to accumulate wealth, their inhabitants erected large monuments
marking their power but also to serve as housing for their ever-increasing
populations. During this period, we also see the development of iconogra-
phy and the shift toward cuneiform writing as key intellectual innovations.
An urban culture emerged in the Early Bronze Age, when much of
northern Syria was under the control of the city of Ebla, until its defeat by
Sargon, the king of Akkad (Frayne 2008). Its language, Eblaite, is consid-
ered the second earliest confirmed Semitic language (after Akkadian). To-
day, the site is most famous for the Ebla tablets, an archive of
around 20,000 cuneiform tablets dating to around 2350 BC. Written in
both Sumerian and Eblaite using Sumerian cuneiform, the archive has al-
lowed for a better understanding of the Sumerian language (Matthiae
2013: 37). This is also where the oldest discovered bilingual dictionaries
have been discovered, which enabled scribes in Mesopotamia and Syria to
understand each other.
During the Middle Bronze Age, these urban centers gradually formed
the nuclei of small states, in particular Aleppo (ancient Yamahad, see Ab-
dulrahman 2009), Mumbaqat (ancient Ekalte), Jarablus (ancient Carchem-
ish) and Mishrife (ancient Qatna). Thanks to the thousands of cuneiform
script tablets that have survived to date, we have documentation of daily
life in these states, including the details of highly-developed social rela-
tions and regulations. These tablets have also given us insight into the
kingdom’s foreign and local relations, helping us, for instance, to trace
back the roots of complex relations between increasingly bureaucratic
states and pastoralist populations. As a center of trade and hegemonic
state, the city of Mari (modern day Tell Hariri) played a key role through-
out the second and third millennium BC, a fact well-documented by the
archive of thousands of tablets found there (Parrot 1953). An archive of
more than 25,000 tablets from the period have survived documenting de-
tails regarding the kingdom, its customs, and the names of people who
lived during that time. More than 3,000 of the tablets are letters document-
ing their social customs, events, and interactions. The remaining tablets
document administrative, economic and judicial matters in the city. Ac-
cording to André Parrot (1953), the discovery of these tablets in the 20th
century has prompted a complete revision of the historical record of the
11 The Damage Done
185
ancient Near East and provided more than 500 new location names,
enough to redraw the geographical map of the ancient world.
As towns and other cities serving as power centers, i.e., Alalach, Emar
(modern-day Tell Meskene), Ekalte (Mubaqat), Qatna and Ugarit emerged
across Syria in 2000 BC, intellectual life and the product of its labors
flourished. The architecture of houses and palaces was perfected and mul-
tiple-storeyed temples were decorated with paintings, sculptures and stat-
ues of humans (goddesses) and animals. Around 1400 BC we see scribes
in Ugarit advancing written communication by using letters that corre-
spond to sounds in what appears to be the invention of a Ugaritic alphabet.
Inscribed on clay tablets and cuneiform in appearance (i.e., impressed in
clay with the end of a stylus), the Ugaritic alphabet bears no relation to
Mesopotamian cuneiform symbols. While the letters show little or no for-
mal similarity, the standard letter order (preserved in the Latin alphabet as
A, B, C, D, etc.) shows strong similarities between the Phoenician and
Ugaritic alphabets, suggesting that these two systems were not wholly in-
dependent inventions. These were later transferred to Greece, providing
the role model for many other alphabets.
During 1000 BC, seafaring peoples invaded Syria and destroyed most
of the cities and empires, particularly those along the coast. New city
states, such as Sam’al (Zincirli), Tell Tayinat, Gindaros (Kunalua), and Til
Barsip (Tell Ahmar), emerged in their place (Bunnens 1997; Orthmann et
al. 2013). Expanding the reach of their administration into outlying areas,
these city states developed extensive administrative, military and econo-
mic systems. These developments brought about a resurgence in architec-
tural art in the form of palaces, city walls and monumental buildings that
were adorned with massive gates and stone sculptures.
In short, modern-day Syria has been a site of trade and cultural ex-
change since humankind began engaging in such activities. Excavation
sites throughout the country have yielded innumerable artifacts of this cul-
tural heritage. Urban centers such as Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Bosracan,
marked by a multiculturalism that has embraced a variety of religious and
ethnic backgrounds, have featured sound city planning in which diverse
inhabitants have lived in harmony — until recently.
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The threat to artifacts
As we enter 2017, much of Syria has been twisted by the destruction of
war. This devastation, inflicted by a variety of actors, has created immense
damage to the shared cultural heritage entrusted to the Syrian people. Few
would dispute the catastrophe underway regarding Syria’s archaeological
sites. Unauthorized excavations, plundering, and trafficking of stolen cul-
tural artifacts in Syria is an acute and escalating problem that threatens our
cultural heritage as the number of objects lost or destroyed grows day by
day.
As the Syrian crisis broke in 2011, the number of archaeological activi-
ties in the country dropped dramatically. Most foreign missions have since
been terminated, though the Syro-Hungarian Archaeological Mission in
the Marqab citadel has continued. National missions are confined to the
governorates not subject to imminent threat, which primarily includes
those located along the coast and in the south (Sweeda) as well as in rural
areas surrounding Damascus (e.g., Latakiya, Tartus, Homs and Hama).
Excavations and research conducted in these areas are carried out on be-
half of Syria’s Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums in Syria
(DGAM), which is charged with safeguarding and restoring all antiquities
in Syria and putting them on public display. For many years, there have
also been foreign missions in Syria from various institutes and universi-
ties; there were nearly 70 such missions operating in 2011. These missions
normally partnered with the DGAM with regard to excavation, restoration
and academic publishing.
Currently, there are only five excavation sites in the country still under-
way. Archaeological activity in the country is primarily focused on pre-
serving and restoring monuments that have been damaged in the conflict.
All of these activities are financed by the DGAM, in a few cases in collab-
oration with UNESCO. These efforts to preserve and restore monuments
have been undertaken by DGAM experts with the support of university
students. From the start of the conflict, the DGAM has pursued a non-par-
tisan policy in its attempts to shield cultural heritage sites from damage.
Although the sources of damage are diverse, looting poses the greatest
threat to the country’s cultural heritage. Looting is rampant and carried out
by actors from many sides of the conflict, though there are three key types
with specific motives:
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1. Locals who live in lawless areas. Desperate for income in the absence
of gainful employment, these individuals dig in archaeological sites
and sell looted artifacts to private speculators.
2. Members of organized crime networks. These individuals engage in il-
licit digging and smuggling for their own gain/profit.
3. Islamist extremists seeking to eradicate any trace of the “idolatrous”
past. Daesh and Al-Nusra are the key actors here, though Daesh repre-
sents the biggest threat because it controls more than 2,000 archaeolog-
ical sites in Syria (and twice as many in Iraq).
The connection between organized crime networks and religious extremist
organizations in this area must be noted, as Daesh is involved in the loot-
ing of antiquities principally to finance its military activities. There have
been occasional reports of cooperative looting agreements between Daesh
and Al-Nusra (Syrian Arab Republic — Ministry of Culture. Directorate-
General of Antiquities & Museums 2015 b and 2016 a).
After seven years of ongoing conflict in Syria, which is now the third
largest market for illegal cultural goods worldwide (United Nations 2014),
it is difficult to single out one factor behind the destruction of archeologi-
cal sites. Indeed, various factors have become intertwined and are now
fostering each other. The following examples illustrate the extent of the
damage done.
Due to its location near the Turkish border, Aleppo has served as an im-
portant frontier city for various factions in the current conflict. Having
taken refuge in historical buildings, souks and mosques, Al-Nusra fighters
have used these structures to deter Syrian armed forces from entering the
area. Al-Nusra fighters have also been accused of blowing up the minaret
of the Umayyad mosque and of stealing all the manuscripts which were
stored in this mosque (Syrian Arab Republic — Ministry of Culture. Di-
rectorate-General of Antiquities & Museums 2016 b). A devastating fire in
2012 gutted the city’s vast labyrinthine souk. Also, the exceptional Aleppo
Citadel was partially ravaged by bombings which damaged the passage-
way leading to the entrance of the citadel.
Located in southwest Syria, Bosra is the country’s second UNESCO
heritage site. As a prosperous provincial capital under the Romans, Bosra
remained administratively important throughout the Islamic era. Located
at the frontline between Al-Nusra and the Syrian army, Bosra has been
subject to repeated clashes and bombings that have destroyed or damaged
traditional houses as well as the Mabrak Al-Naqa monument and the Fa-
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timid mosque. The militias of Al-Nusra took control of the city. By early
2017, the extent of the destruction inflicted remained unclear. Many Syri-
an archaeologists are still deeply worried about the status of the city’s Ro-
man theater, considered to be the most significant theater in Syria.
Apamea, which is not under the Syrian government’s administrative
control, ranks as one of the sites most affected due to ongoing illegal dig-
ging operations in the east, northeast and west of the city. Most of the loot-
ers are interested in tombs and mosaics. Recently, with the help of several
academic institutions including the British Museum and in cooperation
with Google Earth (see Trafficking Culture. Researching the global traffic
in looted cultural objects n.d.), satellite images were taken of various sites
in the city, showing massive damage. Many artifacts have clearly been
transported out of the country. Indeed, many of the mosaics seized on
Lebanon’s black market in 2013 and 2014 have been traced back to
Apamea. The neighboring Al-Madiq Citadel, which was built during Mus-
lim rule in the 12th century, was also damaged by heavy clashes between
the Syrian army and armed groups (mostly from Al-Nusra, who en-
trenched themselves in the citadel).
Among international observers, the destruction of the ancient city of
Palmyra is the most well-known. After Daesh invaded the site, Palmyra
faced an unknown future. The damage inflicted by Daesh to Palmyra can
be termed an assault not only on the cultural heritage of Syrians, but on
human civilization more generally. The DGAM has received eyewitness
accounts of Daesh’s systematic destruction of the site’s key monuments
(Danti & Prescott 2014). In addition, the Baal-Shamin Temple, the sanctu-
ary of the Bel Temple and six tower tombs have also been demolished
(Danti et al. 2015). Witnesses also informed the DGAM that Daesh mili-
tants destroyed the Arch of Triumph on Sunday, October 4, 2015. When
reports were confirmed that Daesh had set up explosives around several
historical monuments in the city, the Directorate General of Antiquities
and Museums announced:
“We feel frustrated as we see the failure of the international community in
achieving the UN resolution #2199, issued in February 2015, stating “that
countries ensure that their nationals and those in their territories not make as-
sets or economic resources available to ISIL3 and related terrorist groups”
and “Condemning the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria, parti-
3 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS).
11 The Damage Done
189
cularly by ISIL and the Al-Nusrah Front”. Our call a few days ago to the in-
ternational community to stop ISIL’s progress towards Palmyra was ignored.
As in other conflicted areas, i.e. in Idlib and Bosra, we count on the local
community and political figures to neutralize4 the ancient city and its muse-
um, in the hope that they can stop these fanatic groups, who only believe in
killing, robbery and destruction. Our solidarity goes to the city, its citizens
and the local staff members of DGAM, who have defended their heritage du-
ring the last 4 years with all their abilities. We call all national Syrians for so-
lidarity and unity for the sake of heritage protection against these barbaric at-
tacks.” (Syrian Arab Republic — Ministry of Culture. Directorate-General of
Antiquities & Museums 2015 a)
Thanks to the devotion of DGAM staff members and the cooperation of
the related local authorities, hundreds of Palmyrean statues and museum
objects have been transferred to safe locations outside the city. Tragically,
Daesh did not hesitate to kill archaeologist Khalid Al-Asaad. The DGAM
commemorated him with these words:
“It is with great sorrow we announce the murder of our colleague, the well-
known archaeologist Khalid Al-Asaad (former Director of the Palmyra Antiq-
uities department) who was beheaded by the terrorist members of ISIS today,
Tuesday the 18th of August 2015. According to reports, his body was cruci-
fied on the Palmyrean columns (which he himself had restored) in the centre
of Palmyra, after being beheaded in the museum’s courtyard. Mr. Asaad start-
ed his career at DGAM in 1963 as a Director of Palmyra Antiquities, he was
an inspirational and dedicated professional who was committed to DGAM
even after his retirement.” (Syrian Arab Republic — Ministry of Culture. Di-
rectorate-General of Antiquities & Museums 2015 c)
Since reclaiming the territory including Palmyra in late 2016, Daesh has
called for the destruction of monuments, rendering the future of the town
and its archaeological sites unclear.
In general, the armed conflicts in the Arab world have had a devastating
impact on the field of archaeology. They have tremendously reduced or
prevented excavation activities outright on many sites. This is true not on-
ly for Syria; we can also see this in Iraq, especially in areas such as Nim-
rud, and in the Sinai in Egypt, where fighting between militants and the
Egyptian army continues. In addition, Libya has witnessed the complete
abandonment of excavations due to the unstable situation. Within Syria,
since the beginning of the crisis the field of archaeology has been heavily
disrupted.




Impact on the field of archaeology
This has mainly been due to security concerns, which resulted in the aban-
donment of the most important sites of Dora Europos and Terqa in Mari
(in the east), the sites of Ebla and Tell Afis in the Idlib region (in the
west), and the sites of Jarablus and Tell Amarna in the Aleppo district. The
archaeological missions engaged in these sites tried to direct the world’s
attention to these priceless, historically unique places in order to prevent
their damage and destruction. These efforts highlighted the unique value
of Syrian cultural heritage to the rest of the world and how important and
urgent it is to protect and safeguard this heritage.
Because radical groups have threatened and even killed archaeologists
like Khalid Al-Asaad, an increasing number of professors and archaeolog-
ical scholars have been unable to pursue their work. Many have left the
country; some have remained in Syria and are in safe areas protected from
confrontations with the militants but isolated from the main sites. The
number of enrolled students across all fields of study has fallen dramati-
cally since 2011 (by more than 75%), even though academic programs
have continued at all universities except Idlib and Deir ez-Zor. Students
have suffered from the unstable situation and their mobility is restricted
due to road checkpoints. Moreover, radical groups often consider students
to be allies of the official government.5
In this context, it is important to note that all foreign archaeological in-
stitutes in Damascus have closed, including the American Centre for Cul-
ture in Damascus, Institut Français du Proche-Orient (Ifpo), the German
Archaeological Institute in Damascus (DAI), the Danish Cultural Centre
and the Italian Cultural Institute. All of these institutes offered essential
resources for students and senior scholars. All excavation activities carried
out by or in collaboration with foreign institutions have been postponed
indefinitely.
The unstable situation has also prevented routine but urgently needed
restorations to several monuments, including Hosn Suleiman in the coastal
mountains (Deutsches Archäologisches Institut 2001) and Al-Rahba
citadel in Deir ez-Zor. Indeed, ongoing conservation work in archaeologi-
cal sites in areas of conflict has been abandoned. The museums in these
5 For a description of the students’ situation in political science in Egypt see the con-
tribution by Jan Claudius Völkel in this volume.
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unsafe areas have been emptied of their holdings, with the archaeological
artifacts transported to secure locations. In addition, burglar alarms were
installed in some museums and fortresses, and the number of guards and
patrols has been increased.
In the midst of this devastating situation, local communities have also
taken measures to guard against the destruction of their heritage. While
there are locals among the fighters and looters, archaeological authorities
have worked for decades to build an understanding of the value of the cul-
tural heritage in these communities. Often, this effort has been thwarted by
the dire conditions inflicted by the crisis. However, in a few cases we have
witnessed collaborative and individual efforts to safeguard Syria’s cultural
heritage. In 2012, local elites in Idlib, for example, demanded that all mili-
tary units (radical groups in particular) keep archaeological sites and mu-
seums out of the battle zone and refrain from using these sites as shields or
fortifications. Such intervention was successful with regard to the Ma’arra
Mosaic museum: When militants tried to take control of it, the museum’s
curator immediately asked the local community, his relatives, and friends
to encircle the museum and prevent them from entering or taking any ac-
tion that could damage the museum. Moreover, in Wadi Barada in the
countryside about 45 km northwest of Damascus — which is not under the
control of the government — locals discovered a large piece of a mosaic
dating back to the Roman period. These locals contacted the DGAM and
reached an agreement allowing DGAM experts to remove the mosaic and
store it in a warehouse. The DGAM awarded these locals with a prize for
their demonstration of civic commitment.
At the same time, archaeologists have had to expand their outreach. The
DGAM held a workshop in Damascus titled “Fighting against illicit traf-
ficking of cultural property: capacity-building and awareness-raising” in
2013. The workshop brought together ministry and government authorities
involved in the protection of Syrian cultural property to discuss the prob-
lem of antiquities smuggling with NGOs, members of the local communi-
ty, scholars, artists and authors. In 2014, more than 4,000 archaeological
artifacts were returned to the DGAM — including three busts from
Palmyra dated from 200 AD — that had been confiscated by police, cus-
toms agents and the governorates.
The scourge of looting and smuggling also means that Syrian archaeol-
ogists must solicit the assistance of international actors beyond the world
of scholarship. The DGAM is increasingly coordinating with INTERPOL
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and the World Customs Organization.6 This collaboration is carried for-
ward by sending reports and photos of what has been lost as well as what
is found in neighboring countries and believed to be of Syrian origin. This
cooperation with INTERPOL and the Lebanese Directorate General of
Antiquities has been somewhat successful in fighting the trafficking of
Syrian antiquities. For example, in 2014, 18 Syrian mosaic panels were
confiscated at the Lebanese borders and 73 Syrian artifacts smuggled into
Lebanon to be sold by antique dealers were confiscated.
Archaeologists must also act as lobbyists for their causes. On July 3,
2013, the DGAM called upon international organizations, members and
heads of foreign archaeological missions, archaeologists, and intellectuals
worldwide to act together in establishing efficient mechanisms able to de-
ter those involved in the destruction, looting and smuggling of antiquities
from continuing such activities. The DGAM has also asked UNESCO to
pressure neighboring countries to reinforce security measures, improve the
monitoring of borders and thereby fight the trafficking of archaeological
property, and to combat illegal excavation activities within their own bor-
ders.
It has become clear that concrete action is urgently needed to safeguard
our shared cultural heritage. The DGAM has tried to make this clear to its
partner institutions. The responses from international organizations such
as UNESCO, ICOM, ICOMOS and INTERPOL have been mostly posi-
tive. They have, in particular, offered guidance on strategies for preserva-
tion and restoration under the difficult circumstances. In a promising
move, the German Archaeological Institute in Berlin (DAI) has offered to
work in direct cooperation with Syrian experts and concerned specialists
at the DGAM through the Stunde Null (Zero Hour) projects. The idea be-
hind this effort has been to set up a database of all archaeological sites in
Syria that will facilitate restoration and rehabilitation work once such ac-
tivities can be resumed. In this context, UNESCO held an international
conference in July 2016, in cooperation with the DAI, on safeguarding the
cultural heritage of Syria.
6 See the contribution of Fatima Kastner in this volume on other forms of internation-
al co-operation in fighting human rights violations.
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The future of Syrian archaeology
Syrian archaeologists currently living abroad can support students of ar-
chaeology inside Syria through their academic networks and thereby help
establish the next generation of experts. In addition, networks of local and
foreign experts must be maintained. In November 2016, with the support
of the Arab–German Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities
(AGYA), a workshop on Maaloula, an archaeological site in the rural area
outside of Damascus, was held in the German city of Tübingen. This
workshop brought together archaeologists from the DGAM, a local expert
from Maaloula, and experts in restoration and cultural heritage from va-
rious European universities and institutions. During the workshop, a pro-
ductive arrangement was agreed upon to help locals in Maaloula rebuild
their homes. Furthermore, the University of Heidelberg agreed to aid the
reopening of the Aramaic institution in Maaloula in order to resume
teaching this ancient language (which is still spoken in the area).
We must also be aware of the most recent developments on the ground
and adapt our strategies accordingly. While, for example, Daesh was ex-
pelled from Palmyra by the Syrian army in 2016, the site fell back into
their hands only a few months later and the fate of Palmyra’s historical
monuments is as uncertain as ever.
A final point relates to the reconstruction of Syrian cultural heritage
once fighting has ceased. The shared cultural legacy embodied in these ar-
tifacts must be made clear to all parties affected by the current conflict if
the preservation of cultural heritage is to succeed in peacetime (Cunliffe et
al. 2016). Heritage authorities must be enabled to complete the infrastruc-
ture and to stop all kinds of criminality. After all, Syrian cultural heritage
is much more than a local issue; as a global matter, it concerns all of hu-
manity.
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Transformations and Continuities. Some general Reflections
Hans Jörg Sandkühler
Germany underwent four radical transformations in the 20th century —
after 1919 and the fall of the empire, after 1933 and the Nazis’ usurpation
of power, after the total defeat of 1945, and after 1989 and the unification
of the two German states. Born in 1940, I have experienced the resistance
of the old and the ambivalence of the new: In societal processes, there is
never the “zero hour” one dreams of that relieves one of the burdens of the
past. Transformations are prepared slowly; they become apparent without
initially being recognized as such by those involved; they break out seem-
ingly as suddenly as a natural event; yet they prove to be enduring, tena-
cious struggles between the new one hopes for and what has survived of
the old.
The German and French universities at which I have studied since 1960
have not been “new” or transformed universities; my areas of study, phi-
losophy and jurisprudence, were not “new” or transformed fields. The ha-
bitus of professors were often the habitus of authoritarian personalities
who did not dare openly to defend the old, who concealed their own histo-
ries of complicity with the old system, who remained silent regarding their
sense of guilt, and for whom recalling those times was treacherous. Pre-
cisely this is the norm in times of transformation. Was no one ever a sup-
porter of the emperor, nobody a Nazi, nobody a Stalinist... and nobody an
opportunist?
Societal normality and the stability and dynamics of convictions
Every society develops its own normality. In this normality, collective so-
cial and political options become individual convictions, and from these
convictions follow adaptation and affirmation or refusal and resistance.
“Transformation” does not only mean the transition from bad to good, but
also a partially forced, partially unimposed change in public and private
normality. So, for example, the transformation of the Weimar Republic in-
to the “Third Reich” attests to the fact that — like other transformations
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— transitions from one normality to another normality — such as that
from the socialist or communist progressive movement to the reactionary
National Socialist protest against modern capitalist society — are fluid. In
times of radical upheaval — not only in 1933, but also 1919, 1945 and
1989, and now 2011 — something manifests that is too often neglected in
the historiography of mentalities: the dynamics and the stability of convic-
tions. Convictions can survive crises, remaining stable under changed cog-
nitive and social conditions. Convictions can change in special ways dur-
ing crises, shifting their contents as if from plus to minus, but retaining
their function and operations; structurally, the habits of conviction remain
unchanged, determining theorems about reality and conduct through
propositional attitudes. A conviction defines the sphere of what can be
seen; this sphere of perception produces a common style of thought. Not
only does this field of perception limit the scope of knowledge; ignorance
also shapes the prevailing style of thought.
Philosophy of coexistence — cooperation without hegemony
My experiences with Islamic Arab countries and with Arab universities
have come since 1998, primarily in Tunisia, and to a lesser extent in Alge-
ria and Morocco. From 2000 to 2011, the UNESCO Chair for Philosophy
at the University of Tunis cooperated with the Center for the Philosophical
Foundations of the Sciences that I run at the University of Bremen along
with the German section on “Human Rights and Cultures” at the European
UNESCO Chair of Philosophy/Paris, which I founded on behalf of UN-
ESCO, in the form of an annual French-language symposium that alternat-
ed between Tunis and Bremen — a collaborative project that took place
under conditions of dictatorship in Tunisia, but which was nevertheless an
outstanding example of cooperation with Arab partners, whose critical
spirit enabled collaboration in full freedom. The main emphasis was on
problems of legal and state philosophy and ethics in a world of cultural di-
versity; problems such as political integration in a post-national era; the
rule of law; democracy and justice; and human rights and tolerance. A sec-
ond focus was on issues of communication and transculturality under con-
ditions of globalization.
In 2001, the second colloquium took place in Tunis under the heading
“The Stranger and Justice”. It was officially opened by the minister for ed-
ucation and science. For the German participants, one element of this was
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a shock: Before the minister’s speech, the police expelled the students
from the lecture hall. Following the ban on the “Ligue tunisienne des
droits de l’homme”, the Bremen delegation used this occasion to plead for
greater respect for human rights in Tunisia. This provoked objections, and
some understandable allusion to the disregard for Palestinian rights and
the humiliations of the Arab world. It again became clear how inappropri-
ately ideological today’s Western political rhetoric is when sweeping ref-
erences to the Arab world and Arab fundamentalism are made. Taking
stock of this tremendously fruitful project, in which young scholars from
Algeria were also involved, I would say cooperative initiatives of this kind
can prepare the terrain for open, prejudice-free mutual learning, unencum-
bered by hegemonic claims; yet it is also certain that transcultural, inter-
disciplinary cooperation requires perseverance.1 For the Germans, the pre-
sentations of their Arab colleagues on the traditions of Islam and Islamic
philosophy, as well as on current problems, were extremely informative.
For their own part, they were themselves able to contribute to deepening
the understanding of the significance of democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights. To me, the degree to which religion gained in importance in
these years, particularly among young women, was striking, highlighted
by the increasing prominence of the headscarf. A vehement protest rose
from among their ranks when, while giving a lecture in Tunis, I criticized
the Islamic and Arab declarations of human rights as the declarations of
authoritarian states. Without meaning to, I had wounded religious sensibil-
ities.
Hopes dashed by the state have focused on the renewal of a religion
abused and distorted under dictatorships, on the renewal of an authentic
form of Islam, on a daily religion that desires justice and peace, does not
stand in the way of cultural and political pluralism,2 and is compatible
1 The Franco–German series of books published by Triki and Sandkühler, Philoso-
pher le vivre-ensemble, became a means of ensuring continuity; see the following
volumes: Triki & Sandkühler (2002, 2003, 2004) and Poulain, Sandkühler & Triki
(2009, 2010).
2 The problem of political pluralism, which is crucial for future development in the
Arab countries, is also addressed by Florian Kohstall in this volume: “In Morocco,
party pluralism and civil society were able to provide a filter to channel social de-
mands and implement reform policies more effectively, while Mubarak’s depen-
dence on single-party rule through the National Democratic Party (NDP) limited the
regime’s reform flexibility […]. These were important findings for the uprisings
that occurred later”.
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with democracy. Verse 256 of the second sura of the Quran reads: “There
shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion”. It should not be
forgotten that, particularly in Algeria, mosques were a place of solidarity-
driven social help for the poor, and that the justice no longer to be expect-
ed from the state could be spoken of by the clergy, the imams.
This is the horizon on which it is clearly becoming apparent why the
Arab uprisings were shaped by an ordinary form of Islam rather than by
Islamism. Fathi Triki (2011: 12 f.) says this about the Tunisian revolution:
“Not only was it never led by a religious or non-religious elite — it also
did not tolerate a single word from the language of the fundamentalist
identity delusion. The revolutionary people thought of nothing more than
freedom and dignity. In this case, the variability of identity shifted the path
in the direction of a new tendency, toward a path that claims its share in
universality.”
On the other hand, the finding by Fatima Kastner in this volume is un-
ambiguous: “At this point one should also recall that neither religion in
general, nor the contested category of Sharia in particular was originally
behind the motives of the protest movements at the outbreak of the Arab
uprisings, where there was on the contrary an urgent call for universal val-
ues and human rights”.3 In this context, the question raised in this volume
by Sarhan Dhouib is very important: “To what degree do cultural identities
and the cultural pluralism often associated with them stand in opposition
to the transculturality of human rights?”.
Transformation, injustice and justice: The example of Germany
Transformations do not per se have a vector toward the good; they are not
a priori progressive. A fundamental reason for the dialectic between the
intended new and the nearly unavoidable continuity of the old lies in the
following: In the society to be transformed, no new personnel fall from the
heavens. Teachers, judges, military staffers and so on are taken from the
old totalitarian system, because it is impossible to conjure an unencum-
bered democracy from out of a test tube.
3 I am still of the opinion that the problematic of religion — mind you, of Islam as a
symbolic form, not of political Islamism — deserved more attention in this book.
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It is thus all the more important that those who have suffered and whose
dignity and rights have been violated do not give up their remembrances.
And yet the remembrance of those who have suffered can be blocked by
the perpetrators. This is exactly what happened in Germany, where there
was little public interest in pursuing the perpetrators for quite a long time,
and it was often the perpetrators themselves who were responsible for the
prosecution of the crimes. There were too many perpetrators. The majority
of German society was intertwined far too broadly with National Social-
ism to be able to effect a transformation from injustice to justice under its
own power. This lack was compensated for by the victorious Allies, par-
ticularly through the Nuremberg trials.
After terror-based systems and dictatorships, after wars and revolutions,
all societies face the moral and legal issue of how to deal with those who,
as yet unpunished, have committed crimes under conditions of state terror.
This is the context in which it becomes clear: Justice emerges from the ex-
perience of injustice (Sandkühler 2015 a, 2013). One is confronted with an
alternative: justice or legal certainty. Three alternatives are available to
solve the problem of practicing justice while guaranteeing legal certainty:
(A) prosecution through a suspension of the principle of non-retroactivity
nulla poena sine lege, as per the international criminal law developed after
1945; (B) amnesty laws, like those adopted in 1949 and 1954 in Germany
with the goal of ending denazification and integrating the Nazi perpetra-
tors into society, in large part through a questionable appeal to the princi-
ple of non-retroactivity; and (C) truth-and-reconciliation commissions
such as that in South Africa after the end of apartheid, which leave con-
fessed perpetrators unprosecuted at the expense of the victims’ need for
justice.
(A) In modern legal culture, the problem of legal certainty finds an ap-
parently clear answer: nulla poena sine lege. The guarantee function of
criminal law incorporates four normative premises: (i) the requirement of
certainty within the criminal law (nulla poena sine lege certa), (ii) the pro-
hibition of analogy (nulla poena sine lege stricta), (iii) the prohibition of
applying common law to the offender’s detriment (nulla poena sine lege
scripta), and (iv), the principle of non-retroactivity (nulla poena sine lege
praevia). The prohibition on retroactivity is considered to be a basic prin-
ciple of justice. However, this is not always the case. In the example of
West Germany’s history following the terror of National Socialism, it was
clearly necessary — and clear why this was so — to exceed the bounds of
the prohibition on retroactivity for reasons of justice. The protected legal
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interest of “no punishment without a law in place at the time of the deed”
becomes questionable if it serves to protect the perpetrator and injure the
victim once again. This example also shows how the alternative “justice or
legal certainty” overlaps with another alternative: legality or expediency.
The Nuremberg trials, which were carried out from 1945 to 1949
against the chief war criminals and other figures from the National Social-
ist era who bore responsibility for the crimes committed — such as judges,
doctors, diplomats and functionaries within the terroristic administration
— as well as other trials carried out after 1945 by the allied military courts
against those responsible for crimes in concentration camps,4 made legal
history; they revolutionized international law and international criminal
law.5 For the first time, neither national laws nor state immunity offered
absolute protection from prosecution. The fundamental judicial right of
non-retroactivity was set aside for certain crimes, especially for crimes
against humanity.
In the Nuremberg judgment, it was stated: “It was urged on behalf of
the defendants that a fundamental principle of all law — international and
domestic — is that there can be no punishment of crime without a pre-ex-
isting law. ‘Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.’ […] In the
first place, it must be to be observed that the maxim ‘nullum crimen sine
lege’ is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of jus-
tice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties
and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obvi-
4 After the main trial, 12 additional large trials against Nazi war criminals took place
in front of American military courts. A total of 185 people were charged, including
39 doctors and judges (cases I and III), 56 members of the SS and the police forces
(cases IV, VIII and IX), 42 industrialists and executives (cases V, VI and X), 26
military leaders (cases VII and XII), and 22 ministers and high-ranking government
figures (cases II and XI).
5 Constitutional and international law expert Hermann Jahrreiß declared in Nurem-
berg: “Insofar as the statute supports all of this with its provisions, it fundamentally
lays down new law, if, with the Lord British Chief Prosecutor, one measures it
against existing international law. That, which – coming from Europe – was ulti-
mately adopted across the entire world, and is called international law, is in its
essence a legal system for orderly coexistence, coordination, and sovereign asso-
ciations of autonomous entities. If we measure the provisions of the statute against
this legal system, it must be said that the provisions of the statute negate the foun-
dations of this law, that they anticipate the legal system of a world state. They are




ously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is
doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be
unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished” (Jahrreiß 2004:
244 f.).
After 1945, the goal was, as stated by the military government’s Law
No. 1, the “elimination of the core ideological components through legis-
lation in the form of open catalogs, expandable at any time” and the “con-
trol of justice-system personnel who, from practical considerations, are not
wholly replaceable, through the commitment to a new system of values”
(Stolleis 1994: 252) in order to “eliminate from German law and adminis-
tration within the occupied territory the policies and doctrines of the Na-
tional Socialist Party, and to restore to the German people the rule of jus-
tice and equality before the law” (Military Government-Germany, law No.
1 1948: 42).
Yet as long as there was little consciousness of guilt within the German
population after 1945, as long as repression reigned instead, and as long as
the democracy imported by the victorious powers was largely a democra-
cy without democrats, the political and judicial systems could feign blind-
ness with regard to the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators. Especially within
the judicial system, perpetrators remained not only undetected, but many
were assimilated into the new legal system. Even 20 years after the war’s
end, for example, 55 percent of the leading Ministry of Justice personnel
were former members of the Nazi party.
In addition to the indifference of large portions of the population, rea-
sons of Cold War expediency also contributed to hindering the new demo-
cratic beginning. In the interests of integrating the young Federal Republic
of Germany into the West, and given the plans for its rearmament, the US
High Commissioner for West Germany J.J. McCloy reduced numerous
penalties in 1951, partially at the urging of the Adenauer government;
most of those sentenced in the Nuremberg follow-up trials were released
from prison by 1955.6 In addition, the prosecution of Nazi crimes met with
fierce resistance in West Germany independently of reasons of political
expediency. For example, the Adenauer government decided in 1952 to
abrogate the article of the European Human Rights Convention that en-
6 By 2005, a total of 172,000 investigative procedures had been carried out, produc-
ing 17,000 indictments and 15,000 trials. The result was 5,000 acquittals, 2,000 dis-
continuances and only 6,600 convictions (Perels 2013: 38.).
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abled the prosecution of Nazi crimes from an international-law perspec-
tive.
As after the end of other dictatorships, the post-1945 period was an era
of exculpatory legends. People maintained: “Not the judicial system, but
rather the legislator alone forsook the banner of the law” (Schmidt 1947:
231). Perpetrators often met with more understanding than their victims:
Many of those who bore responsibility for the injustice in the political and
judicial systems were rehabilitated within the context of the judicial policy
(Stolleis 1994) that was now being carried out. This made possible the fact
that of the 69 justices of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH), 27 had be-
longed to the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). “Of
the remaining 42 federal justices [...] 11 must be categorized as Nazi judi-
ciary-system criminals” (Schumann 2008: 193). It was not by chance that
the BGH ruled in 1956: “In a time in which it was incessantly hammered
home to the population that law is what the Führer dictates, it is possible
that judges and prosecutors also succumbed to the legal thinking of the
time”. It was also no coincidence that — with the exception of a few
members of summary courts active in the last days of the Nazi regime —
no Nazi judge was given a criminal sentence. The ideology of the Nazis
had taken root in the convictions of many legal professionals.
In Germany, it was only in 1998, or 43 years after the end of National
Socialism, that an “Act to Annul the Unlawful Criminal Verdicts of the
National Socialists” was passed. The following conclusion can be drawn
from such experiences: After revolutions, the repeal of previous injustices
will take at least a generation; hopes for quick successes are illusory.
(B) The second variant of dealing with crimes is amnesty laws, as were
adopted in Germany in 1949 and 1954 with the goal of ending denazifica-
tion and integrating National Socialist perpetrators into society, in large
part through a questionable reliance on the principle of non-retroactivity.
In the three western zones, there were more than 2.5 million Germans
whose trials had been decided in civilian denazification courts by 31 De-
cember 1949, with the following rulings: 54 percent were deemed to be no
more than “followers”, 34.6% had their proceedings dismissed, 0.6% were
recognized as opponents of National Socialism, and 1.4% were deemed
primary perpetrators or incriminated persons. On 4 April 1951, with only
two abstentions, the German Bundestag passed the “Law for the Regu-
lation of the Legal Status of Persons Falling under Article 131 of the Basic
Law”. This enabled reentry into the civil service except for people catego-
rized in Group 1 (primary perpetrators) and 2 (incriminated persons).
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(C) The third variant for addressing injustice and the implementation of
“transitional justice” (see Fatima Kastner’s contribution in this volume) is
that of truth-and-reconciliation commissions. These have the problematic
goal of demanding on pragmatic political grounds that victims forgive and
reconcile with the perpetrators, for example through the Ubuntu strategy
in South Africa following the end of apartheid (Tutu 2000; Koné 2010,
2011). I regard this path as being very problematic, because it guarantees
fair treatment to the perpetrators rather than to the victims, and produces
impunity without atonement. The United Nations’ Human Rights Council,
in its Resolution 9/10 of 28 September 2009 on truth-and-reconciliation
commissions, also noted that the reconciliation processes should not pre-
clude the possibility of criminal proceedings. The Council “emphasizes
the importance of a comprehensive approach to transitional justice, incor-
porating the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures, including,
among others, individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institu-
tional reform, vetting of public employees and officials, or an appropriate-
ly conceived combination thereof, in order to, inter alia, ensure account-
ability, serve justice, provide remedies to victims, promote healing and
reconciliation, establish independent oversight of the security system and
restore confidence in the institutions of the State and promote the rule of
law in accordance with international human rights law”. It also highlights
the point “that truth-seeking processes […] can complement judicial pro-
cesses”. The Human Rights Council “stresses the need within a sustain-
able transitional justice strategy to develop national prosecutorial capaci-
ties that are based on a clear commitment to combat impunity, to take into
account the victim’s perspective and to ensure compliance with human
rights obligations concerning fair trials” (Human Rights Council 2009: 4).
And it “reaffirms the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant
obligations to prosecute those responsible for gross violations of human
rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting
crimes under international law” with a view to ending impunity (ibid: 4).
Justice, democracy and the rule of law
Criminal trials or reconciliation commissions after the “Arab Spring”? In
contemporary Arab societies, it appears there is no “political consensus
about the best way forward” (Fatima Kastner in this volume) The finding
that — as Fatima Kastner observes — “the concept of liberal democracy
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seems to have lost its brilliance, and it is no longer seen by a majority of
the population as the only solution, but is rather regarded as part of a larg-
er ‘neo-colonial’ problem” is particularly dramatic.
Tunisian constitutional scholar Ben Achour writes: “We have also un-
derstood that the legend of democracy, imported from the West, is dead. It
was nothing but a lie circulated by all heads of state and government in the
interests of the dictatorship, spread also by our Western friends in order to
convince us that democracy is the privilege of the universe’s beautiful no-
ble nations, while for us dictatorship is better, as it gives us our daily
bread. However, the country ultimately had neither a right to bread nor to
freedom. The people rejected such lessons, and the idea of democracy thus
received its honor and social dignity through the Tunisian people” (Ben
Achour 2012).
Contemporary Western democracy undercuts its opportunities; it de-
pends on conditions — equality under the law, freedom, justice and legali-
ty — that it increasingly fails to fulfill. Yet the human claim to dignity and
equality is the foundation of democracy, and democracy must and can ef-
fect the protection of dignity and equality. That this can de facto only be
achieved to a limited extent cannot mean that one should refrain from tak-
ing on this task. One insight is particularly important in this regard: The
way in which democracy guarantees dignity and equality of treatment is
rooted not in popular sovereignty, but rather in the rule of law. This rule is
founded not on the strength of the strongest, nor in the opportunities af-
forded by a “free play of forces”. The law is founded rather on a hierarchy
of dynamic principles. We develop the law in our historical realization of
ourselves as ends in ourselves. The dynamics of the principles are re-
vealed in the historical differentiation of the principle of equality under the
law as a human right: The normative concept of equality today includes
the prohibition of de facto social inequality, discrimination against women
and discrimination against foreigners, as well as the requirements of equal
treatment, equal opportunity and equal distribution; material equality; the
prohibition of arbitrariness; the prohibition of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion; and equal treatment in the legislative sphere.
If it is true “that current endeavors in the MENA region to initiate polit-
ics of transitional justice have been largely shaped by the objective of es-
tablishing classical national retributive judicial institutions rather than by
mechanisms derived from the global transitional justice model” (Fatima
Kastner in this volume), this could be due to two factors: (i) mistrust in the
local ability to engage in mediation, or (ii) the desire to punish crimes. Fa-
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tima Kastner also identifies a third plausible factor: “simply the conse-
quence of the persistence of the old regime’s institutions (army, police, ju-
diciary, etc.)”. This argues that the restrained attitude toward non-judicial
handing of the past is rooted in the fact that the “bitter hunger for justice
and a better life” is linked with the hope — as yet unfulfilled outside of
Tunisia — for a legal and constitutional democratic state.7 This is attested
to by Sarhan Dhouib’s contribution in this volume, for example: “The is-
sue of compensation, raised in the context of the discussion on transitional
justice and the work of the Tunisian Truth Commission, was rejected by
all philosophers interviewed in the project. Personal compensation was
impossible, they said; however, anchoring the value of human beings and
their fundamental rights in the still-to-be-written Tunisian constitution was
the most important political response to the injustice experienced” (see
also Dhouib, 2016).
Irrespective of which path is selected, an important problem remains to
be solved with regard to following the “call for universal values and hu-
man rights”, as noted by Fatima Kastner: While “the conventional global
model is indeed prioritizing civil and political rights over other rights“,
economic, social and cultural rights, which have not to date been viewed
under the jus cogens as belonging to the minimal set of human rights,
must be given greater consideration in the end.
However, the establishment of a rule of law that guarantees these hu-
man rights faces major problems of more than a purely political nature. It
cannot be overlooked that most Islamic Arab countries feature dense inter-
weaving of Quranic precepts, Arab common law, Roman and other legal
system elements, and elements of European law imported during the colo-
7 In his contribution to this volume, Jan Claudius Völkel observes with regard to
Egypt: “Hence, many students and professors have lost the enthusiasm for the sub-
ject initially shown during the 2011 events, and are afraid to defend their opinions
in public. Under these conditions, it will be difficult or impossible to establish a
competitive and fruitful coexistence between state officials and critical social scien-
tists – a crucial goal if Egypt were working seriously to deepen its democracy”. Fa-
tima Kastner states: “In the case of the post-“Arab Spring” societies, some former
government leaders did indeed fall and new executive powers took their place, but
overall, the hopes and dreams of most of the protesters did not came true. In fact
some turned into true nightmares as documented by the exodus of hundreds of thou-
sands of Syrians and other refugees from the MENA region to Northern Europe,
fleeing the deadly threats of civil war, systematic terrorism and inhuman life condi-
tions in their own countries”.
12 Transformations and Continuities. Some general Reflections
207
nial era. Nor can the conflict between norms — between the commitment
to the Quran on the one hand, and to the United Nations Charter on the
other — be dismissed. The majority of Islamic states have signed the UN
Charter, and are thus committed to two contradictory systems of norms:
one system that guarantees its citizens freedoms, and Sharia, which limits
these freedoms.
Ideas, norms and concepts diffused in a context of mutual exchange
In the same way that this volume takes a transcultural perspective, the
Transformation Working Group of the Arab–German Young Academy of
Sciences and Humanities (AGYA) poses the question of “how ideas,
norms and concepts are diffused in a context of mutual exchange, and how
scientific relations between Europe and the MENA region can be im-
proved”. This is an important and welcome initiative. This book, which re-
flects on transformations in scholarly disciplines, is of equally great im-
portance for the Middle East and North Africa and for Europe, as much
due to Fatima Kastner and Sarhan Dhouib’s fundamental reflections on le-
gal philosophy and philosophy as to the studies on specific consequences
of the revolutionary developments for political science, literature, commu-
nications studies, informatics and archaeology.
In his contribution to this volume, Sarhan Dhouib identifies the motive
for this initiative, the strength of which lies in large part in the fact that the
authors from different Arab and European academic cultures have an
equal chance to have their say: “The liberation from authoritarian direc-
tives and fear-driven self-censorship offers us the chance to introduce
themes into the scholarly discussion […] that reflect critically on contem-
porary society, social affairs and culture. These topics include the discus-
sion of experiences with injustice, human rights violations and the limits
of freedom of expression, for example, but also issues of transitional jus-
tice and the culture of remembrance. In post-dictatorial society, these is-
sues prove to be particularly charged inasmuch as they can become an en-
gine of social and political transformation”. What is key for Dhouib is “the
recognition of cultural diversity and a plurality of forms of knowledge
[…]. The sensitivity to differences — whether this be within a culture or
between cultures — leads to the demand that philosophers contextualize
their guiding experiences and questions more strongly, both temporally
and spatially. […] Transculturality thus does not emerge from the primacy
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of one dominant discourse over the others, but is rather the result of pa-
tient and open communication as well as constant critical engagement
with one another”. Especially under the current conditions of risky rena-
tionalization, this transcultural, transnational and transdisciplinary com-
munication is essential.
The recognition of cultural diversity (without concessions to ethnic
pluralism) and of epistemic and political pluralism is of crucial impor-
tance. “Pluralism” is the term for the attitude that it is more reasonable or
sensible to embrace a heterogeneity, multiplicity and diversity of princi-
ples regarding what exists in the world, as well as toward epistemological
and moral attitudes toward reality, than to believe in the homogeneity and
unity of a world governed by a single substance or single unique principle,
as asserted by ontological monism. From this mindset, with the recogni-
tion of de facto plurality in contrast to uniform compulsion, follows re-
spect for diversity, difference and dissidence. One has to learn to resist the
ravenous hunger for a single truth, and learn to deal with the problem of
relativism without making concessions to an “anything goes” resignation.
One then realizes that the pluralism of relations to reality in knowledge, in
emotions, in value judgments and in modes of behavior is not a failing,
but rather a form of human freedom. Freedom is not the same as chaos; it
is not license for arbitrariness. Thinking and acting from a perspective of
pluralism means presenting truths in comparison. From this emerge prin-
ciples of a transformation without hegemonic claims — for example, those
of Europe with regard to Arab societies; among these principles is what
Sarhan Dhouib calls the “dual critique”: “the critique of the dogmatic ten-
dencies in the Arab–Islamic cultural area, but also of the hegemonic struc-
tures of the ‘Western’ states”.
What is experimented with in thought, and remains a preliminary truth,
must be accepted as a risk. There is no prescribed path. There is no such
thing when dealing with truths. The contextuality of cultures of knowl-
edge, which is tied to the diversity of cultures themselves, produces mod-
est truth claims. Because of their individual particularities, cultures of
knowledge are distinct ensembles of epistemic and practical contexts of
representation. They shape the emergence and dynamics of knowledge,
and claims to validity and standards for the justification of knowledge are
articulated within their frameworks. In them are embedded a certain set of
epistemic habits, certain kinds of evidence, perspectives and world-view-
dependent presuppositions, convictions, semiotic conventions, concep-
tions regarding possible epistemic objectives, questions that are deemed
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useful or not along with their corresponding solutions, culturally specific
practices and techniques, and the values, norms and rules recognized with-
in such a context. However, there is one required path under the law —
not the law per se, but the law in whose center stands the norms of respect
for human dignity and human rights. The contextuality of cultures of
knowledge associated with cultural diversity does not justify legal relati-
vism. The legal system — insofar as it is a just legal system — sets limits
to the free play allowed to relativity by means of legality with legitimacy.
The law and democracy are based on a hierarchy of principles whose
basis is human dignity (Sandkühler 2015 b). To be sure, “human dignity”
is a legal term that — like all legal terms — is subject to interpretation due
to its abstract nature and openness; yet the fact that it is interpretable takes
nothing away from its de facto function as a cornerstone of the constitu-
tion. Beyond dignity is only injury — this is what democrats under the
rule of law think. They know they can reciprocally only demand consent
to a social and state order under a certain condition; this condition is that
the legal and state order grants certain minimal guarantees of dignity: (i)
the security of life and the freedom from existential worry are guaranteed;
(ii) gender, race, language and social origin, even if causes of de facto in-
equality, are not also grounds for normative inequality; (iii) the au-
tonomous individual can act freely in the context of the fundamental rights
to free development of the personality; equal treatment of different con-
victions, religious and political beliefs; the freedom of conscience and reli-
gion; and other basic rights; (iv) the rule of law serves as protection
against the arbitrary use of force; and (v) the fundamental rights to life and
physical integrity are respected.
If these fundamental rights are violated, resistance is legitimate. The
creeping process of the surrender of fundamental rights, observable today,
goes hand in hand with the privatization of the public spaces of democracy
and the retreat of the social state and rule of law that is driven economical-
ly by neoliberalism and politically by conservatism.
From the perspective of the right to dissent, human rights law must be
further developed, while at the same time respecting all freedom of self-
determination, a condition that is consistent with the respect for others.
From this follows the necessity of a neutral conception of the law. From
this demand for neutrality, it does not follow that the conception of the law
must be value-neutral; rather, it must correspond to the moral intuitions
and value judgments shared by the majority of the people, who can distin-
guish between right and wrong.
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A law committed to justice demands the inclusion of difference and re-
spects the freedom of alterity. Therefore, international human rights law is
taking on ever greater importance. Its positive legal norms are the mirror
of a universalizable and universalized moral system; it combines in itself
the moral intuitions that bring about the broadest possible consensus in the
contemporary world. This legal system, which is at the same time a moral
system, draws its transculturally universal grounds for validity from the
fact that it is neutral toward ideologies, world views, religions, and any
subjective or particular preferences derived from these. Spontaneous
moral solidarity cannot be expected given the human “unsociable sociabil-
ity” of which Kant speaks, or under the conditions of an unjust world or-
der. What can be realistically expected, and is at least already partially re-
alized in international law, is the juridical cosmopolitanism of human-
rights law.
A conclusion
This law can only be realized following revolutionary upheavals if the
transformation of the states into states under the rule of law succeeds.
This not only means that law and statutory order prevail, but also that so-
cieties develop on the basis of the guarantee of fundamental rights and hu-
man rights, characterized by their openness to alternatives and the mutual
recognition of people’s legitimate needs and freedoms. Even for states that
have de facto returned to a state of dictatorship, this is the only perspec-
tive.
After the injustice — as shown by the heterogeneous and perspectively
diverse developments in the Middle East and in Arab States — there is
certainly no panacea for handling the crimes committed under the dictator-
ships, which are being addressed by governments today to only a marginal
extent if at all. However, four minimal principles can be identified, with-
out which there can be no solution to the problem: (i) the prohibition on
retroactivity is a legal interest that must be protected; it should be sus-
pended only for the crimes identified in the Nuremberg principles or in the
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. (ii) The only possible
basis for dealing with injustice justly is the democratic state under the rule
of law, with its justice system bound tightly by the strictures of law and
statutory order. (iii) The normative basis for the judgment of injustice can-
not be found in private morals and private conceptions of justice; rather, it
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inheres in the positive legal norms of respect for human dignity and hu-
man rights, the jus cogens, and international criminal law as standards of
criminal prosecution. (iv) After dictatorships, an essential task for all state
institutions and civil society rests in the clarification of the legitimacy of
criminal law norms, and in the formation of a moral consciousness among
individuals that enables them to recognize guilt and distinguish between
right and wrong, between justice and injustice, and between perpetrators
and victims, and allow them to administer a just punishment on perpetra-
tors in order to prevent injuring the victims anew.
References
Ben Achour, Yadh (2012): Die Menschenrechte im Islam denken oder die zweite
Fâthia. In MenschenRechtsMagazin 17(1), 13–27.
Dhouib, Sarhan (2016): Gerechtigkeit in transkultureller Perspektive. Weilerswist: Vel-
brück Wissenschaft.
Human Rights Council (2009): A/HRC/12/L.26, Human rights and transitional justice,
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/LTD/G09/160/62/PDF/G0916
062.pdf?OpenElement
Jahrreiß, Hermann (2004): Der Nürnberger Prozeß. Das Protokoll des Prozesses gegen
die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof 14. Novem-
ber 1945 – 1. Oktober 1946 (2nd edition). Berlin: Directmedia.
Koné, Cycrille B. (2010): De la réconciliation terrestre. Essai sur la citoyenneté rehabi-
litee. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Koné, Cycrille B. (2011): Médiation et gestion des conflits. Essais sur les fins et les
moyens pacifiques de sortie de crise. Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
Military Government-Germany (1948). Supreme commander’s area of control, law
No. 1 (Abrogation of Nazi law). http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/Hist
ory-idx?type=turn&id=History.Denazi&entity=History.Denazi.p0046&isize=text&
pview=hide
Perels, Joachim (2013): Ignorieren, relativieren, verharmlosen. Wie die Justiz in der
frühen Bundesrepublik mit NS-Gewalttätern umging. Erinnerung an einen Skandal.
In DIE ZEIT, 24 January, 38.
Poulain, Jaques & Sandkühler, Hans Jörg & Triki, Fathi (2009): Les figures de l’huma-
nite. Perspectives transculturelles. Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
Poulain, Jaques & Sandkühler, Hans Jörg & Triki, Fathi (2010): Justice, Droit et Justi-
fication. Perspectives transculturelles. Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg & Triki, Fathi (2002): Die Aufgabe der Philosophie in der
transkulturellen Welt. La tâche de la philosophie dans le monde transculturel.
Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
Hans Jörg Sandkühler
212
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg & Triki, Fathi (2003): Der Fremde und die Gerechtigkeit.
L’étranger et la justice. Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg & Triki, Fathi (2004): Gewalt und Recht in transkultureller Per-
spektive. Violence et droits dans une perspective transculturelle. Frankfurt am Main
et al.: Peter Lang.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (2013): Recht und Staat nach menschlichem Maß. Einführung
in die Rechts- und Staatstheorie in menschenrechtlicher Perspektive. Weilerswist:
Velbrück Wissenschaft.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (2015 a): Nach dem Unrecht. Plädoyer für einen neuen Rechts-
positivismus. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (2015 b): Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte. Über die Ver-
letzbarkeit und den Schutz der Menschen (2. Auflage). Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.
Schmidt, Eberhardt (1947): Unabhängigkeit der Rechtspflege. In Tagung deutscher Ju-
risten, Bad Godesberg 30.9./1.10.1947. Reden und Vorträge, Hamburg, 223–251.
Schumann, Eva (2008): Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren. Rechtswissenschaft und Justiz im
‚Dritten Reich‘ und in der Nachkriegszeit. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
Stolleis, Michael (1994): Recht im Unrecht. Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte des Natio-
nalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Triki, Fathi (2011): Demokratische Ethik und Politik im Islam. Arabische Studien zur
transkulturellen Philosophie des Zusammenlebens. Aus d. Franz. übers. v. Hans
Jörg Sandkühler. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.
Tutu, Desmond (2000): No Future without Forgiveness. New York et al.: Doubleday.




3 Middle East Studies and Academic Cooperation in the Wake of the Arab
Uprisings
Florian Kohstall
The Arab uprisings represented a watershed event for Middle East studies.
They have allowed us to reflect critically not only on our own scholarly
output, but also on the relations between foreign and local scholars, and on
appropriate formats for academic cooperation. In this article, I explore
some of the new research trends that have emerged since the uprisings.
While current circumstances in the region have left the discipline in a
fragile and fragmented position, it is important to remember the vivid de-
bates of 2011 and 2012, with the aim of building on them for future coop-
erative projects. Reviewing the research literature from this period, I iden-
tify the need for more comparative analyses in the field of Middle East
studies, as well as for greater inclusion of local scholarship.
4 Political Science in Egypt: Talkin’ Bout a Revolution
Jan Claudius Völkel
This article describes the experiences of a long-term political science lec-
turer for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) who started
teaching Euro-Mediterranean Studies at Cairo University’s prestigious
Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS) in February 2013.
Though the political science field — like all social sciences — has been
subject to increasing pressure by the Egyptian authorities, particularly
since the military coup in summer 2013, the author has continued to re-
ceive considerable positive responses from students seriously interested in
analyses of the European Union, political developments in the Middle East
and North Africa, and relations between the two regions. However, the
fundamental differences in how political science is understood in Egypt
and in Europe, especially in Germany since 1945, has led to some signifi-
cant challenges: While in Egypt, political science is primarily used to edu-
cate future members of the public administration and the state institutions,
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less emphasis is placed on critical thinking and the value of developing an
independent perspective on narrated truths. In consequence, students and
colleagues who dare to criticize the government or its actions risk expos-
ing themselves to legal consequences, rather than being able to expect aca-
demic rewards for advancing the quality of Egyptian political science.
Hence, many students and professors have lost the enthusiasm for the sub-
ject they initially showed during the 2011 events, and are afraid to defend
their opinions in public. Under these conditions, it will be difficult or im-
possible to establish competitive and fruitful coexistence between state of-
ficials and critical social scientists — a crucial goal if Egypt were working
seriously to deepen its democracy.
5 Opening Up the Text: Arabic Literary Studies on the Move
Barbara Winckler and Christian Junge
The uprisings associated with the “Arab Spring” since 2010 have had a
multifaceted impact on the field of Arabic literary studies in general and in
Germany in particular. The political protests in the Arab world evolved
along with a “cultural revolution” that sees literature and art as tools of the
“new political”. In consequence, Arabic literary studies have begun revis-
iting the relationship between literature and society, thereby “opening up”
the concept of the traditional literary text. Scholars of Arabic literature are
now eager to study new text forms such as blogs, graffiti and slogans and
explore the sociopolitical conditions of texts and the sociocultural
practices of writing. However, this opening up is by no means limited to
academic research in Arabic literary studies. Indeed, practices of network-
ing, language instruction and societal commitment throughout the disci-
pline are opening up. Strengthening collaborative research efforts among
scholars based in the West and the Arab world, teaching Arabic as a mod-
ern language of communication and knowledge production, and demon-
strating societal commitment in the growing presence of Arab refugees




6 An Uprising in Teaching Arabic Language
Bilal Orfali, Rana Siblini and Maha Houssami
The Arab uprisings that began in 2010 brought change not only to Arabs,
but also to the study of their language. Traditional textbooks used to teach
Arabic as a foreign language were of little help in understanding the collo-
quial speech and slang of the angry protesters demanding the fall of vari-
ous regimes. Arabic left the elite majlis (literary salon) to dwell in the
public maydan (square). Certainly, travel to the region became more diffi-
cult and at times dangerous, although it has become increasingly important
to learn the language in the social and cultural setting where it is actually
used. Lebanon became an unlikely shelter for students who had been
studying in Egypt and Syria. New teaching methods necessitated the aban-
donment of the glamour of classical Arabic and efforts to blend Modern
Standard Arabic with its dialects, a phenomenon that has become increas-
ingly visible in the media and in literature. Students in intensive Arabic
summer programs, such as the program of the American University of
Beirut, were required to leave their traditional classrooms in order to min-
gle and communicate with native speakers, refugees and disadvantaged
groups in the streets. This shift has left its mark on the curriculum, in part
through an increase in the use of pop songs, slogans and talk shows as
classroom teaching materials.
7 Justice in Transformation:
Rethinking Theory and Practice of the Global Transitional Justice Model
Fatima Kastner
This article aims to investigate whether and to what extent the policies of
transitions initiated in post-revolution societies in the aftermath of the so-
called “Arab Spring” have affected the academic socio-legal discourse on
transitional justice. Starting with a brief history of transitional justice as a
normative concept, this contribution then presents the standard tools of
transitional justice that had been developed for transitioning societies in
order to address systematic violations of human rights perpetrated by for-
mer dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. In addition to strict retributive in-
struments like ad-hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals, further
elements of the present global transitional justice model include restora-
tive and restitutive mechanisms such as commissions of inquiry, truth and
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reconciliation commissions, lustration policies, reparations programs, and
memorials. Socio-legal debates on transitional justice usually focus exact-
ly on these standardized elements of transitional justice, weighing up the
pros and cons of various measures to address a violent past as a means of
promoting lasting peace and processes of democratization and reconcilia-
tion in post-conflict societies. Current scholarly discussions regarding the
Arab uprisings seem to follow that general line of human rights discourse.
Yet, given both the cultural particularities of the region as well as the sys-
tematic nature of economic wrongdoings committed in many pre-revolu-
tion societies, there is a strong demand to widen the present, rather liberal,
understanding of transitional justice both in the direction of local notions
of justice as well as economic accountability.
8 Philosophy in Transition — Philosophy of Transition
Sarhan Dhouib
In his dual role as actor and observer, the author of this article reflects on
specific events, projects and issues in philosophy and philosophical prac-
tice in the wake of the uprisings in North Africa from an autobiographical
perspective. In doing so, he asks whether philosophy in an authoritarian
state can be understood as a form of resistance, and seeks to define the
role that it should take in a post-dictatorial society. Can philosophy con-
tribute to societal transformation, and what institutional transformations
must it go through itself? The article advocates the renewal of philosophy
as a transcultural project.
9 Communication Studies in Transformation —
Self-Reflections on an Evolving Discipline in Times of Change
Carola Richter and Hanan Badr
In this article, we review the scientific knowledge produced in communi-
cation studies of media change and the transformation of communication
after the Arab uprisings. We critically examine the wave of techno-deter-
ministic euphoria in the mainstream communication studies literature of
the last decade, contrasting it with more cautious evaluations of media ef-
fects. Furthermore, we ask whether scholars located in the Arab world can
contribute to a reorientation of communication studies, and if so, how they
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can achieve this. We conclude by stating that the Arab uprisings were in-
deed a major catalyst for rethinking the impact of the media on political
and social change within the field of communication studies.
10 Webs of Change? The Transformation of Online Social Networks and
Communication Infrastructures from a Technological Point of View
Tobias Amft and Kalman Graffi
Online social networks and online real-time communication tools have
gained significant popularity in the last few years. During the Arab upris-
ings they emerged as one of the main tools for exchanging ideas and for
organizing activities. In this article, we review the technology and infras-
tructures of online social communication, as well as the weaknesses that
rendered it susceptible to spying, censorship and blocks. We additionally
highlight current research trends, examining how these obstacles can be
overcome. Specifically, we present networking technologies that provide
tools which enable users to make their communication resilient, secure
and impossible to track. Thus, we investigate social communication during
but also beyond the Arab uprisings from the perspective of computer sci-
ence, and combine the resulting insights with current developments in this
discipline.
11 The Damage Done: The “Arab Spring”, Cultural Heritage and
Archaeologists at Risk
Ammar Abdulrahman
The Arab uprisings have not only affected the politics of Middle Eastern
and North African countries. Instability and militant power struggles are
also endangering the preservation of the cultural heritage in these regions.
The field of archaeology faces tremendous challenges to safeguard valu-
able artifacts from historical eras, particularly in Syria, but also in Iraq,
Egypt and Libya. The author argues that the cultural heritage of this region
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